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Homophily and Strategic Behavior in Social Interactions: Evidence from a Lab Experiment

dc.contributor.authorZeenat Ansari
dc.contributor.authorFarah Said
dc.date.accessioned2019-04-24T05:31:17Z
dc.date.available2019-04-24T05:31:17Z
dc.date.issued2017-12
dc.descriptionPP.36; illen_US
dc.description.abstractSocial networks play an important role in human interaction. It is possible for social differentiation and segregation to discourage links that are desirable from an efficiency point of view, or for social matches to encourage them. This study looks at how individual behavior and the diffusion of demographic information affects social interactions. Based on a controlled lab experiment, we assess three key determinants of social interaction: (i) homophily, (ii) preference for fairness and (iii) past behavior. Of the experiment’s three treatment groups – an out-group and two variations of in-group pairings – we find that participants show less homophily toward an in-group match when they know their partner cannot influence their outcome. However, if there is a chance of the behavior being reprimanded, the opposite is true. Finally, we present strong evidence in favor of reciprocity and coordination because participants are responsive to their partner’s decision in prior interactions.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/16582
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisher© Lahore School of Economicsen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries2;17
dc.subjectHomophily and Strategic Behavioren_US
dc.subjectSocial Interactionsen_US
dc.subjectEvidence from a Lab Experimenten_US
dc.titleHomophily and Strategic Behavior in Social Interactions: Evidence from a Lab Experimenten_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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