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THE MIRROR AND THE LAMP: COLONIAL EDUCATIONAL REFORM IN 19TH CENTURY PUNJAB

Recently, education in colonial India has generated considerable and varied academic interest. Bayly's seminal work on knowledge and information gathering extended the discussion on knowledge systems in India beyond the cabinet and classroom while Viswanathan's*Masks of Conquest'* analysed the use of literature to advance imperial political and religious aims. Other scholars like Minault, Kumar, Allender, Whitehead and Seth critically engaged with female education and social reform, the political economy of education, the role of missionaries and the social and political historiography of education respectively. A critical lacuna that remains, however, is a searching look at the indigenous system of education in the subcontinent and its fate at the hands of colonialism. This paper attempts to fill the gap by evoking a description of the system using colonial sources and describes the unfortunate impact of colonialism on it. Simultaneously, the disappointment and disillusionment that met British efforts to achieve mass literacy are also charted and lessons for educational policy and reform today are then drawn from this historical episode. For a more focussed discussion, attention is restricted to the province of Punjab, at that time one of the largest provinces of British India, spanning territory from Delhi to Peshawar.

The paper is structured as follows: a brief look is taken at the larger policy debates among British policymakers at the time to give the relevant intellectual framework in which reform took place in the Punjab. The particularities in the province are then studied in closer detail using the work of G.W. Leitner, a renowned orientalist and linguist of the time, and government papers and reports. The paper concludes with some recommendations for policy reform in the region today that emanate from this engagement.

Historical Background:

During the 17th and 18th centuries, the British were not overly concerned with education in India, primarily because their efforts were concentrated on expanding and consolidating their political power (Moir and Zastoupil 1999:1). At this time, they opposed missionary activity in the region as they feared it would create unrest and antagonism in a populace they were endeavouring to subjugate.

By the beginning of the 19th century however, British power was more firmly established and the 'contempt for an inferior and conquered people' had set in (Ghosh 1993: 178.) As part of their civilizational mission, the British felt the urge to enlighten the Indians and introduce them to the wonders of Western science and learning. In a sense, colonialism became pedagogic, with the instruments of education extending beyond formal institutions to give public works, railways, the postal system, etc. an educative significance (Seth 2007:2.) Education became a hot topic in parliamentary debates with different camps lobbying for specific policies. At this time, there were three groups trying to influence education in India- the evangelicals, the liberals and the utilitarians. Evangelicals like Charles Grant regarded the Indians as a 'race of men lamentably degenerate and base' (Basu 1978:54) that had to be succoured by Christianity and western science and literature. Viewing Indian society as locked in a deadly embrace of tradition and authority, Grant criticized the 'false system of beliefs and total want of right instruction' among the Indians. It is possible that Grant purposefully exaggerated his views to rally support for the missionary cause. With the consolidation of British power in India, the British forewent their earlier opposition and in 1813, the Charter Act was promulgated which allowed missionaries to proselytize in India.[1]

The missionary zeal was later combined with a practical interest in breeding loyalty among the Indians and cultivating British social values among them (Crook 1996:12). In the 1820s, under the influence of Whig liberalism and utilitarianism, the British took upon themselves the task of 'civilizing' their colonial subjects. Perhaps the most well-known liberal is Thomas Macaulay who advocated 'enlightened and paternal despotism' for a country that was 'debased by three thousand years of despotism and priestcraft' (Ghosh 1993:183). Macaulay, who knew neither Arabic nor Sanskrit, famously asserted that 'a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia'. Utilitarians like James Mill on their part termed Indian learning as 'obscure and worthless knowledge' (Basu 1978:55). Both groups advocated the introduction of Western science and learning and the creation of an elite class that would act as the loyal servants of the British in executing the day to day affairs of government. It was further desired that the real basis of the British empire would rest on the dissemination of British civilization via English education. This standpoint came to be known as the Anglicist position and was opposed by the Orientalists who advocated the promotion of the indigenous learning of India. The Anglicist-Orientalist controversy lay at the heart of educational policy and reform in 19th century India, with decisive consequences for the policy framework pursued.

In 1835, Lord Bentinck vindicated the Anglicist position and ordered that all funds for education would be spent on English institutions alone. No stipends or funds would be given for Oriental learning, with a discontinuation of the printing of the works in Oriental languages.[2] This decision, while couched in a narrative of enlightening the Indian masses, was motivated by economic concerns with the British needing a class of English-speaking Indians who would man the lower levels of British administration in India, thereby reducing administrative costs (Bellenoit

2007:1). In 1844, Indians were allowed to compete in civil service exams and the adoption of English as language of public business and courts furthered the growth of English education in India. Contemporaneously, Urdu was promoted by the British, replacing Persian which was reminiscent of Mughal (and in the Punjab, Sikh) rule. This automatically displaced the hitherto elite *ashraf* class, whose competency in Persian rhetoric and legislation became useless, paving the way for the creation of a new elite aligned with imperial interests (Bellenoit 2007:3).

Education was also a chief instrument in the creation of a colonial subject that would be a loyal and willing consumer of British knowledge and produce. Macaulay voiced this concern thus: 'Indians should not be too ignorant or too poor to value and buy English manufactures' (Basu 1978:58). In a larger sense, the loyal subjects were needed for the calm preservation of empire, echoing the imperial policy of cultivating supportive local elites practiced elsewhere in the colonies.

These concerns translated into a series of despatches and other policy measures that lay the foundations of the new education system. Between 1854 and 1900, there was a rapid westernization of the educational system in India and a concomitant withering away of indigenous schools. As Naik and Nurullah note: 'indigenous elementary schools were either killed by ill-planned attempts at reform, or destroyed by deliberate competition, or allowed to die of sheer neglect' (1951:50). By 1900, the indigenous schools were almost completely extinct and all the institutions of higher education taught Western knowledge and science, using English as the medium of instruction. On the lower level, efforts of achieving mass education floundered and failed for multiple reasons, including low funding, bureaucratic indifference, poor quality of teaching and inspection, etc. Even for the choice few who were educated in government schools, the amount of administrative posts available were limited giving rise to the phenomenon of the educated and unemployed Indian (Basu 1978:60).

All was not bleak however. Even as attempts to achieve mass literacy failed and indigenous education perished, there was a growing class of people who prospered and profited from the regime. The new Indian elite and the ambitious commercial classes had come to embrace Western education in a bid to partake of power and benefits under colonial rule (Naik and Nurullah 1951:xviii). At the same time, social reformers arose in both the Hindu and Muslim communities and advocated the cause of education under the new conditions. Furthermore, the missionaries, many of whom were genuinely devoted to educating the Indians, succeeded in setting up and running institutions of academic merit, whose excellence would continue even in the post-colonial era.

It must be borne in mind however that the British system of education remained marginal and elitist, in its aims and presence, till the end of colonial rule in India. In principle, the Despatch of 1854 did away with the filtration approach and advocated mass education for the Indians and the Hunter commission (1882) allowed a greater role for private education. In practice, however, the British were not concerned with mass education, soon losing 'much of their interest in education for India, and tended to ignore or oppose local efforts to revive it' (Crook 1996:12). When the

British exited in 1947, the literacy rate was a paltry 16%. Even socially, the project was not too successful and Governor-General Mayo in one of his private letters wrote that English education was not 'diminishing the people's dislike to us and to our rule.' (Bhattacharya 1992:xxi)

The Case of Punjab

This larger historical narrative finds particular expression in the province of Punjab which was annexed by the British in 1849. Conquered at the cusp of colonial acquisitions in India, during what Talbot describes as a 'mature imperialism' (1988:10), the Punjab was a rich Sikh kingdom with an ethnically diverse community and a geographically varied landscape. By the time of its conquest, British interest in India had gradually transformed from the economic and extractive concerns of the East India Company to the full munificence of an imperial power wanting to stamp its civilizational imprint on the subcontinent. Upon the completion of annexation, the British were keen to give the area the best of their administrative and organizational capabilities, and a complex attempt in social and economic engineering resulted. Education, in particular, received special attention in this enterprise. Hundreds of young Oxbridge graduates sailed to India aspiring to educate the 'natives' and introduce them to the wonders of Western science and learning. Disillusionment and disappointment would meet these aims however, and by the turn of the century, the indigenous system would perish, the British scheme of mass education would fail and the only saving grace would be a few urban institutions of academic merit that catered to a new and aspiring elite. The gull between what the British professed and what they created merits second thought was it a failure or success of the real design?

The impact of colonial policy on indigenous education was particularly pernicious. G.W. Leitner[3], a renowned educationist and linguist of the period, conducted an in-depth study of the indigenous education system in the Punjab and its fate at the hands of colonial policies. Leitner was an outspoken critic of the official stance towards education at the time, finding the policies ignorant and misdirected. His statistical and anthropological mapping of the indigenous schools in his book was meant as hard evidence to convince imperial policymakers to change their outlook, especially towards indigenous education. Even as Leitner succeeded in establishing the Government College in Lahore in 1864 and a society for the dissemination of indigenous knowledge, his unpopularity in official circles grew, culminating in particular animosity with the Director of Public Instruction, Holroyd, in the 1860s. His book on the indigenous system[4] signals his growing disillusionment with government policy and begins as follows:

> *'I am about to relate-I hope without extenuation or malice- the history of the contact of a form of European with one of Asiatic civilization; how, in spite of the best of intentions, the most public-spirited officers, and a generous Government that had the benefits of the traditions of other provinces, the true education of the Punjab was crippled, checked, and is nearly destroyed; how opportunities for its healthy revival and development were either*

neglected or perverted; and how, far beyond the blame attaching to individuals, our system stands convicted of worse than official failure.'

Leitner reports that prior to annexation, Punjab was home to a progressive and self-sustaining system of education that was tailored to the community's needs. The Settlement Report of 1852 showed that a school existed for every 1965 inhabitants (adults and non-adults) and the schools were not only associated with places of worship like mosques and temples, but also dotted the Punjabi landscape in village halls, shops, open air spaces, etc. Five types of educational institutions, *madrassahs, maktabs, patshalas,* Gurmukhi schools and Mahajani schools watered the educational landscape of the province. The *maktabs* (places of writing) referred to Persian schools which were often open to all religious denominations. The *madrassahs* (places of lesson), on the other hand, were chiefly for Muslims and taught the Quran, Arabic language and literature, law, logic and the sciences in Arabic. The *patshalas* were Sanskrit schools whereas the Gurmukhi schools were mainly for Sikhs in which Gurmukhi was taught. The Mahajani schools chiefly catered to the commercial and trading classes and taught the various tachy graphic forms of Lande and Sarafi, in addition to arithmetic.

Leitner carried out an extensive survey of the indigenous schools in the Punjab in the decades following the annexation and reports that there were at least 330,000 pupils enrolled in the schools in the 1840s who could read, write and carry out basic arithmetic while thousands more were enrolled in Arabic and Sanskrit colleges attaining mastery over Oriental literature and law, logic, philosophy and medicine. The curriculum was both advanced and sophisticated: Leitner observes that 'in philosophical reasoning, there was not a single European system in which it has not been preceded by an Indian school or thinker' ([1882]1982:20). While the teachers in the colleges were often able scholars, even those at the elementary level were amply qualified in teaching a curriculum that was relevant for the children.

There were no regular fees charged and instruction was mostly given gratis- in many instances, teachers fed and clothed the pupils as well. Local rulers and chieftains actively promoted the indigenous schools, giving grants in monetary terms to the teachers as well as allotting them land. Parents of the students, on their part, gave a portion of their agricultural produce and other gifts to the teachers. The system sustained itself through an innate love of learning and esteem for the learned, and there was no direct state involvement. Rather, it was a decentralized, community-based set-up with a focus on providing education that the students would find useful in their lives. The teachers, on their part, ran the schools for ethical, rather than pecuniary considerations and all three major religious traditions in the province, Hinduism, Islam and Sikhism, urged its followers to acquire knowledge.

The chief merits of the system were that it was adapted to local needs and its vitality and popularity endured despite the often adverse political and economic conditions (Naik and Nurullah 1951:42). In spite of civil war and political upheaval, educational endowments witnessed a steady rise and the traditions of founding schools and rewarding the learned were firmly established. 'There was not a single villager who

did not take pride in devoting a portion of his produce to a respected teacher' (Leitner 1982:i) and education was looked upon as a sacred and social duty.

The system undoubtedly had its flaws e.g. outcasts and girls were not allowed to enroll in Hindu schools; but the schools run by Sikhs and Muslims were open to all. In fact, Sikhs actively aimed to destroy the monopoly of learning by Brahmins and made education a mass value, which points to the existence of progressive elements in the system that were attempting to broaden the reach and prevalence of education. Leitner (1982) includes syllabi of the various schools in his book, and though scientific instruction was not highly advanced, the curriculum encompassed literature, religious knowledge, arithmetic, philosophy and science.

The Colonial Intervention

Under the influence of the Bentinck policy of 1835, the indigenous schools lost all official patronage and grants, and the attitude of the Education Department was of neglect, born out of thinly-disguised contempt[5] for the system. The financial drain was not only thus inflicted- the British also set up an Educational Cess in the Punjab for the avowed purpose of collecting funds for the establishment of schools in the region. The funds were however used by the British for other purposes and no schools were set up, to the indignation of the people. Leitner sums up the situation thus:'Whatever their own tyrants had done, they had not come with words of progress and enlightenment to take the money out of their pocket for their education and then appropriate it to something else… In a village on the frontier a school was demanded in return for the cess, and on its refusal an outbreak took place, which had to be suppressed by the dispatch of troops' (Leitner 1882:39).

Arguably, one reason for the neglect of indigenous learning by the British were their own energetic plans for education in the Punjab. Punjab was a prized province and commanded colonial attention and interest with its rich natural resources and potential for growth. The British would set up the world's largest canal network for irrigation in the province, and their enthusiasm for social and economic construction in the newly inhabited lands would include hopes of a well-administered system of education. Unfortunately, mass education was not one of the aims, and the initial mode of using locals to aid supervision in schools was also quickly discarded. This had an unfortunate impact on school quality and attendance, recorded in the Report on Popular Education for 1860-61:

> 'If Her Majesty's Government were prepared to make education compulsory on the people of India, there would've been no need to change the system' (of appointing Indians as inspectors through which 'a vast deal of personal influence and local knowledge were brought to bear on the work') 'but, under the voluntary system of education which we are bound to pursue, our difficulty is to procure the "raw material." The district officer has to persuade people to send their children to school and the 'desire for education has yet to be created' (:2)

Civil authorities were often indifferent to educational responsibilities and secondly, the *tehsildars* (lower level administrators) were not qualified enough to inspect higher classes in schools. The report notes that a great decline in attendance was witnessed, not only from bureaucratic neglect, but also because of the famine, the levy of fees, the rules of absenteeism and the absence of influential teachers from schools while they were away for training (:3). While land revenue payments and income tax increased endowments to educational institutions declined in the period. Consequently, people were starved of economic resources and unable to make fee payments (:4). The poor quality of teaching was an additional disincentive and the report notes that the teachers 'were sadly ignorant of the subjects we wished them to teach, and incapable of teaching even what they did know in a sensible and clear manner' (:5).

The numbers of government schools and attendance in them would remain unimpressive in following years compared to the earlier numbers for indigenous schools, a fact which is documented in successive Reports on Popular Education from the period. In 1860-61, there were 37,280 pupils[6] in schools administered or aided by the government. While the number rose to 52,480 the following year, average daily attendance was 42,192. The report for 1861-62 notes that the levy of fees was a major deterrence to attendance, but also qualified that the Secretary of State for India had explicitly demanded that the fee be imposed as was the case in the rest of India (:3). A system of *Moburirs* was introduced in 1861 to aid the district officers in inspection and administration but it did not lead to any dramatic improvement.

An overriding concern for British administrators in the period was that the system be both economical and efficient. While the reports from the early 1860s begin with a discussion of schools and enrollment, those from later years start off with an account of financial expenditure and savings made. The reports also become lengthier, testament to the increased bureaucratic activity that the reforms were generating, although educational statistics worsened in the period. Financially, things were certainly improving. In 1859-60, only Rs 1,134 were collected in fees, a figure which rose to Rs 12,539 in 1863-64. In the same year, the number of pupils in government or government-aided institutions was 81,102 out of the total population of 15 million. In 1863-64, the number dropped to 76,213. The report for 1869-70 notes a decrease in both the number of government schools and scholars. Schools for females, in particular, fell from 206 in the previous year to 164 in 1869-70. The causes for the declines in numbers were identified as low salaries of teachers, scarcity of resources, illnesses, exhaustion of savings of the educational cess fund and insufficient teachers (:1). The number of scholars reduced from 100,146 in 1868-69 to 86,551 in 1869-70.

A chief factor for the poor performance of government schools was the poor curriculum and teaching. The report for 1870-71 notes that the textbooks were all inferior, 'neither the English language nor literature is taught upon any scientific or intelligent system, and the success of English education as a consequence has not been marked in the Punjab.' (:4) A frequent lament in the reports is the lack of funds available to the administrators for furthering education. Mass education was

not even an ideal however as the report for 1876-77 remarks: 'it is evident that many of the considerations that apply to countries where schools are provided and education is compulsory for all, are not applicable to the Punjab' (88.)

The British established *Zillah* schools (divided into higher, middle and lower levels) inserting an institutional straitjacket into the more fluid system that had existed earlier with an attempted standardization of curriculum and procedures. While a few institutions established by the British became quite prestigious, the vast majority of the schools were not qualitatively different from the schools that had existed earlier. In fact, in several dimensions, the government schools fared worse than the indigenous schools. The personal relationship between teacher and student, and between teacher and parent, which had existed in the indigenous system was sundered. Similarly, one of Leitner's most interesting finds is that rote-learning was prevalent in government schools rather than indigenous ones. While even the humbler indigenous schools, the *Chatsalas*, taught mental calculation and writing and lessons in morality, it was in the government schools that pupils learnt by rote, memorizing answers without any comprehension of the material. The Parliamentary Report of 1874 states that the curriculum being taught in government schools at the time was pathetic and riddled with mistakes[7] and the system of inspection encouraged cheating and deception in attendance records (Leitner 1882:41).

Leitner describes a typical visit to a government school where in the decorum and greeting the predominant wish is of personal ingratiation. 'A few you may observe more reticent or naturally respectful. They are those in whom English instruction has not yet succeeded in eradicating the sense of dignity and propriety inherent in untampered oriental human nature.' While discussing the teaching, he notes that the prevailing method of instruction caused pupils to memorize estoreic facts and to repeat sentences of whose meaning they were completely unaware, subjecting them to 'the tyranny of cram' (:4). He also quotes an instance where he had to look over fifty papers in English prose where none of the answers to the question were correct. The question was to translate the following sentence: 'In studying we should be as docile as children.' A few of the answers given were:

'children are good therefore we should study them'

'children are ignorant but we are not'

'children are clever'

'we should be as children because Jesus blessed them as they are wise' (:4).

The deficiencies of the system are also recorded in Parliamentary reports from the period: 'Our Indian system of education … cannot be said to have given culture, one of the highest marks of education' noted the Parliamentary Report of 1874. The report further observed that native elegance and refinement where it lingered was of Persian origin, and mental discipline and scholarly habits only existed among the *pandits* and *maulvis* while the British had just given a 'smattering of various branches of 'instruction' more or less offensively paraded' in their system.

The Lieutenant Governor of Punjab noted in 1873 that 'the system produced few scholars and was not successful in producing gentlemen either…If the result of sending boys of good family to school is... that they return pert, conceited, and studiously rude and familiar, it is no wonder that parents desire to educate their children at home…True learning and taste among the natives of India are still Oriental, not English.' (Parliamentary Report 1873)

The locals, on their part, preferred their children to remain uneducated than to send them to government schools that provided an education wholly irrelevant to the local context and needs of the community. Simultaneously, the indigenous system of education was dealt a deathly blow. Describing the state of Lahore in 1864, Leitner recounts how 'all that was respectable in the country was either alienated or disappointed' (Leitner 1882:iv). He mentions a village, Babe-di-ber in Sialkot with a population of 250, where everyone could read and write before annexation but 'which an alien system… tended to deprive of the kind of education which it had, because no longer equally useful, and, at the same time, has given no other education instead, thus plunging the country into barbarism (:36). A sharp decline in enrollment was witnessed and the number of indigenous schools also fell. Compared to the situation when every village had at least one school, 'at the turn of the century three out of four villages were without a primary school, and less than one fifth of the boys of school-going age were in school' (Basu 1978:59).

The biggest change instituted by the British however was not in the modalities of providing education, but in the relegation of education from being an instrument of moral and mental culture to 'a means for purely worldly ambition' (Leitner 1882:ii), in the form of low-level jobs in the British administration. The religious basis of education was undermined and the erstwhile forerunners of providing education, the *maulvis*, *pandits* and *gurus*, found no place in the government schools that were mostly manned by poorly qualified teachers on the lookout for jobs. The *fakirs*, many of whom were able scholars, were treated with suspicion and contempt because of their external appearance (Leitner 1882:41). The British system was actively embraced by the commercial and trading classes however, who saw in their education a means to obtaining employment and prestige and of shaking the yoke of the authority of the hitherto influential aristocratic and priestly classes. The aristocracy on its part shied away from a system that educated plebians and rich people together, and many schools run 'for the sake of God' died out.

Furthermore, the colonial system of education did not impart scientific or technical education of much worth and the curriculum remained heavily laden with the humanities, albeit the sources were all European and local languages were not studied (Basu 1978:60). The misplaced emphasis in terms of curriculum becomes apparent in the Lieutenant Governor's wishes for the superior *Zillah* schools, thus quoted in the Report on Popular Education, 1860-61,: 'I am… to impress upon you the importance of enabling the students to acquire a good English accent; and to suggest, as one expedient, that wherever there be a master of English birth, he be required to read out loud some portion of the daily lessons, and that the classes be

taught to repeat after him.' Another case in point is the emphasis on the Bible, as recorded in the same report:

> 'It has been laid down by the Secretary of State for India that the Bible should be lodged in every Government Library, and free access allowed to it. Hence, under the express orders of the Punjab Government, copies of the Holy Scriptures in English and the Vernacular and in Romanised Urdu, have been supplied to all school libraries. Every facility is afforded to scholars, who spontaneously desire to read the Sacred Volume, to do so out of school hours; and to Christian Teachers, whether European or Native, to assist their pupils in understanding its eternal truths.' (:12).

Basu finds that qualitatively, the indigenous schools were at par with British schools of the time. In fact while the indigenous system perished in India, the British adopted its feature of monitorial instruction in their schools in England. This system, under which a senior pupil supervised the education of a junior one to aid the efforts of the teacher, came to be known as the Madras system in England and was the 'chief method by which England achieved expansion of primary education at a very low cost between 1801 and 1845' (Naik and Nurullah 1951:50).

The change in language from Persian to Urdu was also highly significant. Persian had been taught for ages in the Punjab and by teaching pupils in Urdu and later English, the government broke off the continuity of learning that had been a feature of indigenous education. In the Punjab, public enthusiasm for learning Persian was so great that the British had to recant their earlier policy, and instead had to teach it in government schools. The promotion of Urdu eventually won out though and was linked with the influence of natives and Europeans connected with Delhi who desired its promotion (Leitner 1882:46). On a familial level, this crippled the role of parents in a child's education and upbringing and the introduction of a foreign language as the medium of instruction stunted the mental capabilities of the student. Leitner notes that 'thinking in the medium of a foreign language did not aid reflection and indeed had disastrous effects on both the intellect and character' (:51.)Mastery over English did not signify cognitive ability and Leitner notes 'the first B.A. Graduate of this year is a Maulvi who does not know a word of English and who has beaten, among 15 candidates, 13 who were English scholars, including a 'first man' of the Calcutta University' (:51.)

In 1860-61, there were 6559 indigenous schools, a number that had reduced to 4406 by 1875-76 and become insignificant by the turn of the century. As the responsibility for providing education attached more and more to an imperial Educational Department, the role of the community in educational matters receded further and further. Instead of a community sensitive to and actively responsive to its educational needs, the bureaucratic indifference of the educational department dispossessed the Indians from their collective and active participation in their educational structures. Nevertheless, the episode yields important lessons for educational reform and policy in the region today and some of these are discussed below.

Discussion

As a prelude, the successes of the new system must be appreciated. Even as the imperial system of education resulted in mass illiteracy, there were some institutions in leading provincial centres that became oases of academic excellence, and epicentres for nationalist and reformist movements in India. In particular, the missionaries succeeded in setting up several institutions, at the school and college level, that attempted to give the Indians the very best of Western education. While education never became an administrative priority for the British, and funds allocated for furthering it remained paltry, there were many committed British educators who manned the ranks of the Indian Education Service (finally set up in 1896) and their contribution cannot be lost sight of. Whitehead's book is a fascinating account of the many young men and women who devoted their lives and energies to furthering education in India (2003:17). Missionaries, on their part, were not just 'handmaids of empire' but became a significant social factor in the shaping of modern India. Bellenoit discusses how Hindus and Muslims adapted the rhetoric and practices of the missionaries, codified religious canons and organized themselves along proselytizing lines' (2007:7).

Some other battles met with early disappointment- such as the abortive attempt to increase female attendance in schools. Anxious to quell any antagonism in what was otherwise a calm and stable region of the empire, the British quickly receded from their initial aims to expand female education in the Punjab. In the Report on Popular Education for 1861-62, the Lieutenant Governor explicitly cautions against pressing for reforms in this area that may 'resuscitate all the prejudices which have been at rest' (:iii). In fact it was this misplaced appeasement that would prove detrimental to the cause of education in the long run. Even the ensuing reform movements would prove counter-productive in this vein, as Minault shows in her work. She asserts that 'reform movements involved the assertion of male authority and value judgments over those areas of women's lives that in pre-colonial society were largely autonomous' (1998:6). In fact, this is but an instance of the larger failure of the colonial educational enterprise to produce the modern, loyal subject that the British had been anxious to create.

The reality of educational reform in 19th century Punjab (and elsewhere in India) was a burgeoning, resource-constrained bureaucracy, on the sidelines of the larger imperial machinery. With the motives of economy and efficiency being the guiding principles of British administration, educational reforms were bound to be limited in scope and impact. More crucially, there was no social or economic transformation underway that would propel the masses towards modernity- there was no philosophical movement, no rapid industrialisation[8] and no overall change in social customs or family structure as happened in Europe. 'Even as theyengaged with modern institutions, engaged in modern practices, and acquired western knowledge, Indians often seemed to do so in ways that did not render them modern, and that did not accord with the core presumptions of this knowledge' (Seth 13.) In such a state, the impact of a modern bureaucracy was merely to cement existing feudal and traditional structures, albeit in

conditions where the masses became increasingly impoverished and powerless. The rise of the power of the new elites, the feudals, bureaucracy and army, would institute a power structure that would remain resilient and influential in the post-colonial context and continue the indifferent attitude towards education.

But for the policy-maker today, is the counter-factual of the flourishing indigenous system of education worth consideration? Arguably, the indigenous system had lost its relevance for a modernizing state with its attendant centralizing and bureaucratic processes. The system, with its decentralized, community-based model, was reminiscent of the loose suzerainties of the sub-continent and would prove increasingly insufficient to meet the educational needs of a modern nation-state. The possibility exists that the system could have evolved organically, instead of being choked of finances and thoughtlessly discarded but even at the time, 'few nationalists doubted that what India needed was modern, western education, and hardly any advocated a return to 'indigenous' knowledge practices, even as they urged that modern knowledge be disseminated through Indian languages rather than through the medium of English' (Seth 2007:12). However what remains a valuable lesson is the approach to learning in indigenous schools: that of understanding, critical thinking and relating to one's circumstances in a meaningful way, which is the essence of education and must not be sacrificed for a standardized curriculum or proficiency in a foreign language for better employment opportunities. Another key insight is the central role of the educationist or teacher, rather than an automated, disinterested bureaucracy in making key decisions of planning and resource allocation. The sprawling bureaucracy that came to characterise the British attempt (and lingers to this day) was criticised as early as 1861, in the Report on Popular Education as follows: 'there is constantly an outcry against the Educational Department in all parts of India on account of the mass of vexatious forms and returns it is said to demand from every school' (:12).

Additionally, a community-based set-up conjoined with a nation-wide coordination mechanism is feasible for a region that continues to be ethnically diverse. As discussed earlier, the indigenous system was far more pervasive than the colonial one and possessed elements of progress and change. This suggests that in the present scenario, a community-based system, decentralized except in a fundamental organizational sense, is a better ideal to pursue than a monolithic, administrative leviathan. At the same time, the provision of education must be recognized as a fundamental, inalienable right of every child. The extensive mushrooming of private schools in current day Pakistan, along with exams conducted by foreign examination boards, are lamentable and ultimately regressive trends, engendering inequality and furthering class divisions in society.

Leitner's advocacy of self-government in education remains a pertinent suggestion for educational reform in the sub-continent. In a globalized world, the temptations to make English the medium of instruction in schools and standardize curriculum across the country are very strong indeed. However, the importance of learning in one's mother tongue and devising a curriculum that is adapted for a community's

needs are also important considerations. A bilingual system which is attuned to communal and national needs may best serve the aims of mental and financial emancipation. This is especially relevant for Pakistan where the knowledge of English has not only become a tradable skill in the labour market but also impacts social mobility and is considered to facilitate the country's participation in the global economy. Leitner's recommendation of retaining the vernacular for basic instruction so that it aids critical thinking and generates a synergy between home and classroom learning needs to be taken on board however, and English can perhaps be taught at the higher secondary level, as another language. Western science and learning should be engrafted on an indigenous base so that education remains imbued with a local character and is confidently apprehended.

Perhaps the enduring lesson that can be derived from the indigenous system and the colonial impact on education in the nineteenth century, is a forceful argument in favour of a socially relevant system of education that not only enables a populace to revere its language, thought and literature but also treats education as an expansion of mental and creative faculties. The pressing needs of economic and social development may push towards the adoption of foreign languages and practices of instruction but the inherent value of education must not be bartered away in the process. The mercantilist view of education as an importable and later tradable commodity must give way to a system that encourages thought and critical thinking, and which does not make education the privilege of a choice few.

Notes

[1] Anglicists like Grant did not fear any political reprisal from educating Indians in Western science and philosophy. Grant was of the view that 'political liberty cannot flourish among the timid submissive people of India' and a 'vegetable diet and absence of maritime taste will check ardent designs of independence'-cited in Naik and Nurullah, '*History of Education'*, 1951:76.

[2] The effect of the Anglicists, especially Macaulay, on indigenous education cannot be underestimated. Lord Curzon noted that "Ever since the cold breath of Macaulay's rhetoric passed over the field of the Indian languages and Indian textbooks, the elementary education of the people in their own tongue has shriveled and pined."

[3] Leitner had an M A and PhD and was a professor of Arabic and Muhammadan law at King's College London before being appointed principal of Government College Lahore. He was a leading linguist of his time, with command over nearly fifty languages, and a distinguished scholar and educationist.

[4] This was first published in 1882.

[5] Leitner mentions how the indigenous system was considered vicious, obsolete and useless by the Educational Department. Furthermore, the officers did not attempt to honestly examine the prevailing system, basing their reports on falsified accounts stemming from an entrenched bias against the system.

[6] Compared to the figure of 330,000 reported by Leitner for indigenous schools in the 1840s.

[7] For example in elementary schools, the maps used showed the Sahara as running through Spain.

[8] Industrialization of the Punjab only occurred after independence in 1947. Previously, the agricultural produce, especially cotton, had been shipped to England for use in manufacturing industries there.

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HAMID KIZILBASH

THE WAY I SAW IT: STRUGGLE FOR SCHOOL EDUCATION IN PAKISTAN

Based on a talk to MPhil Environmental Science students at the Lahore School of Economics

Introduction

I have worked in the field of education for over forty years, teaching political science at *Punjab University*, organizing educational programmes catering to less advantaged schools for the Society for the Advancement of Education (SAHE) serving as the founding Director of *Ali Institute of Education* (AIE) and more recently as Senior Technical Advisor for donor funded education projects in Pakistan being implemented by the *American Institutes for Research* (AIR). I am presently no longer associated with any of the above mentioned institutions.

In these many years, I have had a chance to work with students, teachers, teacher educators and education officials in all four provinces of Pakistan as well as Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Starting with tertiary education, over time my involvement has grown with the primary and secondary level and in particular with the programmes for teacher training. This morning, I look forward to an open dialogue about education and in particular, teacher training in Pakistan.

Before we go into educational issues, I want to call your attention to The National Education Census of 2005 or the more recent version of it. Along with the EMIS work of previous years, it is now possible to get important data on education in one place. This will help you to get a quantitative perspective on education that is hard to match. All the data in the next two paragraphs below is taken from the 2005 census report and although figures have probably changed since that census was taken, it will serve my purpose to illustrate the size of our educational task in Pakistan.

To start with, our discussion today is about the 245,682 educational institutions in Pakistan, particularly the 164,579 in the public sector. We will note that 12,737 of these are non-functional. Today's dialogue is concerned with the educational lives of around 33 million students and the performance of 1.3 million teaching staff. I have no knowledge of and will not be commenting on the 12,979 *Deeni Madaris* and the 1.5 million students enrolled there. I will, however, try to include in my remarks what I have seen of the 1324 technical and professional institutions in the country, especially the 426 in the public sector that enroll about 103,179 students. We might also keep in mind that Pakistan spends Rs.132 billion on education in the public sector.

To give you a glimpse of the context in which our education system works, out of the 12.4 million (or so) children who will be entering a primary school this year, the overwhelming majority will go to the neighborhood government schools (86.2%). A growing minority will enter the various kinds of private schools (13.8%) that are mushrooming all over Pakistan. The mainstream government school track will in most cases (nearly 50%) frighten the students away from learning and education for the rest of their lives. There are still many schools with no bathrooms (40%), no drinking water (32.3%), no electricity (56.4%) and even no building (6.5%). The message that *you don't matter* gets to the mainstream child loud and clear and it is matched by the lack of interest shown by the teacher including the practice of severe punishment for those that incur his/her displeasure. At the same time, after joining service the government teacher also finds that he is in a department that provides no system of accountability or incentives to inspire him/her to change.[1] *"Ratta"* rules the government schools as well as the low cost private schools . This method of instruction kills curiosity, dulls the mind and teaches the child not to raise questions. All of the child's natural instincts for innovation and invention never get a chance to surface.

The story in the high fees private schools is quite different. Pakistani parents who can afford it are sending their children to a system of exclusive schools which has emerged in response to the demand for quality education which became less and less available at government schools as enrollment grew. These schools which have many shortcomings (such as high fees and overcrowding in the lower grades) are still producing a graduate who can compete with his/her counterparts in the rest of the world. The exclusive and public school divide has created a system of education that produces either graduates who are *aliens* in their own society and who can only survive by serving the foreign corporate world that manages globalization or the *semi-literate* who fail to meet the needs of a changing society. A variety of *non-exclusive* private schools have also emerged which fall short of the quality provided by the exclusive schools including a group that appears to be fleecing the innocent public looking for better education for their children.

Pakistani rulers have failed to create a system in which all children, rich or poor, get the same opportunity for quality education and where the emphasis is on skills and attitudes that are most needed and relevant to serve the society in which they live. If the British colonialists destroyed the *madrassa* education system that prevailed in the Punjab to create one that would serve their interests (see Leitner, *A History of Education in the Punjab*), the Pakistani rulers have managed to deprive the majority population (minus the rich) of any system of quality education whatsoever.

Let me begin by placing before you some of the widely held beliefs about education in Pakistan that I think need to be questioned.

1. *We have not made any progress in the field of education*. Given where we started, Pakistanis can take some satisfaction in the number of schools, colleges and universities that exist today and the level of enrollment. In Lahore, for example,

more children and more girls are going to school compared to any other time in its history and there are more locally trained teachers and head of institutions employed today than ever before.

2. *Pakistan does not have the expertise and quality institutions to improve its education system.* In fact, institutions like, AKU- IED, IBA, F.C. College, LUMS, your own institution LSE and so many others have all kinds of expertise available that can and is actively working to improve the quality of education. While quality maybe missing, government has now established a whole hierarchy of teacher training institutions. To take the example of Sindh, there are nearly 50 such institutions including a Provincial Institute of Teacher Education, Bureau of Curriculum and Extension Wing, 2 Colleges of Education, 25 Elementary Colleges of Education, 2 Regional Educational Extension Centers, 3 Divisional Educational Technology and Resource Centers and 12 Training Outposts (not all are functional).

3. *Educational change can happen overnight and is not very different from the command system used for training soldiers.* A study of Japan's modernization conducted by two Japanese professors suggest that educational change appears to require a thirty year cycle, so expectations of immediate gains are unrealistic. Constant tinkering with the system means that each new Education Minister starts the cycle all over again.

4. *Without English as the medium of instruction we cannot raise the quality of education.* Trying to educate a whole nation in English is not only impossible but serves as a major obstruction to attaining qualitative and quantitative goals.

5. *Buildings and physical facilities are the real key to improving the performance of students in schools.* Our political leadership continues to believe this even today.

6. *Content knowledge of a subject without pedagogical training is sufficient to teach children.* This belief has teachers using the lecture method at all levels, even in primary grades.

7. *Generalists from the highly esteemed corps of civil service of Pakistan are capable of providing adequate leadership of the education departments in districts, provinces and at the federal level.* I would submit that education has become a highly technical and complex field and is best left to the professionals who have training and experience in it.

8. *We require foreign assistance to solve our educational problems.* While learning from the experience of others is always desirable, the assumption that we cannot advance the quality of education without outside help shifts the burden of the task to others.

The Question of Resources

Having worked in situations of resource constraint as well as resource plenty, I would like to suggest that improvement in the education sector is not being held back by just a lack of resources. In fact, many well funded donor programmes have failed to achieve what some locally supported initiatives have managed to do. One

aspect of this is the terrible waste of resources in donor projects, where staff with many exceptions, tend to have unrealistic and very high expectations in terms of salaries and per diem, availability of vehicles, office equipment and a priority on reporting rather than focusing on sustainable change.

The limited achievements in donor programmes in spite of abundant resources suggest two things. First, resources tend to create false expectations about what can be achieved and in what period of time. Second, since the resources are not available before and after the donor project ends, the real beneficiaries see it as a temporary situation with little connection to their continuing reality. Only changes in the resource situation that are permanent and long lasting can have a meaningful impact on the Behaviour of local stakeholders.

In recent times, the Pakistan Education ministers have argued for donors to provide support to programmes being pursued by the Pakistan government instead of coming with their own priorities and agendas. This is the right move but the flip side of this is that, when resources are to be used for existing programmes, the Education ministry needs to have their own act together. The biggest crisis facing resource inputs for education in Pakistan is that departments and ministries do not have a clear and visible programme, preferably at some successful stage of field implementation, which others can find attractive to support. Each Minister comes in to announce a new policy and departments lack basic information and data to show what has been and can be achieved if a specific amount of funding is made available.

International commitments made by GOP to achieve education goals have not only not been met but little serious analysis is available to suggest that we know what are the obstacles and can develop realistic strategies to overcome them. Sadly, international agencies are even less serious and realistic in demanding that certain goals be achieved by certain dates.

Finally, as far as resources are concerned, the education of Pakistani children is a national responsibility, resources for which should never have to be borrowed from others and education must take its place alongside defense and economic development as a priority that gets its proper share of resources in each annual budget. I may be in a minority but I believe that Pakistan has the resources, specially the person power, to provide quality education to its children.

Student performance and quality do not always follow resources; you will be surprised to know that in the internationally recognized most recent OECD results of the 2009 PISA (Programme for International Standards Assessment) tests of 15 year old students in Science, Reading and Mathematics in 65 countries, students of the United States, United Kingdom and Canada do not appear anywhere in the top five. A news item in the *New York Times* admitted that experts could find nothing in the PISA methodology to question the results of the study.

Science	Reading	Math
China-575	China-556	China-600
Finland-554	Korea-539	Singapore-562
Singapore-542	Finland-536	Hong Kong-555
United States- 502 (23rd)	United States-500 (17th)	United States-487 (32nd)

The Question of the Curriculum

As students of environmental issues, you are all interested in the curriculum and as one of you remarked there is a need to improve the curriculum so that our school and college graduates can understand and play a constructive role in dealing with the issues that face Pakistan and the world. While no one can disagree with this, it might be reassuring for you to learn that the 2006 National Curriculum announced by the Ministry of Education is a very progressive and up to date document by world standards.

The problem does not lie with the curriculum but with all that must follow once a national curriculum has been designed. Implementing a quality curriculum requires developing standards based on it; pacing guides to remind the teacher on what has to be covered in what period of time, lesson plans that provide details of how particular topics can be taught and so on.

Basically, the primary or secondary teacher cannot be expected to take the lengthy and complex curriculum document and interpret it for classroom use. In the absence of a well developed programme to help him/her identify the activities and resources required to put the new curriculum into practice, there is every possibility that nothing will change in the classroom in spite of the brilliant document produced by the Ministry of Education.

So that students can achieve the competencies required of them by the end of a particular grade, along with other inputs like quality textbooks, teachers may also need training to tackle new and unfamiliar topics. These trainings must be completed before school heads and teachers are called upon to implement the new curriculum. In short, changing a curriculum to meet the needs of a changing world requires more than a nice new document, copies of which often never reach the average teacher.

In Pakistan, like many other countries, the classroom teacher is often not invited to take part at any stage of curriculum development. The teacher practitioner, who can help to explain the topics and sequence of what students maybe able to learn in a particular grade and highlight other practical issues, is mostly left out of the consultation. The repeated failed attempts to make English the medium of instruction in government schools is an excellent example of the consequences of this lack of consultation.

A senior educator, who was largely responsible for ensuring the timely completion and quality of the 2006 curriculum document, admitted frankly that there was little chance that it would be implemented in the near future.

The Importance of Teacher Training

Pakistan has programmes of pre-service and in-service teacher training like most countries. The difference lies in the quality of the programmes offered and the overall neglect of the field of teacher education. In both cases, we have failed to recognize the importance and technical nature of this activity.

While government schools have required a teacher training certificate (BEd, PTC, CT etc.), private schools and semi-private schools (like the Divisional Public schools) have often hired teachers based entirely on possession of a Master's degree or the ability to speak English. The length and quality of teacher training has remained a secondary consideration.

In recent times, more and more societies have recognized the importance of training teachers for a substantially longer period of time before they can be allowed to enter the classroom and almost all have certification requirements independent of the degree earned. As a result of this realization, nearly all quality teacher training programmes now emphasize substantial school based experience for faculty and student teachers.

In 1993, while making preparations for setting up the *Ali Institute of Education* (AIE), I asked Professor Harry Judge, former Director of the Oxford University Department of Educational Studies for advice on what mattered most. His advice was brief and quite simple, do not hire faculty who have not had experience in the classroom working with children. This was later reinforced as I observed teacher training at Teachers College, Columbia University and Bank Street College of Education in New York. The late Professor Kazim Bacchus, the first Director of the Aga Khan University Institute of Educational Development (IED), designed trainings for in-service teachers that involved spending the entire morning at schools. He also helped me to understand how important a period of *unlearning* was for in-service teachers before they could absorb new concepts and practices. The importance of practice teaching (also known as practicum) as a central part of teacher training cannot be overemphasized.

In Pakistan, the practicum has remained the weakest link in the training of teachers. A few model lesson presentations in front of the peer group have been considered sufficient to prepare the student teacher for his/her role in the classroom. The three to six month attachment to a senior teacher at a school has been the exception. After the setting up of institutions like AIE and IED, this situation has begun to change. More teacher training institutions are recognizing the importance of close involvement with schools. Like the medical profession, new teachers need to work with a senior professional for a considerable period of time in order to be ready to work on their own. Book learning and theory is important but not sufficient for teachers to be effective practitioners of the art and science of teaching.

Teacher training also needs to create a nucleus of professionals who value meeting and sharing classroom experiences with each other. Call it a professional conference or what you like, but opportunities for continued learning are very important in the field of teacher education. Isolated teachers, delivering the same lesson year after year is a sign that the teacher has stopped learning and this reflects on what s/he does in the classroom. Most Pakistani government teachers, especially at the primary and secondary level, don't have the opportunity to meet professionally and learn from each other. Department of education sponsored workshops are very useful but do not fulfill the same purpose.

During 2003-2007, I worked on a donor funded project that was asked to train 34,000 primary teachers in 12 districts of Sind and Balochistan. We saw how quickly teachers respond to opportunities to interact with each other. Teacher members of Professional District Forums started in the second year of the project and managed by local teachers, educationists and DOE staff were transformed in the course of two years from reluctant participants willing to attend only if per diem and location was attractive to fully engaged activists willing to pay their own way and travel to a rural village school for the National get together. The first two provincial forums in 2004 were held in Karachi and Quetta at five star hotels while the Inter-provincial Forum in 2006 was held in village Setharja (district Sukkur) at a middle school and participants asked for no support to come from all over Sind and Baluchistan.

Working for Change in Education

Based on my experience**,** starting with SAHE *Mohalla Primary School Improvement Programme* in 1982 and ending with a $90 million dollar donor driven Educational Linkages project in 2010, I regret having to admit that change in education is difficult to introduce and even more difficult to sustain. As students interested in promoting environmental awareness and related Behaviour change in Pakistan, you might find some of these experiences of interest.

In three Mohallas of Lahore and a village in district Kasur, a SAHE team found that primary schools were poorly maintained and teacher motivation was very low. After the team had helped carry out the school building repairs that teachers desired, they were able to introduce child-centered activities to the school that created a lot of response from the children but very little from the teachers and DOE staff. In the absence of instructions from the education officials, discussions of change did not lead to any action. We heard teachers putting down poor children for having uneducated parents and saw the damage drug addicts did to the school building before they were driven out.

The first private teacher training programme at the Ali Institute showed us what can be achieved with a devoted faculty and in a climate of better resources and positive encouragement. But we also learned that institution building requires lot of time and the low priority attached to teacher education as a discipline hurts all initiatives.

Implementing a 5 year donor project in education with plentiful resources puts you in a world of make believe, everybody wants a part of the pie and it seems that no one cares what happens once the project is completed and the final report is approved by the donor. Despite best intentions, donor projects are more about the politics and privilege of having funds to spend than the needs of the children. Donor nations continue to tolerate the vested interests and waste that has grown up around their funding.

It is common knowledge that instead of adapting their assistance programmes to the local context, donors have designed elaborate application procedures which the great majority of local NGO's cannot satisfy. So the very people donors claim to want to serve are excluded from competing for these resources.

Concluding Remarks

I hope that you will treat my remarks this morning as opinions of one individual and nothing more. Please feel free to disagree with and question the positions I have taken. We covered a lot of issues briefly and each of them could have been the topic of a separate session. I hope you will keep this discussion going.

This has been a very instructive and enjoyable morning and we have gone on much beyond the time that was planned for this session. I want to thank all of you for your interest and participation in the discussion. I look to your generation to bring about the changes that the education system needs to grow and develop in the right direction. It seems to me that the founding of LSE is a sure sign that educational change is on the way in Pakistan. I wish the MPhil Programme in Environmental Science all success in its objectives.

I list below the two publications that came up during our discussion:

National Education Census 2005, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education, Academy of Educational Planning and Management, Statistics Division Federal Bureau of Statistics, Islamabad, 2006.

Education and Japan's Modernization by Makoto Aso and Ikuo Amano, the Japan Times Ltd., 1983.

Notes

[1] For some new developments with respect to teachers you may want to see, *National Standards for Accreditation of Teacher Education Programmes,* National Accreditation Council for Teacher Education, 2009.

RANA EJAZ ALI KHAN
TASNIM KHAN

WOMEN IN URBAN INFORMAL SECTOR: LABOUR PROTECTION POLICY CONCERNS

Abstract:

This paper looks at the conditions of the informal sector working women of Bahawalpur city in southern Punjab in the perspective of Labour Protection Policy of the Government of Pakistan. It is thus as much a study of the working conditions of informal labour as of the rule of law. We have quoted the relevant law and conventions signed and made into law by the Government of Pakistan and we have documented the condition of the informal sector working women. Labour legislation for the informal sector is completely divorced from its implementation.

Introduction

The effective labour protection policy bestows economic benefits on enterprises, workers and the nation as a whole through increase in labour productivity. Extending labour protection to Pakistan's large and diverse informal economy has remained a major challenge. The informal economy supports millions of people across a large geographic area, undertaking a wide variety of low-paid and low-productivity jobs under working conditions that are frequently harsh, unhealthy and hazardous. Workers in the informal economy experience various difficulties and deficits including poor quality jobs with low productivity and low pay, and limited or no protection in relation to working conditions including hours of work, sick leave, overtime wages, and the working environment including lack of safety, exposure to hazards, and unhealthy workplaces. Informal women labour also lacks protection including old age pensions, health insurance, job security provisions, unemployment benefits, work injuries and illness. Finally there are no representative organizations and no voice on work related matters.

Pakistan's commitment to labour protection is enshrined in the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Article 38 makes specific reference to the social and economic well-being of the people in terms that clearly indicate the State's positive intentions concerning labour protection and social justice. "The State shall (a) secure the well-being of the people, irrespective of sex, caste, creed or race, by raising their standard of living, by preventing the concentration of wealth and means of production and distribution in the hands of a few to the detriment of general interest and by ensuring equitable adjustment of rights between employers and employees, and landlords and tenants, (b) provide for all citizens, within the available resources of

the country, facilities for work and adequate livelihood with reasonable rest and leisure, (c) provide for all persons employed in the service of Pakistan or otherwise, social security by compulsory social insurance or other means."

The Labour Protection Policies 2002, 2005 and 2006 cover five main areas of labour protection:

1. Basic rights such as the right to join a trade union and bargain collectively, equal treatment and non-discrimination, the absence of forced labour, and the absence of child labour.

2. Working conditions including minimum wages and above minimum wage issues, allowances and benefits, hours of work, overtime work, rest breaks and leave arrangements, including annual leave, sick leave and special leave issues, and job security provisions. These are the items that typically form the basis of the employment contract that creates both rights and obligations for workers as well as for employers.

3. The working environment including protection against the effects of hazards in the work place involving issues of work safety as well as protection from work-related diseases and illness.

4. Social security including protection against the effects of economic and social hardship resulting from a reduction in earnings due to work accidents, work illness, unemployment, or retirement.

5. The living environment including improved housing, protection against adverse living conditions with regard to health and hygiene, diet, sanitation, water supplies and other matters affecting workers in their non-working life, but which clearly impact on their capacity and productivity at work.

Labour Protection Policy 2006 assists the informal sector workers through the labour extension services, particularly concerning improved safety and health at work, and for some aspects of social protection. Such interventions concentrate on education, information and advice, as compared with the application and enforcement of laws typically found under traditional approaches to labour inspection. Minimum wage, however, is one area where assistance to informal economy workers is supported by legislation. The minimum wage, whether at hourly, daily, weekly or monthly rates, applies progressively to all sectors and situations in which paid work is done under employer-employee arrangements

Previous Studies

The informal sector absorbs 52 per cent of female labour force participation. Earlier studies have analyzed many aspects of working women but implementation of labour protection policy is largely ignored. Azid, et al. (2001) have found a high

degree of female participation in cottage industry of Multan. The study proposed that women's work pattern in cottage industry needs identification for public policy programmes that may improve the well-being of these women. Mirza (2002) reported that lower-middle class women in urban areas, who are commonly not qualified enough are confined as home-based workers in the informal sector. They are usually not gainfully employed, lack social security benefits and are living in bad conditions. The home-based women workers are also analyzed by Mehrotra and Biggeri (2002) for five Asian countries, two low-income (India, and Pakistan) and three middle-income countries (Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines), where home-based work is widespread. The home-based workers face poor conditions of work, low wages and have poor health. Child labour also exists in households. Most of the home-based workers in South Asia live below poverty line. They work long hours, at low piece rates, with delays in payment in many cases. The exploitation is essentially due to the fact that the workers are isolated, and even though they live and work in a cluster but there is no organization and there is little collective action.

In southern Punjab women labour force participation is 50 per cent more than in central Punjab (Sathar and Kazi 2000). The poverty is also more prevalent in this region. Bahawalpur district stands as representative of southern Punjab in economic as well as cultural and social aspects. It has old traditions and customs alongwith deprivation. The deprivation index in terms of education, health, housing quality, housing services and employment has been calculated at 64.14 by Jamal et al. in 2003.

Definitions and Methodology

We will attempt to look into informal sector working women of this region in the perspective of Labour Protection Policy of Pakistan. Towards this end a survey was carried out to construct a socio-economic profile of women, typology of their work and estimate their contribution to household income in the Bahawalpur city. Availability of protection under specific components of Labour Protection Policy 2002 and 2006 was also investigated.

The concept of working women in informal sector is difficult to define as the women in this sector have multiple jobs, hidden economic activities, seasonal employment opportunities, flexible working hours, along with domestic responsibilities of child-bearing and household-management. We have defined economic activity as employment for wages, self-employment, home-based work, piece work[1], own-account work[2], and work in household business/enterprise/farm, any micro-enterprise which results income of woman in the form of cash or kind. The women who remained employed at least for one month during the reference period (on the date of the interview) have been taken as employed. The women employed on regular basis who have not worked for any reason at the time of interview have also been taken as employed.

Definitions of informal sector vary across countries depending upon the political, economic, cultural and social differences. These definitions can be classified into three categories:

a) The enterprise approach defines informal sector according to the size of the enterprise. It includes enterprises below a certain size of employment (most often 10 persons). It is the definition from operational point of view.

b) The employment status approach includes the labour force comprised of self-employed, own-account workers, wage-workers, unpaid family-workers and piece-rate workers.

c) Labour status approach is based on the assumption that labour protection laws do not cover the informal sector labour activities like self-employment, unpaid family helpers, household enterprises, etc.

Federal Bureau of Statistics (Pakistan) has adopted the definition of informal sector, given by the 15th International Conference of Labour Statisticians (FBS 2003). It has defined informal sector as:

> *All household enterprises operated by own-account workers irrespective of the size of the enterprise subject to the condition that such informality is not for the purpose of tax evasion. And that all household enterprises engaged in agricultural or in non-market production are excluded.*

We have adopted the definition of informal sector given by FBS except with the modification that all agricultural activities in which women are paid in kind or cash have also been included. The data has been collected through personal contact with female workers. The observations were taken from six clusters from urban areas of Bahawalpur city. From these clusters 945 households were surveyed which had at least one informal sector working woman. Data on age, educational status, headship of household, household size, marital status, number of children, adult members of the household and their activity, occupation of women, monthly income, working hours, mode of employment (self-employment, employee, contract work, piece-rate work), basic rights (trade unions, equal treatment and non-discrimination, absence of forced labour, absence of child labour), working condition (minimum wage, allowance and benefits, over-time work, sick leave, job security provisions), working environment work safety, social security (reduction in earning due to work accident, unemployment or retirement), social security schemes, (old-age benefits schemes), nutrition, disease prevention, health and hygiene, and education, information and advice was collected from each household. It also included the health status (whether the woman was suffering from common diseases like cough/cold/fever/, weak eyesight, back pain and pain in joints or not), access to health facility (whether the woman was treated by government hospital, private doctor, hakeem, homeopath and *peer* [a spiritual guide] or no treatment), household income and housing condition[3].

Results and Discussion

Table 1 and 2a to 2d summarize the results of the survey. These have been discussed under different sections below.

Socio-economic Profile of Working Women

The socio-economic profile of the working women in informal sector is found to be very dismal (see Table-1).

Table-1: Socio Economic Profile of Women in Informal Sector

Socio-economic profile	Average/Percentage
Mean monthly income of respondent	Rs.2150
Women having monthly less than Rs. 4000	79 per cent
Women having at least 5 living children	69 per cent
Women working more than 8 hours daily	43 per cent
Women receiving overtime wages	NIL
Self-employed women	45 per cent
Employees	44 per cent
Contract workers	30 per cent
Piece-rate workers	33 per cent
Women members of any working women's organization	NIL
Mean monthly household income	Rs. 4225
Mean household size	7.5 persons
Daily working-hours of women	7.2 hours
Households living below poverty line[4]	78 per cent
Female-headed Households	13.5 per cent

The wages and incomes of these women are found to be very low, i.e. average monthly income/wage comes to only Rs.2150. Furthermore, 79 per cent of the women are receiving lower than the minimum wage. But these women are forced to do this low-paid work because they have no other option of job. The work is necessary because their households are very poor. It is estimated that 78 per cent of the households to which working women belong, are living below poverty line. The average monthly income of the household is Rs.4225. Sixty nine per cent of these women have at least five children and thus an average family size of 7.5. In the sample 13.5 per cent of the households are female-headed households. Sudden deterioration of economic circumstances, like death or illness of husband or bread-winner, divorce, separation is the usual cause for female headship. Slightly less, 44 per cent are employees. None of the employees receives overtime wages. Though on aggregate 43 per cent of the women (all kind of employment) are doing work for more than 8 hours daily, the average working hours are 7.2 daily. No woman is a member of any working women's organization.

Typology of Work and Contributions to household budget

There are four overlapping modes of employment for these informal sector women. Forty five per cent of the women are self-employed. It is estimated that 30.2 per cent of women (serial No.1,2 and 3 in Table-2a) are engaged in work on ladies garments, i.e. embroidery, *silma sitara*, *resham ka kam*, *chunri*-making, *thappa*-making, *makaish*-making, stitching, sewing, crocheting, tie and die, and *tarkashi*. House-maids are the second largest group at 15.9 per cent.

The contribution of women to their household budget[5] differs for different job categories. The maximum contribution is made by women from singer/dancers and related group. They are contributing 82 per cent to their household budget, but their ratio in the sample is only 0.1 per cent. After this group, the maximum contribution is made by brick-kiln women and the housemaids. Each of these groups is contributing 58 per cent of the household budget. Together these two categories comprise 23.2 per cent of the sample. Brick-breakers/road makers contribute 48 per cent of the household budget. Finally the women doing different type of work on ladies garments are contributing between 37 and 42 per cent on average to their household budget. It shows that families significantly depend upon women workers.

Health status

In the Labour Protection Policy 2006, occupational health interventions are concerned with the elimination and reduction of hazards that result into illness and disease (GOP 2006:36). The health status of working women in the informal sector of Bahawalpur region was found to be very poor. They suffer health problems related to their work. The work on ladies garments is mostly done at home which have a non-conducive environment for work. Rooms lack proper ventilation and light. In construction industry brick-breaking and spreading stones during road construction are back-breaking labour done by women. Cough/cold/fever, weak eyesight, watering eyes, back-pain, pain in joints, skin problems, respiratory diseases, leucorrhea and exertion are major symptoms among the informally employed women. We have calculated the frequency of incidence of more than nine symptoms for different kinds of jobs. Brick-kiln workers show the highest frequency of the occurrence of symptoms at 4.6. Next comes the embroidery/*silma sitara*/*resham ka kam*/ *makaish*-making with a frequency of 4.5. Brick-breaking/road construction is close behind with frequency of 4.3. Overall there are eight jobs where frequency is more than 3, which shows a severe impact of working conditions on the health of informal sector women (see Table 2-d).

The prevalence of specific symptoms of ailment in women was also calculated. Results showed weak eyesight (31 per cent), back pain (29 per cent), cough/cold/fever (27 per cent), exertion (25 per cent), skin problem (18 per cent), watering eyes (14 per cent), pain in joints (10 per cent), respiratory diseases (1.6 per cent) and leucorrhea (1.5 per cent) and no symptoms (8 per cent). The symptoms of weak eyesight and watering eyes are found in 45 per cent of women. This ailment

can be connected with work on ladies garments that absorbs the highest ratio of these women. The second highest ailment affecting 29 per cent of the women is back-pain, which may be traced posture during road making, brick kiln work and again to the ladies garments, which work is done by sitting on the floor.

Not only the health status of the women workers in informal sector is found dismal and unsatisfactory but the access to medical facility is also very poor. Our field estimates of access to medical facility is as follows: only 25 per cent of the women get treatment from government hospitals; 6.2 per cent go to private sectors; 10.8 per cent go to *hakims*; 20 per cent go to homeopaths; 7 per cent go to *peers* while 31 per cent of the ill go without any treatment whatsoever. The status of health and typology of treatment reflects a near total lack of provision of public health through state and social security hospitals. Going to *peers* could mean prevalence of superstition but it could also be that they cannot afford the needed material medical treatment.

In the Labour Protection Policy 2006, protection to the workers (formal and informal) in the form of annual leave, sick leave, and special leave is determined by law (GOP 2006:73). There are five types of jobs in our survey where sick-leave is applicable. These are brick-kiln workers, brick-breaking/road-making, house maids, factory/office workers and agricultural labour. In all of these jobs sickness leave provision is completely absent (see Table 2-c).

Housing Conditions

An important component of Labour Protection Policy 2006 relates to enhancement of the productive efforts of workers through improved living conditions including improved housing, better sanitation, water supply and domestic hygiene. As majority of the informally employed women work in their homes, so the living conditions become even more important. To assess the living conditions of women, we considered the household structure, electrification of house, congestion of the house, and sanitation and water supply facilities. It is found that 83 per cent of the houses are electrified; 89 per cent of the households have separate bathroom; 30 per cent of the households are living in one-room houses (with an average family size of 7.5 persons); 19.5 per cent of the families are living in *kacha* houses; and only 10 per cent of the households have sanitation facilities. Such type of living and usually the same working conditions for a significant proportion of women increases the health risk to women.

Education and Training

Under the agenda of Labour Protection Policy 2006, labour protection for persons working in informal employment arrangement will be assisted through the introduction of labour extension services. Interventions will concentrate on education and information (GOP 2006:125). The informal sector women lack education and information and are low-paid (Karim 2001). The educational and training level of these women in the surveyed area was as follows: 55 per cent are illiterate; 28.5 per cent have had five years of education (primary); 11 per cent have

had eight years of education (middle); 5.5 per cent are matric (10 years of education); 0.5 per cent are intermediate and above and among them only 9 per cent have had technical training (from training centers and vocational institutes).

Working Conditions and Environment

The working conditions represent the very essence of Labour Protection Policy. Three aspects of working conditions are of particular importance, namely, wages, hours of work, and leave and rest periods. The Government is committed to providing workers with reasonable hours of work, which must not exceed 48 hours per week. Workers must be provided with at least one day off in each seven-day period. Our survey revealed that out of eighteen types of work by women in informal sector, there are 9 types of work where women are employees and employer-employee relationship exists and working hours apply. Out of these 9 there are 8 types of work, where working hours are more than 48 hours per week. The intensity differs for different types of work[6]. Sick leave is also applicable to 9 types of work. In only 3 types of work sick leave is available partially but in the remaining there is no sick leave. Overtime work/wages may apply to three modes of employment, i.e. employee, piece-rate work and contract work. There are 14 types of work where overtime work rate applies but none of the women in these works are taking overtime wages. Allowances and benefits are also non-existent in all the above 14 types of work where the provision applies due to mode of employment of employee, piece-rate work and contract work. Of course, there is no job security to women in all these 14 categories of work (see Table-2c).

Labour Protection Policy in relation to work environment embraces three main areas, namely, work safety and prevention of accidents, occupational health, and the impact of enterprise work processes and practices on the wider environment. Prime responsibility in all three areas rests with the employer, but with workers required to cooperate to the fullest extent to enable employers to meet their obligations. Under the Labour Protection Policy, workers in the informal economy, especially home workers and domestic workers, stand to greatly benefit from improved safety arrangements and access to some social security arrangements where an employer-employee relation is evident. Our results revealed that work safety, if at all, is available only to the beauty parlour and brick-breaking/road making jobs. In all the other seventeen kinds of jobs, work safety is not present though in some kinds of jobs it can be relatively easily provided.

Labour protection Policy: Commitment without action

The labour protection provisions of the Constitution of Pakistan are supported by ratification of 34 ILO conventions, including 7 of the 8 core conventions embodied in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. This Declaration embraces four main areas including freedom of association and the recognition of the right of workers and employers to bargain collectively;

elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; effective abolition of child labour; and elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.

The ILO Declaration was adopted by the ILO Conference in 1998, but Pakistan's commitment to the principles of freedom of association, and the right to collective bargaining date back to 1951 and 1952 respectively, indicating a strong commitment by Pakistan to the protection of basic rights in the very early years of Pakistan's nationhood. The Abolition of Forced Labour Convention 1957 (Convention 105) was ratified by Pakistan in 1960, and the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (Convention 111) was ratified in 1961. The act of ratification means that a Convention becomes legally binding on the ILO member states concerned, and it provides clear evidence that Pakistan's commitment to such basic rights is long standing. In recent years, Pakistan has reaffirmed its commitment to labour protection by its ratification of the Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (Convention 100), and the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (Convention 182). Both conventions were ratified in 2001 and indicate that Pakistan's commitment to basic rights is not only long-standing, but also on-going. It is also reflected in all the labour protection policies of Pakistan. The Labour Protection Policy 2006 is much refined compared to the previous ones in the aspect that in this policy Government of Pakistan has committed to extend the coverage of employee's old-age benefits scheme to self-employed persons, informal economy workers, and the agricultural sector, on a voluntary basis. Furthermore, the government is committed to provide women with equal opportunities for employment and non-discrimination in wages (GOP 2006:9).

In our survey employees' old-age benefits are non-existent in all types of jobs of women. The Labour Protection Policy elaborates that corporate agricultural workers along with informal sector workers would benefit from application of minimum wages (which was raised from Rs.4000 to Rs.6000 in 2008) to all situations in which a contract of employment is evident, even for limited periods (GOP 2006:25). These workers would benefit from increased information on work-safety and health and eligibility for some social security services (GOP 2006:26). The minimum wage applies to brick-kiln work, house-maids and factory/office workers. It also partially applies to work on ladies garments (serial No. 1 to 3), bedding clothes and rug-making, beauty parlour, livestock and poultry farming and door to door selling where contract work, piece-rate work and employee status exist simultaneously. In our sample, only 9 per cent of the women involved in brick-breaking/road-making were having minimum wage at the time of the survey (see Table-2a).

In our survey bonded labour which is related to advances and loans was found in the job of brick-kiln industry, brick-breaking for roads and construction, road-making, agricultural labour but partially also in ladies garments-making and house-maids. In the informal sector households, usually the adult males took the loan. Their women and partially their children pay off by surrendering a part of their daily wages. Thus these women enter the labour market not in pursuit of a career, but extreme financial necessity compels them to take up paid-work in such low-income occupations.

Targets and activities set out in the National Policies and Action Plans to Combat Child Labour (May 2000) and Abolition of Bonded Labour is part of Labour Policy 2002 (GOP 2002:14). Additionally, Pakistan by ratifying ILO Convention 182 has accepted the obligation to enhance age limit to 18 years in respect of worst forms of child labour, for entry into labour market. In our survey, out of eighteen types of jobs, there are only two types of jobs where child labour does not exist. They are beauty parlour and trainees in embroidery, tailoring and fashion design. Discrimination in wages exists in bedding clothes and rag-making, beauty parlours, brick-kiln workers, street work, brick-breaking/road-making, housemaids, live-stock and poultry farming, factory/office work and agricultural labour. Finally membership of organization of working women is non-existent in our sample (see Table-2b).

Conclusion

The present work is a study of the work related conditions of informal women workers in the urban area of Bahawalpur. There are four overlapping modes of work for these women including employed, self-employed, contract workers and piece rate workers. Under these there are 14 different categories of informal women workers. The two largest categories are engaged in work on ladies garments and as house-maids. The next two categories include brick-breaking/road making and brick-kiln workers. The mean monthly income of 19 different categories was found to be Rs. 2,150. Yet it constitutes a significant contribution to the household considering the overall mean monthly household income of Rs.4,225 which explains the extreme circumstances under which these women are compelled to work for such meagre wages.

A large majority of these women suffer from multiple illnesses for which no proper treatment is available. A majority of the informally employed women work at home where they live in congested conditions, with 30% of families living in one room houses and only 10% enjoying sanitation facility at home. Since many of the informal sector women work from home their miserable living conditions also translate into miserable working conditions. A majority of informal women workers are illiterate and of the remaining nearly 60 per cent have done only 5 years of primary education.

Numerous provisions of international and national labour protection policy cover these informal women workers. These have been neither enforced nor propagated. Not only Pakistan's commitment to labour protection is enshrined in the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 but in fact Pakistan has ratified all ILO declarations and international conventions willingly and eagerly since the creation of the country. The National Labour Protection Policy comprehensively covers all aspects of labour protection with numerous provisions extending to many types of informal work. The conventions, the policies and the provisions, however, have never touched the life and work of informal women workers. Labour legislation for the informal sector is completely divorced from its implementation.

Table-2 a: Typology of Work and Labour Protection Policy

Sr. No.	Types of work	Frequency per cent 77	Contribution to household budget per cent	Mode of employment	Social Secruty[VIII]	Employees' oldage benefit scheme	Percentage at or above official wage
1	Embroidery/ *Silma Sitara/ Reshim Ka Kam/ Makaish*-Making	6.8	47	Contract Work, Piece-rate Work	Nil	Nil	None
2	*Chunri*-Making / *Thappa*-Making/ Tie and Dye suites	8.9	42	Contract Work, Piece-rate Work	Nil	Nil	None
3	Stitching/ Sewing/ Crocheting/ *Tarkashi*	14.5	41	Contract Work, Piece-rate Work Self-employed	Nil	Nil	None
4	Bedding Clothes and Rug-Making	3.2	31	Self-employed, Employee	Nil	Nil	None
5	Beauty Parlour	3.9	35	Self-employed, Employee	Nil	Nil	None
6	Trainees of Embroidery, Tailoring, Fashion Design, etc.	2.8	30	Self-employed, Employee	Nil	Nil	None
7	Food-making[I]	5.1	38	Self-employed, Contract Work	Nil	Nil	None
8	Brick-Kiln Work	5.7	58	Employee	Nil	Nil	None
9	Tuition of Formal and Informal Education	3.5	40	Self-employed	Nil	Nil	None
10	Door to Door Selling[II]	2.7	31	Self-employed, Employee	Nil	Nil	None
11	Street Women[III]	5.4	32	Self-employed,	Nil	Nil	None
12	Brick Breaking /Road making	7.3	48	Employee	Nil	Nil	9

Continued …

Sr. No.	Types of work	Frequency per cent 77	Contribution to household budget per cent	Mode of employment	Social secruty[VIII]	Employees' oldage benefit scheme	Percentage at or above official wage
13	House Maids[IV]	15.9	58	Employee	Nil	Nil	None
14	Singers/Dancers /Street-singers-cum-baggers	0.1	82	Self-employed,	Nil	Nil	None
15	Live Stock and Poultry Farming	2.1	24	Self-employed, Employee	Nil	Nil	None
16	Office / Factory Workers[V]	5.1	33	Employee	Nil	Nil	None
17	Pottery and *Cholay*-Making	4.2	31	Self-employed,	Nil	Nil	NA
18	Agricultural Labour[VI]	3.6	30	Piece-rate Work, Employee	Nil	Nil	None
19	Others[VII]	3.4	29	-	Nil	Nil	-
20	Total	114.2	-	-	-	-	-

I. *Chapati*-making of flour, *Samosa*-making, *Berian*-making (leaf wrapped cigarettes), and pickles-making
II. Selling toys, artificial flowers, vegetables, utensils, bed sheets, clothes, embroidered rugs, etc.
III. Collecting waster paper, tins, bottles, plastic, shoppers, etc.
IV. It includes cloth-washing, cleaning, dusting, dish-washing and cooking, baby-sitting, pressing clothes, etc.
V. It includes sowing, cotton picking, winnowing, crop cutting, etc.
VI. Shop-keepers, embroidery on shoes, match-makers, *dai* (traditionally trained mid-wife), casual labour with undefined profession, etc.
VII. Labour in factories, private schools, organizations and offices, telephone operators, etc.
VIII. Benefited from any social security scheme.

Table-2 b: Typology of Work and Labour Protection Policy

Sr No.	Types of work	Work safety	Discrimi-Nation	Social secruty[VIII]	Existence of child labour	Existence of forced labour	Organization of working women
1	Embroidery/ *Silma Sitara*/ *Reshim Ka Kam*/ *Makaish*-Making	Nil	No	No	Yes	No	Nil
2	*Chunri*-Making / *Thappa*-Making/ Tie and Dye suits	Nil	No	No	Yes	No	Nil
3	Stitching/ Sewing/ Crocheting/ *Tarkashi*	Nil	No	No	Yes	No	Nil
4	Bedding Clothes and Rug-Making	Nil	Yes	No	Yes	No	Nil
5	Beauty Parlour	70	Yes	No	No	No	Nil
6	Trainees of Embroidery, Tailoring, Fashion Design, etc.		No	No	No	No	Nil
7	Food-making[I]	Nil	No	No	Yes	No	Nil
8	Brick-Kiln Work	Nil	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Nil
9	Tuition of Formal and Informal Education	-	No	No	Yes	No	Nil
10	Door to Door Selling[II]	Nil	No	No	Yes	No	Nil
11	Street Women[III]	Nil	Yes	No	Yes	No	Nil
12	Brick Breaking /Road making	13	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Nil
13	House Maids[IV]	Nil	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Nil

Continued …

Sr No.	Types of work	Work safety	Discrimi-Nation	Social security[VIII]	Existence of child labour	Existence of forced labour	Organization of working women
14	Singers/Dancers /Street-singers-cum-baggers	-	No	No	Yes	No	Nil
15	Live Stock and Poultry Farming	Nil	Yes	No	Yes	No	Nil
16	Office / Factory Workers[V]	Nil	Yes	No	Yes	No	Nil
17	Pottery and *Cholay*-Making	Nil	No	No	Yes	No	Nil
18	Agricultural Labour[VI]	Nil	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Nil
19	Others[VII]	Nil	-	No	Yes	NA	Nil
20	Total	-	-	-	-	-	-

For explanation of superscripts I, II, III etc., see under Table 2-a.

Table-2 c: Typology of Work and Labour Protection Policy

Sr. No.	Types of work	Hours of work (exceeding 48 hours per week)	Overtime wages	Sick leave	Allowances and benefits	Job security provision
1	Embroidery/ *Silma Sitara*/ *Reshim Ka Kam*/ *Makaish*-Making	-	No	NA	No	No
2	*Chunri*-Making / *Thappa*-Making/ Tie and Dye suites	-	No	NA	No	No
3	Stitching/ Sewing/ Crocheting/ *Tarkashi*	-	No	NA	No	No
4	Bedding Clothes and Rug-Making	Yes	No	No	No	No
5	Beauty Parlour	Yes	No	No	No	No
6	Trainees of Embroidery, Tailoring, Fashion Design, etc.	Yes	No	NA	No	No
7	Food-making[I]	-	No	NA	No	No
8	Brick-Kiln Work	Yes	No	No	No	No
9	Tuition of Formal and Informal Education	-	NA	NA	NA	NA
10	Door to Door Selling[II]	No	No	No	No	No
11	Street Women[III]	-	NA	NA	NA	NA
12	Brick Breaking /Road making	Yes	No	No	No	No
13	House Maids[IV]	Yes	No	Partial	No	No
14	Singers/Dancers /Street-singers-cum-baggers	-	NA	NA	NA	NA
15	Live Stock and Poultry Farming	Yes	No	Partial	No	No

Continued …

Sr. No.	Types of work	Hours of work (exceeding 48 hours per week)	Overtime wages	Sick leave	Allowances and benefits	Job security provision
16	Office / Factory Workers[V]	Yes	No	Partial	No	No
17	Pottery and *Cholay*-Making	-	NA	NA	NA	NA
18	Agricultural Labour[VI]	Yes	No	No	No	No
19	Others[VII]	-	NA	NA	NA	NA
20	Total	-				

For explanation of superscripts I, II, III etc., see under Table 2-a.

Table-2 d: Typology of Work and Labour Protection Policy

Sr. No.	Types of work	Health and hygiene	Nutrition proper or poor	Disease prevention considerations	Disease incidence	Social security[VIII] availability	Education information or advice
1	Embroidery/ *Silma Sitara*/ *Reshim Ka Kam*/ *Makaish*-Making	No	No	Nil	4.5	None	Partial
2	*Chunri*-Making / *Thappa*-Making/ Tie and Dye suites	No	No	Nil	4.1	None	Nil
3	Stitching/ Sewing/ Crocheting/ *Tarkashi*	No	No	Nil	3.9	None	Partial
4	Bedding Clothes and Rug-Making	No	No	Nil	3.5	None	Nil
5	Beauty Parlour	No	No	Nil	0.7	None	Nil
6	Trainees of Embroidery, Tailoring, Fashion Design, etc.	No	No	Nil	1.5	None	Partial
7	Food-making[I]	No	No	Nil	2.2	None	Nil
8	Brick-Kiln Work	No	No	Nil	4.6	None	Nil
9	Tuition of Formal and Informal Education	No	No	Nil	2.2	None	Nil
10	Door to Door Selling[II]	No	No	Nil	3.2	None	Nil
11	Street Women[III]	No	No	Nil	2.9	None	Nil

Continued …

Sr. No.	Types of work	Health and hygiene	Nutrition proper or poor	Disease prevention considerations	Disease incidence	Social security[VIII] availability	Education information or advice
12	Brick Breaking /Road making	No	No	Nil	4.3	None	Nil
13	House Maids[IV]	No	No	Nil	4.1	None	Nil
14	Singers/Dancers /Street-singers-cum-baggers	No	No	Nil	1.6	None	Nil
15	Live Stock and Poultry Farming	No	No	Nil	2.0	None	Nil
16	Office / Factory Workers[VII]	No	No	Nil	3.9	None	Nil
17	Pottery and *Cholay*-Making	No	No	Nil	2.3	None	Nil
18	Agricultural Labour[V]	No	No	Nil	2.7	None	Nil
19	Others[VI]	No	No	Nil	1.7	None	Nil
20	Total	No	No	Nil	3.1	None	Nil

For explanation of superscripts I, II, III etc., see under Table 2-a.

Notes

[1] Piece-worker is defined as a person who receives raw material from middleman, shopkeeper or producer, give back the finished product and take the wages at contract rates.

[2] Own-account worker is defined as a person who operate enterprise or business jointly or in partnership with others without engaging any employee.

[3] Housing conditions refer to the condition whether the house is *kacha* or *pacca (mud or masonary),* the number of rooms in the household, whether the household is electrified or not, and whether the household has separate bathroom and kitchen or not.

[4] The official Poverty Line was placed at Rs.848.79 per capita per month (GOP 2004).

[5] Contribution of a woman is defined as the percentage ratio of woman's expenditure for the household to total household expenditures.

[6] Overall (all types of work irrespective of mode of employment) 43 per cent of the women are working more than 8 hours daily.

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RIAZ HASSAN

MODERNIZATION, SOCIAL CHANGE AND RELIGION: A CASE STUDY OF THE ISLAMIC UMMAH

Abstract:

In this paper I explore the impact of modernization and social change on the Islamic *ummah* (community of believers) and how they are shaping the emerging struggle between 'hybridity' and 'authenticity' among Muslims and Islamic movements. The paper will explore the challenges of this struggle and its sociological implications for the 'de-centering' of the Muslim world into multiple autonomous regions. The future of Muslim *ummah* may gain strength not as a unified and unitary community, but as a differentiated community consisting of ummahs representing different Islamic regions, each regional *ummah* possessing and embodying a unique character moulded by the history and temperament of its people. The paper concludes with observations on the future religious, intellectual, economic and political trajectories of Muslim countries.

Islamic Ummah: A Brief Historical Overview

The concept of *ummah* has inspired the imagination of Muslims, especially Muslim intellectuals, from the very early days of Islamic beginning. The term *ummah* appears over sixty times in the *Quran,* where it has multiple and diverse meanings ranging from followers of a prophet, or of a divine plan of salvation, to a religious group, a small group within a larger community of believers, misguided people and an order of being. However, from its numerous and, sometimes, vague meanings in the early days of Islam, it came to symbolize and embody the very notion of an Islamic community, gradually acquiring socio-legal and religious connotations. Sociologically, *ummah* became a transformative concept in the sense that it played a significant role changing, first, the Arab tribes into an Arab community and, later, as Islam began to expand to non Arab lands, different groups of Muslims into a community of believers.

Ummah as a community of believers entailed a consciousness of belonging to a community whose membership was open equally and without any qualification or restriction, except that of the faith, to all believers. In this sense it embodied the universalism of Islam. It became a means of establishing a religious and cultural identity that was independent of the Muslim state. This means of constructing a

religious and cultural identity made the spiritual development and sense of cohesion independent of the transitory territorial states.

The life of the new *ummah* was marked by a pervasive new moral tone, derived from the individual relationship to God and not by old primordial loyalties and maintained by the expectations prevalent in the group as a whole and given form in their corporate life. Over time, *ummah* became a state of mind, a form of social consciousness, or an imagined community which united the faithful in order to lead a virtuous life and to safeguard and even to expand the boundaries of the autonomous *ummah*.

Ummah became a framework for maintaining the religious unity and accommodating the cultural diversity of the believers. This generated a strong sense of unity, which permeated the Muslim world and was instrumental in submerging, or overriding, the significant ethnic and cultural differences on the level of the ideal. It thus became a critical basis for expansion that allowed for a certain disregard of the realities of life. Psychologically speaking, the term *ummah* provided for an existence on two levels, an existence in a tension that, never completely to be relieved is still an important element in the inner unrest besetting significant parts of the Muslim world.

In the modern Muslim world the notion of *ummah* is an integral part of religious, political and ideological discourses on Islam. Its foundation is constructed on the basis of the *Quranic* revelations and on the collective memories of the political grandeur of Islamic history. In the Muslim imagination, the *ummah* lives under a divine law whose protector is the *ummah* itself. The temporal political authority is neither a source nor a guarantee of the law. Its legitimacy is recognized so long as it guarantees the preservation and expansion of religion. While this type of volitional orientation is very much in tune with the contemporary globalization trends, it is also an inherent source of political instability and unrest in the modern Muslim world. This is reflected in the ideologies of several major modern Muslim social and political movements, like the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood.

For organizations like the Mohmmadiyah, Jamaat-i-Islami and Muslim Brotherhood, the Muslim *ummah* is a transnational geographical entity with its heart lying in the modern Arabic Middle East. According to their ideologues, the dignity and political authority of the *ummah* have been severely undermined by the last five centuries of Western political and military domination. The Western attempts at keeping the *ummah* ineffective forever are now being resisted by the new signs of Islamic revival.

This illustrates the fact that, for many Islamic activists, the notion of *ummah* is an important and integral part of the contemporary Muslim consciousness that originated in *Quranic* revelations, but has evolved in meaning and usage in conjunction with developments in the Islamic world. *Ummah* manifests itself at the ideological, cognitive, behavioral and ethical levels. For Muslims, and especially Muslim activists and intellectuals, it is a sociological reality. It is a unique principle of social identity in Islam which acts as a basis of collective consciousness and community organization. There is a consensus among Muslim scholars that the

ummah refers to a spiritual, non-territorial community distinguished by the shared beliefs of its members.

However, the Islamic world is not immune from the ideology of nationalism. In Muslim countries nationalism has often incorporated the concept of the *ummah*. While most of the Muslim countries, like their counterparts elsewhere, have been strongly influenced by nationalism, the Islamic revivalist movements invariably make the existence of Muslim *ummah* an important part of their political platform. These movements argue that loyalty to the Islamic *ummah* overrides any other ethnic, linguistic and geographical loyalties.

The political reality, however, is that while most Muslims regard the idea of *ummah* as an important source of their collective identity, nationalism and nationalist movements are also an important part and parcel of most Muslim countries. As such, Muslims tend to have dual or multiple social identities comprised of national, or ethnic, and Islamic identities. In a sociological sense, the concept of *ummah* refers to an ideal state—an all-encompassing unity of the Muslims that is often invoked but never completely realised.

Sociology of the *Ummah*

As a sociological phenomenon, the *ummah* can be viewed as a collective identity. Collective identity is grounded in the socialization process in human societies. Individuals develop it by first identifying with the values, goals and purposes of their society and by internalizing them. This process, besides constructing the individual identity, also constructs the collective identity. Rituals and ritualized behaviors of the society further reinforce it and give the members a sense of similarity, especially against the 'Others' whose collective identities are different.

The key role in the construction of collective identity is played by symbolic systems of shared religion, language and culture, which act as boundary defining mechanisms of the collective identity. The boundaries can be crossed, or changed through incorporation, or shedding of symbolic domains such as those that are entailed in religious conversion or excommunication. Collective identity is constructed through major 'codes' of primordiality, civility and transcendence or sacredness. These codes are ideal types as real coding invariably combines different elements of these ideal types. The construction of collective identity is not purely a symbolic affair unrelated to the division of labour, to the control of resources and to social differentiation. Collective identity and social solidarity entail consequences for the allocation of resources and for structuring entitlements to members of the collectivity as against the outsider.

From this perspective *ummah* would constitute a collective identity of Muslims in the sense that it refers to Muslim's identification with the sacred domain of Islam and its incorporation in their individual consciousness. The implication of viewing *ummah* as a frame for collective identity of Muslims is that, since it is a result of social construction in which social structure and social processes play critical roles, as these framing

devices change, they also produce changes in the nature of collective identity. In other words, since Muslims, besides partaking in common faith, also live their lives in the contexts of their respective societies, as these societies change under the impact of modernization and globalization that also will impact on Muslim collective identity.

The *Ummah* Consciousness

If *ummah* is a form of collective identity or an imagined community can we detect its presence in contemporary Muslim consciousness? I attempted to investigate this question in my study of Muslim religiosity in Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Iran and Turkey. This study was conducted between 1997 and 2003 and involved the questioning of over 6300 Muslim respondents about their religiosity.

The evidence shows very high to high *ummah* consciousness in Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Egypt, Iran and Turkey and low in Kazakhstan. The Kazakhstan case is unique among the countries included in the study. It was the only country that was part of the Soviet empire until its disintegration in 1991, which led to its independence. During the Soviet rule religion was more or less banished from public life. Consequently Kazak Muslim identity became grounded in ethnicity and history rather than religiosity. In all other countries Islam was a powerful and ubiquitous part of public and private life and played a pivotal role in the development of religious identity and ummah consciousness as reflected in the data.

Table 1: Ummah Consciousness and Modernity in Muslim Countries

Country	Ummah Consciousness[1]	Modernity[2] (Human Development Index)
Indonesia	92	0.682
Malaysia	90	0.790
Pakistan	91	0.499
Egypt	94	0.648
Iran	76	0.719
Turkey	71	0.734
Kazakhstan	22	0.765

1. Ummah Consciousness Index was derived from unpublished survey data from the named countries. It is an average of respondents "agreeing" with the following beliefs: 1. No doubt about the existence of Allah. 2. Firm belief in the Quranic miracles. 3. Faith in the month of Ramadan. 4. Belief in life after death. 5. Belief that persons who deny the existence of Allah are dangerous. These surveys were conducted by me between 1997 and 2003. The sample sizes for the various countries were: Indonesia 1472; Pakistan 1272; Malaysia 802; Egypt 788; Iran 614; Turkey 527; and Kazakhstan 1000. The samples were not random. The findings apply to surveyed samples.

2. Modernity refers to the Human Development Index value for the selected countries, see UNDP (2002)

This consciousness shapes the image of the 'self' and also that of the 'other'. It allows Muslims to identify with the other Muslims who are subjected to oppression, violence and injustices by the 'other'. This is the reason why the conflict in Palestine and the pro- Israeli policies of the West, especially of the United States, have created a feeling of intense anti-Americanism in Muslim countries. For the same reasons conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya, Iraq and Afghanistan have provoked anti-Western feelings and attitudes. One can argue that *ummah* consciousness also underpins the so called Jihadist movements which are actively involved in violent resistance in a number of Muslim countries in Southeast, South and Central Asia and the Middle East. Their activities in the Iraq, Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere are the most commonly reported stories in the media.

Does this mean that *ummah* consciousness also acts a catalyst for Islamic unity at the international and even at the national level? The answer is *no*. The clearest evidence of this is the fragmentation of the Islamic world into 49 Muslim majority countries many of which are hostile to each other as well as the ethnic and sectarian violence which is endemic in many Muslim countries. Other indicators of this are the lack of or poor mass support for Islamic political parties in almost all Muslim countries and conflict between radical Islamist movements such as Al Qaeda, Jammah Islamiah and the existing political structures.

Muslim countries differ in their level of modernity. I would like to argue that the level of modernity would have a significant impact on the institutional development, differentiation and institutional specialization that may lead to a decline in public influence of religious institutions in society while at the same time leading to a greater emphasis on personal religiosity. Such developments would obviously have consequences for the development of religious and political pluralism or at least their greater acceptance as a social and political norm. My argument is that in Muslim countries, political culture, as elsewhere, will evolve in response to national aspirations and not in response to the *ummah's* aspirations. If this argument has any validity then the future of Islamic *ummah* would not be a unitary social reality but a differentiated one. And one consequence of that may be the 'decentring' of the Islamic *ummah*. Let me explore this proposition in some details

Modernization and the *Ummah*

Modern technology has resulted in rapid communication over unlimited space. This technology is now in existence nearly all over the world. The potential for worldwide rapid communication has been translated into actual practice. We now live in a globalizing social reality in which previous effective barriers to communication no longer exist. The world is fast becoming a global village and 'a single place'. Therefore, in order to understand the major features of social life and emerging religious and political trends in contemporary Muslim societies, we need to

go beyond local and national factors and situate the analysis in the global context. In the pre-globalized world, 'knowing' of all Islamized people was seriously constrained or even rendered impossible by the limitations of technology. At best, only a small number of people were able to travel to other cultures and societies. The legendary travels of Ibn Batutta and Vasco de Gama are now a reality experienced by thousands of business and recreational travellers every year.

In the pre-modern and globalized world *ummah* consciousness was largely determined by the observance of the practice of the 'five pillars' of Islam (oath of belief, payment of zakat, performance of hajj, daily prayers and fasting) and certain other key beliefs. The existence of these beliefs and practices was seen by many believers everywhere as evidence that the entire culture of the Muslim societies was Islamized, that is, had come to resemble the Arabian culture where Islam had originated. This transformation of all Islamized people was considered to be an integral part of Prophet Mohammad's (PBUH) social and religious mission. It was naively assumed by many Islamic intellectuals in the Middle East that such cultural trajectory was the common destiny of all Islamized people. The difficulties of communication and contact with people in far off regions fed this belief. But the reality was that Islamized cultures invariably added the Islamic layers on top of the various other cultural layers. The work of Clifford Geertz (1968) on Islam in Java and Morocco provides an excellent illustration of this. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the study of the customary laws of Muslim countries, which still continue to play a significant role in social and cultural affairs of Muslim communities.

It can be argued that modernization is prompting a reformulation of the common Muslim belief that Islam is not only a religion but also a complete way of life, which, in Islamic discourse is known as the 'one religion one culture' paradigm. Instantaneous and worldwide communication links are now allowing Muslims and non-Muslims to experience the reality of different Islamic cultures. Such experiences reveal not only what is common among Muslims but also what is different. For example, gender relations and dress codes for Muslim women are structured in different ways in Muslim countries like Malaysia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Kazakhstan.

While the first consequence makes us conscious of the social and cultural diversity of the Muslim *ummah,* the second consequence produces a reaction of rejection of this cultural and social hybridity and a desire to replace it with the authentic 'Islamic way'. The struggle between 'hybridity' and 'authenticity' perhaps constitutes the most important challenge of globalization for the Muslim *ummah* and is one of the underlying causes of the emergence of Islamic fundamentalist movements. Islamic fundamentalism refers to a strategy by which Islamic 'purists' attempt to reassert their construction of religious identity and social order as the exclusive basis for a re-created political and social order. They feel this identity is at risk and is being eroded by cultural and religious hybridity. They try to fortify their interpretation of religious ways of being through selective retrieval of doctrines, beliefs and practices from a 'sacred' past.

Religious fundamentalism thus is a problem produced by the encounter between modernization and Muslim *ummah* in all its diversity and cultural hybridity. Its strength varies according to the intensity of attitudes towards diversity and cultural hybridity. For example, in the context of Indonesia, Islamic scholar Azyumardi Azra has observed that Islamic radicalism in Indonesia is predicated on the perception that indigenous Indonesian Islam is syncretic and hybrid, and needs to be purified and transformed into 'authentic' Islam through the application of the radicals' interpretations of the sacred texts. According to Azra, this 'literalist' interpretation is the root of the radical Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia (Azra 2002). This observation is applicable not only in the case of Indonesia but also in the context of other Islamic countries as well.

In the modern globalized world diversity and cultural crossovers will become a matter of routine. Instead of eliminating hybridity, this may in fact transform different Islamic countries and regions into autonomous cultural systems thus posing a challenge to the conventional categorical oppositions of 'us' and 'them', 'Muslim' and 'other'. This type of development would have far reaching implications for the Muslim *ummah*. Islamic countries in different parts of the world could be transformed into unique religious and cultural systems, each claiming acceptance and recognition as authentic traditions of Islam. This transformation may lead to the 'de-centering' of the Muslim world from its supposed cultural and religious center in the Arabic Middle East to a multi-centered world. Five such centers of the Islamic world can be readily identified, namely, Arabic Middle Eastern Islam, African Islam, Central Asian Islam, Southeast Asian Islam and Islam of the Muslim minorities in the West. The demographic characteristics such as size, diversity and age structure of the populations in the Muslim countries will further accentuate the movement towards de-centering. Over time, these traditions may find strength and consolidate with the support of their followers.

Drawing from the insights of Professor Alatas's work one can argue that modernization, while corroding and challenging the inherited or constructed cultural identities, also encourages the creation and revitalization of particular identities as a way of competing for power and influence in the global system (Alatas 1970). This will be aided by a unique affinity of religion for particularistic identities. And because religion in a globalizing, modernizing world is marginalized, it uses new opportunities and ways to gain public influence and legitimacy. My argument here is that, far from losing public influence, religion may gain public influence under conditions of globalization. This influence, nevertheless, will be mediated by a sub-global religious tradition that can adapt and encourage the applied role of religion with greater success than the inherited global tradition can.

In the light of the above, the future Islamic *ummah* will gain strength not as a unified and unitary community but as a differentiated community consisting of *ummahs* representing different Islamic regions. This de-centering of the Muslim *ummah* may also be beneficial for the intellectual revitalization in the Muslim world

The Real Challenge to *Ummah*

The looming challenge for the Muslim world is not religious, but intellectual. At present, Islamic *ummah* is in the doldrums not because of the weakness of commitment to the faith but because of its intellectual stagnation brought about by political, social and cultural conditions generated by colonialism, neo-colonialism and economic underdevelopment, poor governance some of which can be attributed to the real or imagined influence of increasing devotional religiosity of the masses. This stagnation is most dramatically manifested in the scientific and technological backwardness of the Muslim world.

In the 2008 ranking of the world's top 200 universities by the Times Higher Education Supplement (THES) 2008, 49 Muslim majority countries did not list a single university. Likewise the research contribution of Muslim countries is negligible and there are few writings or translations from other languages.

Several factors account for these intellectual conditions. One of these being the meagre resources allocated by Muslim countries to research and development. However, this is not only a cause, this itself is an effect of the legacy of the colonial history which was experienced by most Muslim countries for an extended period in the past two centuries, during which they endured some of the worst excesses of racial and economic exploitation that stalled their development which has been brilliantly detailed by Professor Alatas in his book *The Myth of Lazy Native*. But the causes of their present predicament can also be attributed to the prevailing cultural and political practices and poor governance.

Muslim countries are increasingly coming under intense pressure from religious fundamentalist movements to impose epistemologies compatible with their versions of Islamic doctrines that are generally hostile to critical rational thought. This is stifling the development of conditions conducive to the development and growth of vibrant institutions of higher learning.

In my recent studies of contemporary Islamic consciousness in a number of Middle Eastern Muslim countries, I was struck by an all-pervasive sense of humiliation arising from the inability of the Arab countries to match the military and technological superiority of Israel. This sense was further reinforced by the economic power and absolute technological superiority of the West vis-à-vis Muslim countries. This sense of humiliation is a major underlying cause of Islamic militancy and terrorism.

A robust civil society is a prerequisite for the development of a society based not on the tyranny of strongly held convictions and beliefs but on a social order based on doubt and compromise. Science and technology prosper only under conditions which privilege the rule of reason and nature. The intellectual stagnation of Muslim countries threatens to imprison a significant proportion of humanity into permanent servitude. There is a great urgency to create and nurture conditions promoting academic excellence and to develop strategies to arrest the decline of the institutions

of higher learning to ensure an honourable survival of future generations of Muslims. This is probably the greatest and growing challenge facing the governments of the Muslim countries today.

The real challenge for the differentiated Muslim *ummah* will be to find political, social and cultural ways to fuse a high degree of piety and a high degree of intellectual activity for scientific advancement. The Algerian – French anthropologist Muhammad Arkoun has proposed three categories of thought. He labels these categories as 'thinkable', 'unthinkable' and 'unthought' (Arkoun 1994). The cultural conditioning emanating from the dogmatic religiosity and traditionalistic self-image appear to encourage the majority of Muslim masses and intellectuals to think only in terms of the 'thinkable' and the 'unthinkable' and discourage cognitive processes leading to the 'unthought'.

The conditions which prevent the realm of the 'unthought' from flourishing and which now prevail in most Muslim countries constitute perhaps the most significant barriers to the development of science and technology. Muslims, like non-Muslims, will be called upon to address and solve modern problems not only related to the development of science and technology but also other problems like equality of citizenship for women and children, the management of human sexuality, environmental degradation, the rule of law, political and cultural freedoms. A proper understanding and resolution of these and other problems would require a common understanding based on rational scientific knowledge.

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MUNEER AHMAD

ATTRACTIVENESS OF CIVIL SERVICE AS A VOCATION

Civil service as a vocation has held a great appeal for young men in the subcontinent for long. It was especially so during the British colonial rule. The British rule in the subcontinent represented essentially an administration led by the civil servants. In the absence, for the most part, of popular political institutions, the government officials, in the field as well as at the headquarters, exercised real power. In addition, conditions of service including salaries, in the prevailing circumstances, were magnanimous. Two of the attributes of a civil service career, security of service and retirement pension, were sources of special attraction. These features of civil service vocation continued to endure after the independence. Almost all the bright young men tried their luck at the nationwide, annual, competitive examination for a place in one of the Central Superior Services (CSS). The most coveted of the CSS was the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) which held the promise of occupying, in due course, some of the leading administrative positions in the national and provincial administrations. In the newly independent state of Pakistan, because of manpower vacuum following an exodus of non-Muslim civil servants, a large number of vacancies of important administrative posts were available. The number of eligible competitors for the vacancies was relatively small. The candidates were largely men who graduated from the limited number of mainly public institutions of higher education in the country. There appeared to exist a symbiotic relationship between the prestigious public educational institution and the higher bureaucracy. At that time, comparative prize jobs in the private sector were severely limited. The trend among the graduates of higher education was to seek jobs in the superior services of the public bureaucracy and to stick to these jobs for a life-long career. More recently, on the one hand the number of aspirants for high office has increased while the state has contracted and the choice of equivalent or more lucrative jobs in the private sector has expanded. As a result, many of the highly qualified candidates are now opting for private sector occupations or are willing to give up public sector jobs for better paid private sector vocations. In other words, the attractiveness of civil service as a vocation seems to have registered some decline.

In this paper an attempt has been made to assess the attractiveness or decline in attractiveness of civil service as a vocation. For this purpose three indicators have been utilized.

(a) How many of the CSS officers are the offsprings of CSS fathers?

(b) How many CSS officers have one or more sibling who is also in the CSS?

(c) What proportion of the CSS officers has recently relinquished service in the higher government bureaucracy?

Indicator (a) assumes that if a CSS officer is the son or daughter of a CSS father both father and offspring are likely to have a favourable perception of civil service as a vocation.

It was noted that, in many cases, more than one member of a family (son or daughter) decided to join a civil service cadre. Indicator (b) refers to this aspect of choosing civil service as a vocation. The magnitude of such cases, in some way, reflects the attractiveness of civil service as a vocation.

Indicator (c) reflects the converse aspect of the attractiveness of civil service. The proportion of CSS officers deciding to quit civil service or (one of the cadres) indicates the degree of lack of attractiveness.

The background data that has been used for this objective refers to the years 1990 to 1998. An overall impression emerges that during the 1990s the relative attractiveness of the civil service showed some decline.

Offsprings of CSS Fathers

Out of 1283 CSS officers, between 1990-98, only 47 were the offsprings of CSS fathers. Six were the offsprings of Police Officers, 17 were the offsprings of CSP/DMG fathers and 24 were the offsprings of CSS fathers (belonging to occupation groups other than Police and CSP/DMG) (Table 1). In aggregate, only 3.6 per cent of the CSS officers were the offsprings of CSS fathers.

Table 2 gives the educational background of CSS fathers. Almost all of them have high level of education (over 80 per cent had post-graduate degrees). Table 3 shows the income background of CSS fathers. Almost all of them are middle class according to annual income (nearly three-quarters of them had an annual income of over 100,000 and below 300,000 rupees). Table 4 gives the educational background of CSS children of CSS fathers. Over two-fifths of them had earned post-graduate degrees. One-fifth had a degree of B.Sc. (Engineering). Seven (15 per cent) had had education in USA/Canada or Europe.

Four of the six CSS officers, who were offsprings of Police officers, were placed in the DMG occupation group (66 per cent). Seven of the 17 CSS officers who were offsprings of CSP/DMG fathers were themselves allocated to DMG occupation group (41 per cent). Three of the 17 were allocated to Police service and another three to Audit and Account Service. Six of the 24 CSS officers who were offsprings of CSS fathers (other than Police CSP/DMG) were allocated to DMG and another six to Audit and Accounts Service. There seems to exist some association between the 'elitist' family background and allocation to the elitist occupation group in the civil service. Sixty-six per cent of police officers' offsprings, 41 per cent of

CSP/DMG officers' offsprings and only 25 per cent of the CSS officers' offsprings (other than Police and DMG) were selected in the elitist service of DMG.

CSS Siblings

Between 1990 and 1998 thirty-seven CSS officers were such that had also one or more sibling selected and working in the CSS. They constitute only 2.8 per cent of the total (1283) CSS officers recruited during this period. The DMG and Police are generally considered to be highly esteemed Occupation Groups. Railways (Commerce and Transport), Postal, Commerce and Trade, Military Land and Cantonment, Information and Office Management Groups in comparison are rated as relatively less esteemed occupation groups. Foreign Service, Customs, Income-Tax and Audit and Accounts may be considered to be ranked somewhere in the middle of the two groups of occupations in terms of public esteem. In this perspective only in four cases (11 per cent) both the siblings were inducted into a highly esteemed occupation group (High-High). In 14 cases one of the two siblings was placed in a highly esteemed occupation and the other in an occupation of medium level of public esteem (38 per cent) (see Table 5).

Looking at the occupations of the fathers, it is found that the tendency to send more than one child into CSS is the highest among professionals (college and university professors, advocates, and engineers) (30 per cent). It is followed by middle level managers in the government service (24 per cent). Such a tendency among the members of the elite service (CSP/DMG) is comparatively low (8 per cent). This tendency is also low among the top managers in the government administration (not belonging to CSP/DMG) (11 per cent) (see Table 6). CSS jobs for their children seem to be attractive enough for the middle class fathers. Besides it is probably difficult for them to contrive prize jobs for their children in the private sector.

Table 7 gives the educational background of fathers who sent more than one child into CSS. Only one-third of them had post-graduate level of education. Around one-half had graduate level of education and the remaining had an educational attainment up to high school level or less. Table 8 shows the annual income level of fathers who encouraged or approved more than one child's entry in to CSS. Around one-third had an annual income of 60,000 rupees or less, around 30 per cent had an annual income of 150,000 rupees or less and one-fifth had an annual income of 300,000 rupees or less.

Out of the 199 children of the 37 families, 78 were girls and 121 were boys. Ten of the girls joined the Central Superior Services (12.8 per cent) and 68 of the boys did so (56 per cent) (see Table 9). CSS jobs appear to be attractive enough for the middle class families because (thanks to the impartial procedures of the Public Service Commission) they are within their reach and secondly because terms and conditions of CSS jobs are liberal by middle class standards.

Dropouts from CSS

According to an informal estimate 28 CSS officers relinquished service between 1990 and 1998. Ten of these officials (36 per cent) belonged to occupation groups that may be described as commonly rated low on public esteem, (1 in Postal Group, 2 in Railways (Commercial and Transport) group, 2 in Information Group and 5 in OMG). Eight of the 28 officials (29 per cent) belonged to occupation groups normally considered to be of medium esteem, (1 from Customs and Excise, 3 from Income Tax and 4 from FSP). Ten officers who relinquished service belonged to occupation groups of high esteem (8 from DMG and 2 from Police service) (Table 10).

Two officers left CSS after one year of service. One had 40th position in order of merit in the Competitive Examination and the other 86th. Both were allocated to OMG. Three officers left CSS after two years of service. One had 48th position in order of merit and belonged to lowly esteemed Railways group. The second had 25th position and was allocated to highly esteemed Police group. The third was placed at the first position and was serving in the highly esteemed DMG. Three officers relinquished CSS after around three years of service. One had attained the second position in the competitive examination and was serving in the prestigious DMG. The other had achieved 39th position and was serving in the Income Tax group. The third was placed at 218th position and was serving in OMG. One officer left CSS after five years of service. He earned 52nd position and was serving in OMG. Another officer left CSS after six years of service. He was inducted from the Armed Forces into DMG. Six officers decided to leave CSS after seven to ten years of service. Five of them were placed among the top ten positions in order of merit and were allocated to the prestigious DMG. One of these six officers was placed at 82nd place and belonged to lowly esteemed OMG (Table 11).

Two officers decided to leave the CSS immediately that is they did not join the Common Training Programme and thus the CSS. One had 126th position and was allocated to the lowly esteemed Information group. The other was placed at the 74th place in order of merit and was allocated to the FSP, an occupation of medium esteem (Table 11).

Ten officials decided to relinquish CSS after completing the Common Training Programme (CTP). Four of them belonged to the relatively low esteemed occupation groups (Railways, Postal, Information and OMG). All of them were placed rather low in order of merit in the competitive examination – (between 106th to 186th positions). Five officers belonged to Occupation Groups of middle level of esteem (Customs, FSP, IT). They had attained a good position in order of merit (between 17 and 88). One officer belonged to high-esteem occupation group of Police and had achieved 20th position in order of merit.

It appears eleven officers (39 per cent) decided to quit the CSS because the occupation groups to which they were allocated were not favoured by them. One did not fancy Postal group, two Railways group, two Information Group, two

OMG, one Income Tax Group and three FSP. The first four groups are generally considered to be low-esteem groups. Though rated fairly high Foreign Service was turned down probably because it involved foreign posting. The three FSP officers would have preferred a different occupation and a domestic posting. The officer who disliked the Income Tax job opted eventually to migrate to Canada (Table 12).

Nine officers (32 per cent) decided to relinquish CSS because they felt attracted to some other vocations. A Customs officer opted to adopt journalism as a career. A Police officer opted to start his own private business by starting a training academy. Two OMG officers quit: one to migrate to USA and other to start his own private business. Four DMG officers opted out of CSS; three to join a MNC and one to migrate to USA/Canada. One Foreign Service officer resigned to join an international organization in USA.

Eight officers (28 per cent) left CSS because of disenchantment. One belonged to Police, two to Income Tax, one to OMG and four to DMG. Three of the disenchanted DMG officers were placed at the first, fourth and ninth place in the Competitive Examination (Table 12).

Where did the dropouts from CSS go?

Seven out of 28 CSS officers (25 per cent) chose to migrate to USA or Canada. Two officers each were from the DMG, OMG and Income Tax group. One belonged to Police Service. Barring one female officer who migrated for marital reasons all others appeared to be disenchanted with the conditions of service in their occupation groups. Five or 18 per cent opted (after many years of service) to join the service in an international organization. Four of the five belonged to the highly esteemed DMG and had attained a very high place in order of merit in the competitive Civil Service Examination (between 1 and 9). Four officers or 14 per cent preferred to undertake consultancy work, legal practice, work as a contractor or start own business enterprise. Three officers decided to return to their original jobs, all of whom were Provincial Civil Service officers in the judicial branch. The new jobs allocated to them were either low in public esteem or required working outside the country (Table 13).

Table 14 gives the occupational background of the fathers of CSS officers who decided to quit CSS as a vocation. Over two-fifths of such fathers are government servants of middle managerial level. Table 15 shows the educational background of fathers of drop outs from CSS. Nearly two-fifths of them are graduates and 28 per cent are postgraduates. Table 16 gives the annual income of the fathers of drop outs from CSS. Over fifty per cent of them have an annual income of 100,000 rupees or less. Thirty two per cent have an annual income of over 100,000 rupees but less than 200,000. Fourteen per cent have an annual income of 400,000 rupees or more.

Conclusion

Only 3.6 per cent of the CSS officers happen to be the offsprings of government servants who themselves are CSS officers. Even if we take account of the offsprings who tried but failed to enter the CSS the proportion is not likely to rise very high. Low percentage of recruitment of offsprings of CSS officers in to the CSS may be interpreted as low level of popularity of civil service as a vocation. Of course a large proportion of new CSS officers are the children of government servants but only a small percentage of these government servants are members of the CSS.

Only 2.8 per cent of the CSS officers have one or more sibling in the CSS. Even if we take in to account the fact that the number of eligible candidates in the families of CSS fathers may be limited (by numbers or by age) the percentage is extremely low. This information also demonstrates that approval rating of the CSS as a vocation tends to be rather low.

Twenty-eight officers out of 1283 decided to quit the CSS in nine years (between 1990 and 1998). It constitutes around two per cent which is very low. It seems, once selected, very few officers choose to relinquish the CSS. It may be partly because of lack of alternative openings. It may also be because of, under the circumstances, relatively attractive conditions of service in the CSS. But what is worth noting is that a relatively large proportion of the CSS officers from high-esteem occupation groups are leaving the civil service. Over 28 per cent of those relinquishing the CSS are from the highly esteemed DMG. Over 21 per cent of the drop outs left after seven to ten years of service. Around 25 per cent of the drop outs are from the high achievers holding one of the top ten positions in order of merit in the competitive examination (Table 17). Twenty five per cent of the drop outs migrated to industrially developed countries and 25 per cent left the CSS to join MNCs or an international organization. In short, the civil service is losing some of its brightest officers to developed countries, MNCs or private sector.

Table 1: Occupation Group of CSS Fathers of CSS Officers

Occupation Group	Number	Per cent
CSP/DMG	17	36
Police	6	13
CSS (Other than DMG and Police)	24	51
Total	**47**	**100**

Table 2: Educational Background of CSS Fathers

Education	Number	Per cent
MA/MSc	23	48.9
MA LLB, MBA, MCom	13	27.7
BA/BSc	5	10.6
BA LLB	4	8.5
MPhil	1	2.1
PhD	1	2.1
Total	**47**	**100.0**

Table 3: Annual Income of CSS Fathers

Income	Number	Per cent
Upto 100,000	6	12.8
Upto 200,000	20	42.6
Upto 300,000	14	29.8
Upto 500,000	5	10.6
Upto 700,000	1	2.1
DNK	1	2.1
Total	**47**	**100.0**

Table 4: Educational Background of CSS Children of CSS Fathers

Education	Number	Per cent
MA/MSc	13	27.7
MBA	7	14.9
M.Phil	1	2.1
BA/BSc	10	21.3
BSc (Engg.)	10	21.3
BBA	4	8.5
MBBS	2	4.3
Total	**47**	**100.0**

Table 5: CSS Siblings allocation according to Public Esteem of Occupation Groups

Esteem of Occupation Group	Number	Per cent
High-Medium	14	37.8
High-Low	6	16.2
Medium-Low	5	13.5
High-High	4	10.8
Medium-Medium	3	8.1
Low-Low	1	2.7
Medium-Low-High	3	8.1
High-Medium-Medium	1	2.7
Total	**37**	**100.0**

Table 6: Siblings according to Father's Occupation

Occupation	Number	Per cent
Elite Service	3	8.1
Government Service (Top Managerial)	4	10.8
Government Service (Middle Managerial)	9	24.3
Government Service (Non-Managerial)	5	13.5
Professional	11	29.7
Small Business	2	5.4
Farmer	3	8.1
Total	**37**	**100.0**

Table 7: Educational Background of CSS Fathers of Siblings in CSS

Education	Number	Per cent
Upto Matric*	6	16.2
Upto BA/BSc**	13	35.1
MA/MSc***	11	29.7
BA/LLB	6	16.2
PHD	1	2.7
Total	**37**	**100.0**

* Including 4 Under Matric
** Including 3 BSC (Engg) and 4 FA
*** Including 3 MA LLB

Table 8: Annual Income of Fathers of Siblings in CSS

Income	Number	Per cent
Upto 60,000	13	35.1
Upto 150,000	11	29.7
Upto 300,000	8	21.6
Upto 600,000	3	8.1
Over 600,000	2	5.4
Total	**37**	**100.0**

Table 9: Siblings according to Gender

Sex	Number (1)	Joined CSS(2)	Per Cent (2 of 1)
Girls	78	10	12.8
Boys	121	68	56.2
Total	**199**	**78**	

Table 10: Dropouts according to Occupation Group

Occupation Group	Number	Per cent
Custom and Excise	1	3.6
DMG	8	28.6
FSP	4	14.3
Information Group	2	7.1
Income Tax	3	10.7
OMG	5	17.9
Police	2	7.1
Postal Group	1	3.6
Railways (C&T) Group	2	7.1
Total	**28**	**100.0**

Table 11: Dropouts according to Time of Relinquishment

Time	Number	Per cent
Immediately	2	7.1
After completing Pre-service Training	10	35.7
After one year	2	7.1
After two years	3	10.7
After three years	3	10.7
After five years	1	3.6
After six years	1	3.6
After seven years	1	3.6
After ten years	5	17.9
Total	**28**	**100.0**

Table 12: Reasons for Relinquishing CSS

Reason	Number	Per cent
Undesirable allocation	11	39.3
Attracted to another vocation	9	32.1
Disenchantment with occupation group	8	28.6
Total	**28**	**100.0**

Table 13: Dropouts according to New Occupation

New Occupation	Number	Per cent
Migrated	7	25.0
Journalism	1	3.6
Consultancy/Business/Practice/Contractor	4	14.3
MNC	2	7.1
International Organization	5	17.9
Returned to original job	3	10.7
Politics	1	3.6
Private sector job	1	3.6
DNK	4	14.3
Total	**28**	**100.0**

Table 14: Occupational Background of Fathers of Dropouts

Occupation	Number	Per cent
GS (Middle Management)	12	42.9
GS (Non Managerial)	4	14.3
Business	3	10.7
Elite Service	2	7.1
GS (Top Managerial)	2	7.1
Farmer	2	7.1
Professional	3	10.7
Total	**28**	**100.0**

Table 15: Educational Background of Fathers of Dropouts

Education	Number	Per cent
Upto Matric	4	14.3
FA/FSc	2	7.1
BA/BSc	8	28.6
MA/MSc	4	14.3
MA LLB BEd	4	14.3
BA LLB	3	10.7
Ph.D	1	3.6
Diploma (Engg)	1	3.6
MBBS	1	3.6
Total	**28**	**100.0**

Table 16: Annual Income of Fathers of Dropouts

Income	Number	Per cent
Upto 20,000	6	21.4
Upto 50,000	6	21.4
Upto 100,000	3	10.7
Upto 200,000	7	25.0
Upto 300,000	2	7.1
Over 400,000	4	14.3
Total	**28**	**100.0**

Table 17: Dropouts according to Merit Position

Merit Position	Number	Per cent
1-5	5	17.9
6-10	2	7.1
11-20	2	7.1
21-40	3	10.7
41-50	2	7.1
51-60	2	7.1
61-80	2	7.1
81-100	3	10.7
101-150	3	10.7
151-200	2	7.1
201-250	1	3.6
DNK	1	3.6
Total	**28**	**100.0**

ASAD ZAMAN

POWER/KNOWLEDGE AND ECONOMIC THEORIES

Abstract:

It is widely believed that human knowledge represents valuable information about the world we live in. Historical studies of Michel Foucault led to the striking conclusion that human knowledge cannot be separated from the power configurations governing society. In this paper, we study how economic theories are shaped by socio-political power.

Introduction

Epistemology is a branch of philosophy that investigates the origin, nature, methods, and limits of human knowledge. Currently dominant conceptions of knowledge define knowledge as "True, Justified, Belief." Without going into the complex details, we focus on the basic idea that knowledge is "true". Suppose we wish to evaluate a sentence such as: "Electricity generated by the Kalabagh dam would be worth 3 billion Rupees per year at current prices." Then we would look at engineering specifications of the proposed dam, relevant water flow data, and energy prices. If these technical details add up, then the sentence would be considered "true" and would be added to our knowledge. If data on water flows, energy generation capacities and prices of electricity lead to figures like 1 billion or 6 billion, then the sentence would be considered false, and we would not add it to our knowledge base. The following questions may be interesting, but they are not relevant to the evaluation of whether or not this sentence represents knowledge:

1. Who made this claim about the dam? Who was he talking to?

2. In what context did this conversation take place? Why was it said?

3. What will be the consequences to Pakistan, and to the speaker, if the sentence is accepted as true?

Post-modern philosophers dispute this idea of knowledge. Many earlier philosophers have noted the relationship between theories propounded and the interests of the proposer. For instance, Karl Marx argued that different classes adopt different economic theories which align with their economic interests. Among modern philosophers, Michel Foucault (1980) took this idea to a radical extreme. He argues that modern human sciences (biological, psychological, social) purport to

offer universal scientific truths about human nature that are, in fact, often mere expressions of ethical and political commitments of a particular society. On deeper analysis, what passes for knowledge, and is stated as a universal scientific truth, is actually a defense of existing power configurations. On initial encounter, this is a startling claim. Our goal in this article is to make it more plausible by studying some examples of economic theories and their relations to power interests. But first we give an example to more clearly illustrate the nature of our argument.

According to the Knowledge=Truth theory, the statement that "VAT Taxes will benefit Pakistan" should be evaluated by economic arguments regarding amount of revenue generated and costs and benefits to the economy of Pakistan. However, the Knowledge=Power theory states that if the interests of multinationals and powerful elites are served by acceptance of this sentence, then it will be accepted as knowledge. On the other hand, if it does not serve power interests, it will be rejected as invalid. If the post-modernists are right, than questions 1-3 posed above, as well as a host of other questions, become very crucial to epistemology. In this essay, we will study the relation between certain economic theories and the interests of power groups within society.

Poverty

In traditional societies, poverty was accepted as a natural phenomenon. The Bible states that "The poor you will always have with you." Karl Marx's famous dictum that "Religion is the opium of the masses" refers to this state of affairs. He argued that religion serves the interests of the powerful by reconciling the poor to their lot, instead of revolting against the rich to capture a greater share of the pie.

There are numerous recorded instances where the poor did revolt against exploitation by the rich. The French revolution was the most important of these events, which permanently changed conceptions of poverty and attitudes towards the poor. The desperation of the excessively exploited poor led to the overthrow of the established aristocracy and the formation of peoples' government; for more details, see for example, Forrest (1981). The changed power configurations led to the emergence of new ideas about the nature of poverty. It became clear to powerful aristocrats and landowners that more rights for the poor supported the long-term interests of the rich by reducing the chances of a revolution. In this favorable atmosphere, slogans of "Liberty, Fraternity and Equality," and progressive ideas of Enlightenment thinkers like Godwin and Condorcet led to substantial popular support for social programmes to improve the lives of the poor.

Across the channel, these ideas were threats to the power of the English aristocracy. It was necessary to come up with an alternative stance regarding the poor, in order to protect the interests of the powerful, and prevent them from having to make too many concessions to the poor. Necessity is the mother of invention, and Malthus fabricated the desired theory in his famous "Essay on Population." Working entirely from his imagination, without any support from facts or statistics, he argued that the

main reason for poverty, vice, and misery was the high population growth rate of the poor. Schemes to help the poor would be counterproductive because giving the poor more food would only lead them to reproduce faster, creating even more poor. By putting the blame for poverty on the poor, he diverted attention from the responsibility of the rich to provide welfare and social programmes to help the poor.

This example is an interesting test case to compare the two theories of knowledge discussed at the outset of this article. Even now, it is widely believed that Malthus was right. However, on comparison with facts, we find that all of the quantitative elements of Malthusian arguments have proven to be false. For example, on the basis of his calculations showing that population would outstrip food supplies, Malthus argued that the island of Britain could not sustain a population of more than 20 million. However, 150 years later the population was more than triple Malthus' ceiling. Also, Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen has shown that supplies of food per capita have been increasing slightly for centuries, contradicting a key Malthusian assumption. Even more striking is Sen's (1981) demonstration that famines are not caused by food shortages. Thus the idea of knowledge as truth does not fit the Malthusian theories on population; this is again conflicts with Malthusian theories. Widespread belief and acceptance of Malthus reflects the power of the English elite, whose interests were well served by these theories. Initiatives for social programmes to help the poor were curtailed or dropped by the English parliament, resulting in a budget saving for the rich. It was also widely observed, with approval, that worse conditions for the poor led to a more docile labor force, willing to work for less in poor conditions, for lack of alternatives.

Communism

The idea that human knowledge represents configurations of power receives substantial support when we look at situations where power configurations changed. In the twentieth century, the Russian revolution was a dramatic change in configurations of power, both within Russia and also globally. The theory of Communism as developed by Marx stated that Capitalist societies would over-exploit labourers, which would eventually lead to a communist revolution. Peasant agrarian societies like Russia were supposed to first transition to capitalism, and then later on to communism. Thus the Russian revolution in some ways contradicted Marx's theories about how economic systems changed. The Russians revised the theory to align with their experience of having by and large skipped the capitalist stage of development.

The battle between capitalism and communism was reflected by the intellectual debates about the relative merits of planned economies versus free market economies. Russia was the only successful example of a transition from an agrarian economy to an industrial economy at the time. The capitalist economies feared that agrarian societies all over the world would seek to emulate Russia and turn communist. The theory of Development Economics was developed as the capitalist answer to this threat. It provided theoretical answers to how economies could

develop within a capitalist economic structure. These theories reduced the complex process of economic growth to capital accumulation. They argued that poor growth due to low savings could be accelerated by foreign aid. Although the results of these strategies were very poor, these theories were very conveniently tied to the interests of the elite ruling classes in the developing countries. As has been documented by many sources, the lending countries themselves as well as military and civil ruling classes in the borrowing countries were the beneficiaries of these foreign aids policies, which only increase tax burdens on the populace which repaid these loans, without gaining any benefits from them. Yet these strategies continue to form the foundations of development economics and policies in the form of World Bank loans and foreign investment (FDI).

In the 20th century, Mao's revolution which brought Communism to China, was a major upset to dominant power configurations. The CIA was called to the carpet for its failure to anticipate and frustrate this anti-capitalist phenomenon. They explained that this revolution was based in rural areas, while the CIA had presence only in the urban areas. Older readers will remember the extensive Village Aid programme in Pakistan. Similar programmes were launched all over the world to gather information, and generally prevent unrest and revolutions in rural areas. Thus theories of rural development entered the discourse of development economists not as a result of discovery of new facts about the real world, but as a result of shifting power configurations. Furthermore, these programmes were dismantled when it became clear that unlike Russia, China did not plan to export its revolution. Decline in academic studies of rural development in the present era corresponds to this loss of funding, rather than any factual changes in the world, providing further support for the idea that knowledge represents power interests.

Development Economics

The prescriptions of Development Economics were applied to generate growth in Pakistan in the 60's by a group of expert economists from Harvard. As already discussed, these theories focus on the accumulation of capital, rather than lives of human beings. Pakistani economist Mahbubul-Haq saw through the mathematical formulations to the heart of the strategy proposed for growth. He wrote: "It is well to recognize that economic growth is a brutal, sordid process. There are no short cuts to it. The essence of it lies in making the labourer produce more than he is allowed to consume for his immediate needs, and to reinvest the surplus thus obtained." Despite this clear recognition, he thought that exploiting the poor was necessary to create growth, which would bring long-term benefit to all. Much to his credit, he renounced his earlier views when he saw the bad effects of these economic policies. As the Power/Knowledge theory predicts, these theories were accepted and adopted not because they were true, but because they served the interests of the rich. Mahbubul Haq noted that wealth became concentrated (in the hands of 22 families) and did not "trickle-down." He wrote that "we were told to take care of our GNP as that would take care of poverty – let us reverse this and take care of poverty as this will take care of our GNP."

One might think that the learning acquired from experience would translate into practice. This accords with the idea that knowledge is "true" and is acquired by rejection of false theories. However the knowledge acquired by Mahbubul-Haq at such great cost to the Pakistani public was promptly forgotten. Mahbubul-Haq went back to the World Bank, and Pakistani governments, military and civil alike, continued to concentrate on programmes favoring accumulation of capital by the wealthy at the expense of the public. Only lip service was paid to key initiatives like achieving universal literacy or self reliance, which are a prerequisite for economic growth of any kind.

Free Trade

John Kenneth Galbraith writes "The modern conservative is engaged in one of man's oldest exercises in moral philosophy; that is, the search for a superior moral justification for selfishness." The Invisible Hand of Adam Smith is an illustration of this idea – selfish behavior by individuals leads to the best outcomes for society. This is at the heart of mainstream economic theory, which propagates as a core belief the idea of "Laissez-Faire": let everbody do what they please, and the best social outcomes will result. Superficially, "Laissez-Faire" or no interference in markets seems like a fair and equitable philosophy – let everyone do whatever they want. In fact, it is highly inequitable; the poor don't have choices, while the rich and powerful take advantage of this liberty to extract money from the less rich.

The economic theory of free trade is an application of Laissez-Faire to international relations. It says that it is best for all nations to not put any restrictions on trade. This is among the most widely believed and fervently advocated ideas of economists. It is an excellent illustration of the idea of power/knowledge. This theory was invented in England, *after* it had acquired a fifty year lead over the rest of Europe in industrialization. As Bairoch (1995) has shown, adoption of this theory in Europe led to a recession in European economies and a boom in the English economy. German economist List realized this and put forth the infant industry argument to create tariff barriers against England. This revived the German economy and allowed it to compete and industrialize. Contrary to the idea of knowledge as truth, English theories of free trade represented their economic interests while German theories of infant industry reflected German needs of the time.

There are many other instances which show the direct relationship between Power and the Knowledge that Free Trade is good. These are cases where these theories were imposed by force on unwilling (and ungrateful) recipient nations. Japan was invaded for the sole purpose of imposition of free trade by Admiral Perry of the U.S. and including Britain, France and Germany with some representation of Holland as well, The treaty imposed upon Japan forbade her from imposing any tariff, either on imports or exports. Similarly, the two Opium Wars in China were fought in the holy name of Free Trade to defend the rights of the English to export Opium to China. The theory that it was beneficial for Portugal to export wine and import clothing from England instead of setting up her own cotton industry was enforced upon Portugal by English gunboats.

If knowledge that free trade is beneficial for all nations is the objective truth, then it is rather odd how nations at the receiving end of these theories stubbornly refuse to see this truth, while the more powerful nations utilize force to bring them to their senses, and do what is beneficial for all. The idea that knowledge is an expression of power conforms perfectly with this historical experience.

Trickle Down Theories

The World Bank and other powerful institutions continue to insist, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that the best way to eliminate poverty is through economic growth. This is also the approach of standard economic textbook on growth theory: the main problem is the accumulation of capital. This idea has been labeled the "trickle-down" theory – concentrate on acquiring wealth, even though this wealth will go primarily to the rich and powerful. Eventually their prosperity will trickle down to the poor. Furthermore this is the best strategy to help the poor.

We have already detailed Mahbul-Haq's implementation of these theories in Pakistan, and their subsequent failure. Under the name of "Structural Adjustment Programmes" or SAP's these economic policies were applied all over the world by the World Bank. According to the received wisdom, this should have created growth, stabilized governments, and alleviated poverty. However, independent evaluations by Mr. Fantu Cheru (2001) show that these have had the opposite effect:

> "Increasing malnutrition, falling school enrolments and rising unemployment have been attributed to the policies of structural adjustment. Yet these same institutions continue to prescribe the same medicine as a condition for debt relief, dismissing the overwhelming evidence that SAPs have increased poverty."

Many other authors have documented the harmful effects of the SAP's on global poverty and inequality. Even World Bank experts have admitted that these policies have failed to achieve the desired effects. Accordingly, the SAP's were replaced by PRSP's – Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. The name strongly suggests that these papers would be more poor friendly. Closer examination reveals old wine in new bottles – policies known to worsen poverty continue to be pushed as effective anti-poverty measures. The reasons why PRSP's will not make any impact on poverty is detailed in the report by Cheru (2001) cited earlier.

There is overwhelming empirical evidence against the central idea of the "trickle down" effect. Repeated experience shows that implementation of unfettered capitalistic policies leads to unhealthy concentrations of wealth and income at the top, and increasing poverty and misery at the bottom. The collapse of communism has allowed for the worldwide application of these free market theories. Reagan and Thatcher implemented these free market policies in the USA and UK with predictable results. From 1980 to 2006 the richest 1% of America tripled their after-tax percentage of the nation's total income, while the share of the bottom 90% dropped over 20%. Between 2002 and 2006, it was even worse: an astounding three-

quarters of all the economy's growth was captured by the top 1%. The same pattern of sharply increasing inequality holds globally; the wealthiest 250 persons have more than the poorest 2.5 billion people on the planet. In her book *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism***,** Naomi Klein (2008) has provided a detailed picture of the adverse effects of these theories and policies.

Empirical data clearly shows that free market policies lead to "trickle-up" – money is extracted from labourers and accumulates in hands of wealthy elites. Nonetheless policies and theories taught in texts continue to favor and advocate the opposite: a growth oriented perspective towards poverty removal. This does not accord well with the idea of knowledge as truth, but is very much in line with the idea of knowledge as an expression of power.

Conclusions

Extremely disturbing consequences follow from the idea that our political and economic theories are reflections of dominant power interests, rather than an encapsulation of objective truths about the world. An immediate consequence is that our educational institutions strengthen existing power structures. This is because the "knowledge" being imparted to the students is not factual information about the world, but a representation of existing power configurations. This may be very useful to the wealthy and powerful countries, but is very harmful to the poorer countries, since the political and economic theories studied as objective truths support the current extremely inequitable distribution of world wealth. Klein (2008) has given examples of how specific universities in target countries have been helpful in supporting the interests of foreign capitalists at the expense of domestic industries and labourers. For example, the School of the Americas run by the US Military for Latin Americans produced many dictators who ruthlessly enforced free market policies in Latin America, favouring US Corporate interests at the expense of the native populace. Efforts to shut down the School and cut its funding for these reasons failed, and it continues its old policies under a different name.

Globally, university educated elites are taught to favor political and economic policies which limit, harm or destroy domestic industries, while favoring foreign investors. Several economic theories point to foreign debt as the key to progress; it can fill the investment gap and accelerate growth. Such theories place the poor countries in bondage to the rich, enabling them to extract colonial revenues without actually colonizing:

- The developing world now spends $13 on debt repayment for every $1 it receives in grants.

- For the poorest countries (approximately 60), $550 billion has been paid in both principal and interest over the last three decades, on $540bn of loans, and yet there is still a $523 billion dollar debt burden.

In the past, armies were required for this process of revenue extraction from the colonies, and wars were used to dictate free trade as the terms of surrender. Today graduates of elite Western universities and their local replicas at the helm of Economics and Planning ministries suffice. These observations have radical implications for the planning for higher education in Pakistan.

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FAISAL BARI

FROM ECONOMIC GROWTH TO HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: JOURNEY WITH DR. MAHBUB UL HAQ

Introduction

The field of development economics has undergone some fundamental changes in the last sixty years. Most regions that became independent in the aftermath of the Second World War were economically very underdeveloped. This, apart from theoretical innovations, sparked significant interest in development issues. The early growth theories suggested ways, through planning and targeted investments, in which developing countries could quickly be moved to sustainable and high growth trajectories. These models furnished reason for optimism and hope that the development process which took much longer in the West, could be short-circuited to a few decades. But, for most of the developing countries, these hopes were not fulfilled. Even at the end of the 1960s and into the 1970s, the gaps between the developed and the developing were still not only very large, very few countries had been able to narrow them by much. Concerns about poverty and the suffering of people became an increasing refrain, and development economics saw the rise of the *basic needs* approach to development, suggesting a lexicographic ordering of policy priorities. In the 1980s the growth theories made a comeback, but now they endogenized the human dimension. In the 1990s we also saw the evolution of the *human development* paradigm from the basic needs approach. These transitions reflect important changes in our understanding of the development process, and in turn, inform policymaking.

Dr. Mahbub ul Haq has been one of the pioneers in the area of human development literature.[1] He was leading the group of economists and researchers working at and for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that started publishing the *Human Development Reports*. He was instrumental in the creation of the *Human Development Index (HDI)* as well as some of the subsequent refinements in it. Dr. Haq was also involved with the development efforts of Pakistan. He was one of the architects of the Second (1960-65) and Third (1965-70) Five Year Plans of the Ayub era, and he was one of the leading members of the finance team under General Zia ul Haq in the 1980s. In this context he is a very important witness of the development efforts of a typical developing country: Pakistan, as well as a witness and an active participant in the changes that had occurred in the field of development over the last forty years.

Dr. Haq started out as a very enthusiastic proponent of the Harrod-Domar/Solow growth theories. They gave him a way of structuring the development effort. His first book *The Strategy of Economic Planning: A Case Study of Pakistan,* published in 1963, gives an account of this enthusiasm as well as the methodology behind the thinking of that time. By the late 1960s and early 1970s Dr. Haq had come to realize some of the shortcomings of the paradigm, and the mistakes that planners had committed in implementing that paradigm. This is beautifully brought out in his second book, published in 1976, *The Poverty Curtain: Choices for the Third World.* Here we see a shift towards the b*asic needs* paradigm, but a groping for operationalization of these concepts as well. The third book, published in 1995, *Reflections on Human Development: How the focus of development economics shifted from national income accounting to people-centred policies, told by one of the chief architects of the new paradigm*,[2] brings out the complete and radical change that had occurred. By going through the three books we not only see the changes that have occurred in development theory through the eyes of a thoughtful and self-critical thinker, but we also see the practical implications of mistakes and the identification of new directions for research and policymaking. Dr. Haq has other writings as well: articles, speeches and edited work. But in this article we have focused on these three books to bring out the transitions, the reasons behind them, and the direction they point out for the developing and developed countries.[3]

Dr. Haq had the ability to challenge assumptions, paradigms and entrenched ideas. This is rare, even in academics. Most academics tend to get set in their ideas and pre-suppositions, sometimes despite strong contrary evidence. As John Maynard Keynes said: "The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones which ramify…..into every corner of our minds." Dr. Haq, by going after his assumptions, ensured that he lay bare, for his readers, what he did challenge and what he did not:

"In a way this is not a book in the standard sense of the term. It is more an evolution of ideas over time. I have tried to relate them as honestly as I could, including my own agonizing mistakes and rediscoveries. I personally believe that ideas have a life of their own and there is nothing more fascinating than to watch their growth." Pp. xv, Preface of Book 2. By allowing us to 'watch his ideas grow', he will allow us to grow with him, maybe in a different direction, but that is what growth is all about.

Growth Euphoria (The 1960s)

1950-70 was the era of great optimism and hope in the area of development economics and planning. Most of the developing countries had just arrived on the international scene in the aftermath of WWII, and at the end of the colonial period. Their governing elites were very optimistic about their growth and development prospects. Modern growth theories had just been formulated, and they suggested that the developing countries could short circuit the development process through planning and selective intervention. They could thus catch up with the developed countries in much shorter times than it had taken these countries to reach advanced stages of development.

Dr. Mahbub ul Haq joined the Pakistan Planning Commission sometime after completing his doctorate in economics from Yale University.[4] He went through the graduate education programme when the reigning paradigm of development was shaped largely by the growth theories of Rostow, Harrod-Domar and Solow, and the various two sector models that were being discussed and published.[5]

The basic insights of these models were that, by and large, growth occurred through investment (and delaying current consumption). These investments would mainly be in industry. Developing countries were predominantly agricultural, with at best nascent industrial sectors. Thus the scope for industrial development was massive, and the expected returns from such investments were very significant. The main problem was lack of capital due to poverty and low savings. The solutions were to encourage savings, make the worker and agriculture sector produce surplus that could be invested in industry, and also raise funds through foreign aid and borrowing. The 'virtuous cycle' of investment and income was to be created by reinvesting the returns from initial investments till the activity could become self-sustainable. Agriculture would provide a large part of the investible surplus, and all of the labour. Since agriculture was seen to be suffering from real and disguised unemployment, the shift of labour was not expected to reduce the output and surplus from agriculture significantly.[6]

A simple version of the Harrod-Domar model[7] is reproduced here to explain the framework further. Harrod-Domar model takes the macro approach to growth modeling, where capital K and labour L are jointly supplied to produce total national output Q, which is then used for current consumption C, or investment I leading to additional capital accumulation. Hence the model:

$$Q = C + I$$
$$I = sQ$$
$$Q = (1/k)K$$
$$I = dK/dt$$

The first equation gives the static allocation between consumption and investment, the second is a savings function, the third is the production function where $k = K/Q > 0$ is the capital-output ratio, and the fourth is the dynamic capital accumulation equation. If $g_x = (dx/dt)/x$ denotes the growth rate of any dated variable x, the above equations give us:[8]

$$g_K = s/k \text{.....} implying$$
$$g_Q = g_I = g_K = g_C = s/k$$

Given the rate of growth in capital, since all other variables are proportional to capital, they will all grow at the same rate. The simple Harrod-Domar model

suggests that the growth rate of income of an economy can be raised by raising the savings rate and investing that saving, and by making the production process efficient. If we add population increase to the model, the net rate of increase in per capita income will be given by the increase in income, net of the increase in population. The Solow model replaced the simple constant return production function above with a neo-classical diminishing returns (in K and L) production function. This allowed Solow to predict convergence in incomes or growth rates, as long as technological change is not introduced. This basic framework was behind the planning efforts of the 1960s.[9]

Dr. Haq fully subscribed to the model and paradigm:

" It is well to recognize that economic growth is a brutal, sordid process. There are no short cuts to it. The essence of it lies in making the labourer produce more than he is allowed to consume for his immediate needs, and to reinvest the surplus thus obtained." Pp. 1. Book 1.[10]

It did not matter whether you termed the process exploitation in the Marxist terms or investment, the bottom line was the same. There was no choice for these countries. They had pressing poverty and underdevelopment problems and the only way to address them was through this growth process. For Pakistan[11] the problem was:

"To summarize, the economic problem of Pakistan seems to be to lift its teeming millions to a higher level of per capita income than the current starvation level of $63, while facing severe foreign exchange shortage, lack of any known industrial raw materials or minerals, regional inequalities between East and West Pakistan, an acute unemployment problem, and an overall population growth rate of close to 2 per cent per annum." Pp. 6. Book 1.[12]

This led Dr. Haq to postulate the idea of a 'socially *necessary* rate of growth' which was based on the need to maintain per capita income in the face of rising population, absorbing both the net additions to the work force and the backlog of the unemployed, keeping up with other developing countries (India was the favourite comparison) and maintaining a growth rate that would lead to self-sustained growth in the 25-30 year period:

"Specifically, the (long-term growth) model can be constructed by (a) breaking down the long-term national income target into successive Plan targets; (b) multiplying additional income required in each plan period by the assumed net capital-output ratio to obtain an estimate of net investment required for each Plan period; (c) calculating depreciation on the basis of assumptions about the lifetime of new capital stock and, thus, estimating GNP and gross investment figures; (d) calculating gross domestic saving for each Plan period by deducting the assumed amount of external assistance from gross investment figures; (e) determining the target of marginal rate of domestic saving by dividing additional saving required in each Plan period by additional GNP expected during that period." Pp. 90. Book 1.

The technical requirements for working out the details of the plan were relatively simple, keeping in view the extremely reductionist view of growth provided by these spartan growth theories:

"Suffice it to note that, on the technical level, these (growth) models are built on three key assumptions: (a) net capital-output ratio, (b) marginal rate of domestic saving and projections of foreign assistance, and, (c) average life of new capital stock." Pp. 16. Book1.[13]

In the late fifties to the early sixties, till the possibilities of a *Green Revolution* altered perceptions, the focus was almost exclusively on industry. It is only in the mid sixties that agriculture was given some importance as a supplier of food, raw material, foreign exchange earnings, and as a provider of subsistence:

"It is a truism, however, that a healthy industrial sector cannot be based on stagnant agriculture. In fact, a fast developing industrial sector in Pakistan must perforce be based on a progressive, commercialized agricultural sector in the absence of any other known industrial or mineral resources." Pp. 76. Book 1. But nonetheless the focus was on industry: " It is hard to see how the high rates of growth in national income, postulated in the long-term model, can be obtained without developing the industrial sector in Pakistan at a very fast rate." Pp. 76. Book 1.

One of the consequences expected from following this growth paradigm was the creation of and increase in inequality in the economy. Some sectors would grow faster than others in the beginning, industry would grow faster than agriculture and services, and some regions would also show faster growth. This growth differential would show up in income differentials as well: industrialists, entrepreneurs, professionals and skilled labour would get higher rewards than people in the more traditional sectors. The creation of this inequality was seen as something inevitable, and though not laudable, a necessary corollary of the growth process:[14]

"There exists, therefore, a functional justification for inequality of income if this raises production for all and not consumption for a few. The road to eventual equalities may inevitably lie through initial inequalities." Pp.3. Book 1.

The 'growth philosophy' as opposed to the 'distribution' philosophy, should not look at this inequality as an evil and should not invoke government regulatory powers to intervene:

"If an individual has a very high income and he invests all of it in socially desirable capital stock, he should not be penalized for rendering this service to the community. He should be penalized only if a large part of his income spills over into conspicuous consumption, and only on that part of his income which spills over in this way. This is basically a philosophy of growth as opposed to a philosophy of distribution and, as has been argued earlier, its adoption is indispensable in period of 'take off'." Pp. 26. Book 1.

Not only should the state not intervene to reduce the incentives of the entrepreneurs and others receiving high returns, the state should also not start welfare projects and spend too much on redistribution at an early stage or it would run the risk of derailing the growth process:

"Secondly, growth philosophy demands that the expenditure on the provision of social services should be given less emphasis. This applies to housing, health and social welfare services." Pp. 35 Book 1. Dr. Haq did not place education in this gambit. He could see the instrumental value of education in providing a more trained, efficient and productive work force. Thus education, especially basic literacy and technical education, given the externalities for the society, could be financed by the state and this was not seen as part of the 'distribution philosophy'.

It is not being argued that the researchers and policymakers advocating the 'growth model' were blind to the needs of the people, or were not concerned about poverty and the squalid condition of the majority of the people living in developing countries. They were also not blind to the potential for social unrest that imbalanced growth and increased inequality could create. But they did see growth as the way to address these issues in the shortest possible time, and did think that early preoccupation with distribution could reverse or even abort the entire process:

"Some level of subsistence must be assured to the present generation.....But what we have sought to stress is the harm that can be done to economic growth because of undue preoccupation with distributional policies or ideas of social justice during a stage of development when the real problem is the creation of 'surplus value'." Pp. 3 Book 1.

Dr. Haq was scathing in his criticism of Keynes and his preoccupation with distribution and suggested that this preoccupation was a 'luxury' that only the rich countries could indulge in.[15]

The importance of creating long-term plans, the operationalization of these plans through five-year plans, and the integration of planning in the overall government apparatus was taken to be essential. There was not much thought, at the initial stage at least, that this would increase the role of the public sector in the economy, and have implications of its own:[16]

"The revolutionary regime, which took over in October 1958, had restored political stability in the country, for lack of which the First Plan had failed to command wide political or public support. Continuous increases in the price level were brought under control and a measure of financial discipline imposed on the economy. The administrative structure was toned up, the institutional arrangements improved and the system of planning built into the whole fabric of society. As such the Second Plan has become a rallying point for national effort which the First Plan, unfortunately, never was." Pp. 173. Book 1.

The optimism of the time was clear as well:

"The Second Plan is likely to make a decisive breakthrough in investment……According to the historical experience of the developed economies, the Second Plan should prove to be the turning point for Pakistan's economic growth. If the contemplated acceleration in investment is achieved and maintained, Pakistan will graduate from a struggling underdeveloped country to a fairly fast developing economy." Pp. 176-177. Book 1.

The only caution that Dr. Haq sounded was about a reorientation of the Third Plan (1965-70) to strategic sectors, reduction of dependence on foreign aid,[17] and some focus towards education:

"1. The Third Plan should be formulated within the framework of a socialist philosophy. It should critically re-examine the country's increasing dependence on foreign assistance; discard the notion of balanced growth by selecting certain leading sectors and concentrating resources and organization in those sectors; accept a higher per capita growth rate for East Pakistan as its policy objective; evolve a concrete organization for the proper management of the surplus manpower of the nation; and develop an adequate portfolio of well-engineered projects as a prelude to plan formulation.

…….

4. It is suggested that agriculture, irrigation and housing should receive a lower priority and industry, fuels and minerals and education a much higher priority in the Third Plan compared with the Second Plan." Pp. 216-217. Book 1.

The policymaking and planning apparatus put in place was pragmatic and reflective of the need to expand industry. Throughout the Second Plan (1960-65) the same approach was followed and there was no effort to work out the basic set of principles and 'philosophy' on which the entire paradigm was based. There is scant recognition of the need for a political ideology and Dr. Haq addresses it only once in passing, and even then in the context of the long term:

"The economic system has continued to be a curious mixture of free enterprise and public intervention: the declared objective of the Government is to encourage private enterprise but its bureaucratic procedures and controls tend to favour allocations to the public sector, despite some recent decontrol measures. It is obvious that economic planning cannot proceed indefinitely in such a philosophic vacuum. Particularly in a long-run perspective, the ultimate objectives of planning must be clearly defined and the social and political framework within which planning decisions are to be made should be outlined." Pp. 198. Book 1.

The growth theories of the 1960s understood the growth process in a mechanical and process-oriented sense. There was scant recognition of the agents that would be

producing the growth and the ends for which this growth was being produced. In other words, humans, as means or ends of development, were missing from the picture.

Practioners and theorists, and Dr. Haq was no exception at that time, believed that 'development' would be a short term process, and hence could justify the sacrifices of the present generation through the certainty of a much better future for subsequent ones.[18] But the view had at least three problems. One, the process need not be short enough or certain enough to justify the imposition of these costs on the present generation in the hope of benefits for the future ones.[19] Two, even if one could be certain of future benefits, it is not clear how the interests of the present generation, who are 'ends' in themselves as much as the future ones, can be traded against the benefits to the future generations by a planner. Three, by ignoring the interests of the present generation (qua ends), one could damage the development effort itself and limit future growth and benefits. This can be due to both low investments in human capital and increasing social and political problems created by persisting poverty and inequality in society. These three points would form the core of the critique that the human development paradigm would bring to the fore a couple of decades later. But the realization was dawning even by the late 1960s.

By the end of the 1960s Dr. Haq was beginning to have serious doubts about the growth process and the validity of the paradigm. The growth in Pakistan had been impressive: per capita income growing at an average of 3.6 percent per annum for the decade (1960-70) while manufacturing grew at more than 10 percent per annum,[20] but it had not been shared across the people. The rise in inequality had been taken for granted initially, but some of the consequences were not seen. The increasing tensions between East and West Pakistan, the social unrest in the workers, salaried classes and professionals, the rise of the Left and the increasing concentration of wealth made Dr Haq uncomfortable. The 1965 war with India reduced foreign aid drastically and slowed down the growth process, and it also led to increased defence expenditure. Neither was an encouraging development.

Dr. Haq, despite being in the government and being one of the chief architects of the economic policy, spoke about the "22 family problem" in Pakistan. Speaking in Karachi in 1968, Dr Haq said that 22 family groups "controlled at that time about two thirds of the industrial assets, 80 percent of banking, and 70 percent of insurance in Pakistan". Pp. 6, Book 2.[21] This implied that growth had not filtered down to even the middle class and the impending tensions due to the development of crony capitalism were clear.

However before policy could be changed to address the shortcomings events took a very different course. Ayub Khan was overthrown, and Martial Law was imposed by General Yahya Khan. East Pakistan separated after a bloody civil war and became Bangladesh, and the remaining Pakistan installed the Bhutto government of Pakistan People's Party (PPP) at the center. Dr. Haq left Pakistan and joined the World Bank.

The Transition (The 1970s)

The time (1970-1982) at the World Bank gave Dr. Mahbub ul Haq a chance to introspect and reflect on his decade of experience of development planning in Pakistan, and the wider implications of the changes that were happening in the world. Economic growth rates, across the world, were slowing down, and some countries were facing significant stagflation: stagnant growth with price inflation.

For Pakistan the time had been particularly traumatic. The dismemberment of the state after a violent and bloody civil war (1970-71), the loss and surrender of the Pakistan Army to India and the rise of the Left in Pakistan meant fundamental changes in structures and institutions in Pakistan. Dr. Haq was one of the chief architects of the policies that had contributed to the developments: the high growth rates as well as the tensions in Pakistan. Being a reflective person it was inevitable that he would think about the experience. He was disturbed by what he saw:

" A poverty curtain has descended right across the face of our world, dividing it materially and philosophically into two different worlds, two separate planets, two unequal humanities—one embarrassingly rich and the other desperately poor." Pp. xv, Preface, Book 2.[22]

At the end of the 'decade of development', the achievements were finally summed up as follows:

"In blunt terms, Pakistan's capitalistic system is still one of the most primitive in the world. It is a system in which economic feudalism prevails. A handful of people, whether landlords or industrialists or bureaucrats, make all the basic decisions and the system often works simply because there is an alliance between various vested interests." Pp. 7, Book 2[23] (from an article Dr. Haq wrote in 1973). "What Pakistan badly needs today is to broaden the base of its economic and political power; to evolve a development strategy that reaches out to the bulk of the population; to innovate a new life style which is more consistent with its own poverty and its present stage of development." Pp. 7, Book 2.

There were a number of serious problems and flaws in the growth paradigm that he and others had religiously followed, defended and applied to Pakistan. The growth theories were reductionist, focused too much on GDP growth alone, separated distribution concerns from growth, did not pay any attention to the poor and their needs, made the process too narrow, allowed and encouraged excessive bureaucratic interference in the economy, and at the micro level had no criteria for project selection and appraisal.[24] Dr. Haq termed these shortcomings as the 'sins' of the development planner:

"The five-year development plans tended to ignore problems of unemployment, rural poverty, urban unrest, and poor social services since there was so little quantitative information available in these areas." Pp. 13, Book 2.

"Again planners in Pakistan devoted even less of their time and skills to project selection and appraisal. This was regarded as dirty work which operators in the field must do. The link between planning at the macro-level and project selection at the micro-level was, therefore, often weak and uncertain…

After spending a good deal of time with economic plan making, it is my conviction that the basic ingredients of a good development plan are economic policies, social and economic institutions, and project selection—certainly not the overall elegance of the plan models". Pp. 14, Book 2.[25]

There was increasing realization that 'social justice' was important as an end and a means:

"Second and even more important, policies of economic liberalism can work only if the fiscal system plays an aggressive role in ensuring social justice. Since the existing income distribution was considerably distorted in Pakistan, the free play of market mechanism naturally favored the richer regions as well as the richer income groups within the regions." Pp. 17, Book 2.

The human side of things was also completely ignored. The poor were left to fend for themselves, and by intention, there was little expenditure on social sectors like health, education and worker training. Inequality between the rich and the poor and the poverty of the majority was not only tolerated but 'functionally justified' for substantial periods of time. Dr. Haq could now see the cost:

"Not withstanding any protests to the contrary, very little investment seems to have gone into the development of human resources in most developing countries, particularly in South Asia". Pp. 22, Book 2. And:

"The most unforgivable sin of development planners is to become mesmerized by high growth rates in the Gross National Product and to forget the real objective of development." Pp. 24, Book 2. The development of humans, their ability to satisfy basic needs and have more opportunities was now being seen as the 'real objective of development'.

After identifying the shortcomings and 'sins' of the growth era, Dr. Haq specified some of the variables that would require more attention from policymakers, and the changes that would be needed in the process, institutions and aims of development. Dr. Haq could see how the entrenched socio-political set up had derailed the earlier development effort. He emphasized the need to deal with basic institutional/structural change first:

"The new development strategies require such a basic restructuring of the political, economic and social balance of power that, unless a decision is reached at the highest political levels and the entire political movement within the country is mobilized behind it, these planning exercises will remain largely academic." Pp. 64, Book 2.

Only after the balance-of-power restructuring could the planning process focus on the basic needs of people and on eradicating the 'worst forms of poverty'. Institutions needed to be reformed and then 'distribution had to be restructured' as "……, another way we went wrong was in assuming that income distribution policies could be divorced from growth policies and could be added later to obtain whatever distribution we desired." Pp. 33, Book 2. There was a need to move towards 'equality of opportunity' as "there is an increasing realization that economic growth does not filter down automatically to the masses". Pp. 60, Book 2.

Equality of opportunity could not be created as long as the institutions as well as policies favoured the rich, and there was not enough investment in education and training: "It is my conviction that the most essential ingredient in a successful and harmonious development effort is a massive investment in functional literacy and training." Pp. 24, Book 2. The instrumental role for education and training is pretty clear again, but what is a distinct change from the sixties is that Dr. Haq is also making a case for education and training on the basis of extending economic franchise, addressing poverty and increasing opportunities for improvement.

But in the end, these proposals are only non-operationalized suggestions. Dr. Haq does not give a framework for looking at the issues and formulating them in a way that would facilitate policymaking and policy change:

"By now, the strategy of launching a direct attack on mass poverty is generally accepted.....And yet, the change in our perceptions has remained largely at an intellectual level. There are not many concrete instances in the developing world where the philosophy of a direct attack on mass poverty is translated into specific development strategies and practical policy action. This is perhaps not surprising in the initial stages of a search for new development styles." Pp. 59, Book 2.

By the mid seventies Dr. Haq is also disillusioned with some of the policies that had been pursued by the developed world. He found that the level of aid to the developing countries had been very low, the focus on human needs had not been there, even the international agencies like the World Bank were not focusing on basic needs and making significant outlays in these sectors mandatory for borrowers,[26] and despite preaching the virtues of free trade, the developed world had continued to erect significant barriers to trade and movement of labour from developing countries. He also believed that power relations, between the developed and the developing, North and South, even in international bodies were not balanced. He saw scope for development for South-South relations and dialogue, coordination of South activities and the development of a South block that would increase the bargaining power of the developing countries. He was one of the founding members of the Third World Forum, created with the intention of bringing the concerns of the developing countries to the fore and articulating their 'voice', and for making the developed aware of the injustices and the imbalance.

Dr. Haq was quite convinced of the need for the third world commodity suppliers to coordinate actions for managing the price for their exports. He had argued that markets tend to favour the rich in a country if the underlying framework was not just and access not even. He believed that the same held at the international level as well. He could see the increasing disparities in income across nations and understood that for sustainability, a basic redistribution was needed. This is exactly the direction his thought developed in later, and it comes through clearly in Book 3. His thoughts on coordination pre-date the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crisis, and in some ways he saw OPEC like collusions as one way for the Third World to exert some control over resources as long as the North was not willing to listen to them.

Dr. Haq stayed with the World Bank through the 1970s. It was a turbulent time for Pakistan. The People's Party government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto affected significant changes in the Pakistani economy. The most significant, from the economic point of view, was the nationalization of all large scale industry, and most of even the medium sized industry, the entire banking and insurance sectors, shipping, education and health, and even some of the small scale rural industry (rice husking and flour mills).[27] This implied a massive increase in the size and responsibilities of the public sector and the bureaucratic setup. Neither was to the liking of Dr. Haq.

Dr. Haq returned to Pakistan in 1982 to work with the government of General Zia ul Haq. Over the decade of the 1980s Dr. Haq was again heavily involved in economic planning, policymaking and implementation in Pakistan. Over this period he held important positions as Commerce Minister, Planning Minister and Finance Minister, and as a member of the upper legislative chamber, the Senate. He left in 1989, after the death of General Zia, and went to UNDP. It is here that Dr. Haq led the team that developed the *Human Development Reports* as well as the *Human Development Index(HDI)*. This is, in some ways, the culmination of the intellectual journey that Dr. Haq had started with the disillusionment brought about by the growth experience of the 1960s.

(Hu)Man is the Measure of All Things (The 1990s)

During the 1980s, when Dr. Haq was responsible for the economic policies in Pakistan, the economy once again grew at an impressive rate of 6% plus per annum. The main reasons for the growth were the revival of investment by the private sector, the impressive textile sector growth based on the good weather crops of the early 1980s, the large foreign remittance being sent to Pakistan mainly by Pakistanis working in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the significant aid and loans available to Pakistan through international agencies and the United States, mainly due to the Afghan war.[28] This allowed Pakistan to not only make significant strides in lowering poverty, it also allowed a shift of some resources towards the social sector and new initiatives in adult literacy and health provision.

But despite the progress, the human development indicators for Pakistan, compared to countries at roughly the same level of income, were still quite low at the end of the decade.[29] The decade was not a complete success for Dr. Haq, but it was a useful learning experience. Unlike the last foray into planning, this time the 'challenges' which hindered Dr. Haq from achieving more on the human development and basic needs side were very different. It was not the problem of the theoretical framework and the limitations of the paradigm, it was more the political factors that shuttered Dr. Haq in. He worked under a military government and at the time of the Afghan conflict. This meant that military expenditures, the might of the army and the need to strengthen it, could not be challenged far less curtailed. At times Dr. Haq did not have the backing of the military government for initiatives that could alienate the stronger interest groups in the country. Innovative initiatives to levy luxury taxes on the rich, and agricultural taxation, could not be pushed through. It was thus not possible to spend the requisite amount on social sectors to make the breakthroughs needed, and neither could Dr. Haq make the coalitions necessary to break the stranglehold of the powerful and entrenched interests of the industrialists, landed, bureaucrats and the military.[30] For Dr. Haq this experience further cemented the view that institutional reform based on equity to make the playing field more 'leveled' had to be one of the pre-requisites for progress in human development.

The changes in Dr. Haq's view were complete by now and the journey started in the late 1960s was almost reaching its intellectual destination:

"…, after many decades of development, we are rediscovering the obvious—that people are both the means and the end of economic development." Pp. 3, Book 3. By making humans 'means' as well as 'ends', Dr. Haq invoked all three of the critiques of the growth paradigm developed in Section 2. 'Ends' cannot be sacrificed for the future, even when benefits are certain, and ignoring 'ends' undermines the entire development process in a dynamic setting automatically.

The idea of human development being the 'end' and not just a means is of course not new. It is, in many ways, a rediscovery of the wheel. But in social sciences we do find that 'progress' is not linear in the way that people believe it happens in the physical sciences, In social sciences we 'visit the same place' a number of times but with the difference that each time our understanding is a bit richer and a bit more connected. It is the same with human development and Dr. Haq was the first to admit it. He refers to Aristotle[31] and Kant as some of the pioneers who had talked about this view long ago, and there are many others. Dr. Haq was not a philosopher, and he had no intention of being one. But the stream of thinking he was plugging himself into is certainly a deep and old one. That gave justification for the view that 'humans' and their welfare, and in the present, needed to be at the centre of planning:

"The defining difference between the economic growth and the human development schools is that the first focuses exclusively on the expansion of only one choice—income—while the second embraces the enlargement of all human choices—whether economic, social cultural or political." Pp. 14, Book 3. Here Dr.

Haq is quite close to the view of Sen who argues that development should be seen as the enhancement of freedom: freedom to be, freedom to do and freedom from.[32]

At the same time, despite the recognition of the importance of humans as the end: "…there has been little consistent, comprehensive analysis of how to integrate people into development as both a means and an end." Pp.4, Book 3. To address the shortcoming, Dr. Haq suggested that there should be a human balance sheet in each year's annual budget for each country, as there is one for physical capital. The human balance sheet should give us an in-depth account of existing human resources. The 'basic needs' targets should also be an integral part of every plan document, and apart from growth objectives and strategies, distribution objectives, and employment planning should also be one of the main components of the budget and plans. Dr Haq also recommended decentralization as a way of ensuring community participation and self-reliance.[33] He gives a list of even more operational and concrete proposals to ensure basic needs coverage and attack on poverty, but we are not going to focus on these. Suffice it to say that by the mid 1990s, when Book 3 was written, the human development paradigm had made enough progress to be able to show the kind of policies that should be pursued to achieve objectives within reasonable time periods.

Human development paradigm places each and every human being at the centre of our concern and policymaking. In stark contrast to the economic growth paradigm it utilizes the cost/benefit analysis of options to evaluate impacts on people and not just on variables. It makes enhancing the potential of each human being, in a sustainable fashion, as the goal of development. And the goal cannot be achieved by ignoring the individual.

There are 4 essential components in the human development paradigm: equity, sustainability, productivity, and empowerment. These became the basis for the creation of the *Human Development Index (HDI)* that was reported in the *Human Development Reports* initially written under the guidance of Dr. Haq. The operationalization of the concepts, through measures of health, education, income and even freedom (eventually) show how the paradigm has evolved from initial concepts to a fairly developed state where policy prescriptions can be worked out from the framework.

This goal of development cannot be achieved without incorporating the ingredients mentioned above. Dr. Haq's emphasis thus shifts completely away from capital accumulation,[34] defence and national aggregates of various sorts towards education, health, food and overall security and the future well-being and sustainability of individuals. Humans are not only the measure of all things, they are to be the prime focus in the process as well.

HDI, by giving weight to education, health and some other variables, apart from income, explicitly argues that income alone cannot be a proxy for development. Single-minded focus on income leaves out crucial aspects. Though the weights attached to specific variables, and the choice of variables itself might be disputed,

HDI does focus the attention of the policymakers on 'humans', and on aspects that determine their freedom and choice. This is exactly what the human development paradigm proposes and requires.

The human development paradigm, though favouring the markets, does not take the markets as providing the ultimate and apposite solutions in a number of areas. Dr. Haq clearly mentions this in discussing the structural adjustment programmes and the moves towards the markets in a lot of countries:

"…: any adjustment process is a dismal failure if it does not protect and advance human development." Pp. 6, Book 3. Markets are a very powerful tool for resource allocation and distribution, but they can help only if some prerequisites have been established, otherwise they will lead to misery for the poor:

"One important point: markets are not very friendly to the poor, to the weak or to the vulnerable, either nationally or internationally. Nor are markets free. They are often the handmaidens of powerful interest groups, and they are greatly affected by the prevailing distribution of income." Pp. 141, Book 3 and therefore, "Markets cannot become neutral or competitive unless the playing field is even and playable." Pp. 142, Book 3.

Dr. Haq was initially not in favour of 'conditionalities' on loans from multilateral agencies or aid and loan from countries. But his views changed on this quite significantly. By 1990s he was arguing that the established power structures in developing countries were so entrenched in local politics that it was not possible for governments to make or implement policies that would alter the arrangements fundamentally in favour of the poor or even make the field more level. International agencies could provide the necessary 'pressure' to change things. He advocated that the international lenders and donors should do comprehensive human development reviews when looking at progress and prospects:

"Besides macroeconomic conditionality for budgetary and balance of payments measures, or sectoral conditionality for necessary policy or institutional changes, there must be conditionality for protecting minimum nutritional standards, maintaining minimum employment levels, and setting expenditure floors for education and health." Pp. 10, Book 3.

The conditionality aspect was particularly important in ensuring the removal of subsidies and programmes that benefit the rich exclusively or predominantly (most state run subsidized credit programmes for example), reduction in inefficiency and corruption, and in a reorientation away from defence expenditure. Dr. Haq gave ample statistics to back the assertion that South Asia was spending too much on defence and too little on human development. He was of the opinion that international pressure and promises of help in case of compliance, and cooperation through South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) could help in reducing the 'waste' and getting the priorities right. He was an optimist in the end!

But Dr. Haq was also very aware of the continuing imbalance in power between the North and the South. The dialogue started from the Third World Forum in the 1970s continued, and Dr. Haq was very involved with organizations and ideas that would address the imbalance. Suggestions to set up an Economic Security Council and better international financial institutions are only a few of his ideas in this arena.

In his third book there is no discussion of the fact that both of his forays into policymaking were at the time when military governments were in place in Pakistan. Though Dr. Haq talks about participation of the people and decentralization and devolution of decision-making powers, he does not discuss the implications of his own work for military regimes, the connection between military regimes and change in a society, and the need (or not) of democratic setups at the national level. Though it is clear from later developments that his concerns about individual security and well being and for justice and equity, and his opposition to defence expenditures would have made it well nigh impossible for him to support military regimes, and this form of non-democratic governance.

Conclusion

The growth theories of the 1960s (Harrod-Domar, Solow, and the two sector models) gave the point of departure for development planning. They also, unintentionally, gave development planners too much confidence and to the point that they became blind to a lot of the variables that did not come in the models directly, and that could not be adequately quantified.

The growth performance of the 1960s, despite excellent GDP growth rates and the green revolution, did not translate into the overall 'development' that had been hoped for. Poverty remained significant, and lives of large numbers of people in developing countries remained impoverished. The growth process itself slowed down by the end of the 1960s, and the stagflation of the 1970s was particularly disillusioning.

This gave food for thought to thinking development economists. One response was the development of the *basic needs* approach (a strand of which further developed into the human development paradigm) that allowed policy to be focused on the needs of the poor. Food, clothing, shelter, health, primary education and skill training, potable water and sanitation could acquire lexicographic importance. Not all development economists went in this direction, but it did focus the attention of the profession on the 'human aspects' of development. The World Bank and other multilateral agencies reprioritized their lending policies and even the growth theories of the 1980s and 1990s internalized the human aspects of development.

Dr. Haq, shaped by the experience of the three decades, as a policymaker and implementer, and as a theorist as well as a World Bank official, went in the direction of the Human Development paradigm. He was a pioneer in the development and publishing of the *Human Development Reports* from UNDP, and the *Human*

Development Index (HDI), and the founder of the Human Development Center in Islamabad. His writings and experiences show not only his evolution, but the developments in the profession, and the trends in the thinking of the time. Few participants are such active commentators of change in them and in the world around them. It provides us with a rare window on the developments over 40 years, and this can only help our future evolution.

Notes

[1] Sanchez (2000).

[2] In this article, we will refer to the three books as Book 1, Book 2 and Book 3, going in the chronological order of publication.

[3] A number of his articles and speeches from these years became the background for these books. Some are even explicitly mentioned.

[4] Dr. Haq was at Cambridge University, England prior to Yale.

[5] For an excellent textbook discussion of some of the growth models see Ray (1998), chapter 3 & 4, Pp. 47-125.

[6] Initial withdrawals would not effect output if some labour was employed at zero marginal output. But even with positive marginal output, reallocation of labour to industry would be more than compensated as long as the marginal output was higher in industry.

[7] See Fei and Ranis (1997), chapter 1 pp. 35-46.

[8] $g_K = \frac{dK/dt}{K} = \frac{I}{K} = \frac{sQ}{K} = \frac{s(1/k)K}{K} = s/k$.

[9] For more details on growth models and the connections to later contributions of endogenous growth models see Fei and Ranis (1997).

[10] About Book 1, Dr. Haq later wrote: "Though I have written much else since then, my detractors have seldom allowed me to forget my original writings, perhaps believing that the evolution of ideas is an unforgivable sin". Quoted in the UNDP 'A Tribute to Dr. Haq'. My intention is different. I am looking at the first book to actually trace the evolution of his ideas.

[11] For a fairly in-depth look at Pakistan's performance in the fifties and sixties see, Ahmed & Amjad (1984) chapter 2 Pp. 14-28, Zaidi (1999) chapter 6, Pp. 84-104, and Noman (1990).

[12] The two gaps, savings and the needed investment level gap, and the foreign exchange gap, are clearly identified as the main problems.

[13] See the exposition of the Harrod-Domar model given above.

[14] Economists were aware of Kuznet's inverted 'U' hypothesis. Kuznet found that as you moved to higher income countries, you also saw higher levels of inequality The trend continued to an income level after which it reversed itself, and further increases in income were associated with lower inequality. Sectoral growth imbalances were usually given as a logical explanation of the empirical regularity. Later work has confirmed some inverted U effect in time series, but the cross-section finding is very disputed. And literature also points to examples of countries that have made the transition without a pronounced effect due to specific distribution policies, removing any 'necessity' from the relationship. For a discussion see Ray (1998).

[15] See pp. 2-3, Book 1.

[16] Fei and Ranis (1997) draw a distinction between the planning school and the growth methodology. Though important, it is not relevant for us. See Fei and Ranis (1997) pp. 32-34.

[17] Reduction in foreign aid did occur after the 1965 war with India and this became a severe binding constraint on the development effort.

[18] They also believed that there were no options or alternative paths.

[19] Maynard Keynes's opposition to communist or totalitarian schemes derived from this view. He represented a viewpoint shared by many. See Skildelsky (1983) for a discussion.

[20] See Noman (1990) pp. 37.

[21] Later work has disputed the extent of concentration quoted by Dr. Haq. But despite the revisions, the degree of concentration was very high. See Zaidi (1999) for a discussion.

[22] The increasing concern about the North-South divide was a part of the larger movement taking environmental and human concerns at a global level more seriously. This is brought out very well in the foreword Barbara Ward wrote for Dr. Haq's Book 2.

[23] For more details on the 'elitism' in the Pakistani economy and state see Husain (1999).

[24] "Another sin of the development planners is the curious love for direct economic controls. It is too readily assumed that development planning means encouragement of public sector and imposition of a variety of bureaucratic controls to regulate economic activity, particularly in the private sector. It is a strange phenomenon that the very societies which are generally short of good administration experiment with the most baffling array of administrative controls." Pp. 14-15, Book 2.

[25] "Development planners are quite fond of making a distinction between planning and implementation. When hard pressed, they generally argue that while development planning is their responsibility, its implementation is the responsibility of the entire political and economic system. This is no more than a convenient alibi. A good development plan often comes with a realistic blueprint for its own implementation. It must contain specific recommendations on all detailed policies, institutional reforms, administrative framework and well-conceived projects which are necessary for its successful implementation. Pp. 21, Book 2.

[26] For changes in Dr. Haq's views on loan conditionality see the discussion in the next section.

[27] For a sympathetic account of the Bhutto years see Zaidi (1999), and for a less sympathetic one see Burki (1980).

[28] For differing opinions about the Zia era see Zaidi (1999) and Burki & Baxter (1991).

[29] Ranis and Stewart (1997) show that Pakistan not only has low Human Development indicators, but it has usually oscillated between stagnation and high economic growth and one reason for this might be the low achievements on the human development side. They argue that this shows the way forward as well: through investments in human capital.

[30] For a recent development of the thesis on the 'elitism' in Pakistan see Husain (1999).

[31] Giving the contingent and intrumental relation of wealth and income to life and our goals, Aristotle stated "wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else'. From the Nicomachean Ethics, quoted in Sen (1999) pp. 14.

[32] See Sen (1999).

[33] Dr. Haq's involvement with military regimes is discussed at the end of this section.

[34] Just as an end, not as a means though.

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Review

Duncan Hewitt 2007. *Getting Rich First: Life in a Changing China.* London: Chatto & Windus. Long review by Munir Ghazanfar.

The Chinese civilization is one of the oldest. A lot of this period is documented to varying degrees. China, during this period, passed through many stages of social change with major achievements in the fields of culture, production, science, innovation and technology. It passed through numerous empires and dynasties. There were periods when the country was invaded and when it was divided. The Chinese people fought foreign invasions and resisted oppression. In spite of a long history of sacrifices the fruit of their labour was always reaped and enjoyed by the ruling classes. It was only during the last 100 years that the Chinese people started to take their destiny in their own hands. More specifically this change can be dated to 1921 when the Chinese Communist Party first came into being. The resolve of a few individuals finally translated itself into a historic torrent which departed from some thousands of years of failed cycles. On October 1, 1949 the Chinese people announced that they had stood up and overthrown foreign masters and their local partners, feudals, bureaucrat capitalists and the comprador bourgeoisie. The 62 years of post-revolutionary period can be broadly divided into two halves – 1949 to 1978 and 1978 to 2011. During the first period the Chinese people snatched power, consolidated it and struggled to recreate China in their own image. However, the progress in this period was not all linear. The last ten years were extremely tumultuous during which the Chinese people tried to retain their hold on power. The death of Mao Tse Tung marked a turnaround in the post-revolution history of China. With it the Chinese working class lost their brief stint in power. The initial changes were slow and the Chinese people were routinely assured that Mao Tse Tung thought would continue to guide the Chinese Communist Party and the latter would continue to represent the power and interests of the Chinese people. However, around 1978 China changed course and since then the history of China has been the history of development and restoration of market economy.

This book is about the process of liberalization in the life and society of the Peoples Republic of China as it accompanied the process of capitalist restoration after the death of Mao. The book concentrates on the cultural aspects of transformation and not the economic processes.

The case of the role of state and bourgeois liberalization makes an interesting study in China. Starting with the dismemberment of communes and collective agriculture to the privatization of state industry and permission to set up private businesses and industry the state has done everything to facilitate and promote the emergence and rise of the bourgeoisie in China. Yet on the other hand it has repeatedly tried to dissociate itself from and at times repress liberalism and political expression, the

very result of the economic change the Party had initiated as policy. It is understandable as most of the economic reform was undertaken in the name of socialist reform. Dismantling of socialism or restoration of capitalism has never been owned as such by the Chinese rulers even 33 years after the process began in 1978. By maintaining an iron hold over the political process and disowning its political expression it has ensured a continuity of the capitalist restoratory process until the emergence of a strong bourgeoisie and a very large petty bourgeois class. Today the bourgeois classes in China are strong enough to defend their interests and promote their culture. At the grass-root level the Communist Party from an independent and political apparatus has assumed the role of the state apparatus executing and fulfilling the commands of the higher authorities. The Communist Party, which in Mao's time claimed to represent the dictatorship of the proletariat, as in Soviet Union, changed its character and proved itself the best instrument for a smooth transition to the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

The author has covered social change in the Chinese society across a wide spectrum including peoples' new life styles, culture, consumption, religion, livelihood, aspirations, life of rural migrants and the land they left behind, changes in media and the metamorphosis of the Chinese cities.

This review basically describes the Hewitt's personal observation and interviews over an extended period after the mid-1980s, paraphrased with reviewer's comment.

Cities in Motion: Beijing

Perhaps one of the most visible changes in the Chinese society is the transformation of the big cities in China.

After the mid-nineties all major Chinese cities have virtually been recreated with, in some, hardly a vestige of the old left intact. It is a radical departure from Mao's period when the policy was not to develop the cities but to bring the countryside up and eliminate the historic difference between cities and the countryside. All efforts were made to spread technology, education, science and philosophy evenly over the nation. For example the educated youth were encouraged to leave cities and settle in far-flung villages where they married and took up farming. The purpose was to disseminate culture, strengthen bonds between urban-rural and intellectual-manual workers, and learn from each other. Such a view of development was radically different from current view of development that is being implemented in China today. This present day paradigm of urban development is reflected in glitzy malls, shining cars, glass towers, golf courses, exclusive restaurants, electronic gadgetry and branded wear. The Chinese could have achieved all that long before; it's only they chose the other road.

Until the 1980s the old architecture that characterized Beijing was marked by single storey houses with grey sloping roofs, thick brick-walls, and six to eight rooms around a courtyard. Swathes of such houses connected by narrow lanes, called Hutongs, which radiated out symmetrically from the imperial palace - the Forbidden City. The grandest of these houses had dozens of rooms around many inner court

yards, many with trees in them. Mutton Hutong, Coal Dust Hutong, such names reminding one of history and the traders who originally worked there. During Cultural Revolution of 1960s, Red Guards had forced some old middle class families out and moved in multiple families in the space vacated. Many of these houses of Beijing were up to 400 years old. They had survived two dynasties – Ming and Qing and two revolutions - foreign occupation and the Cultural Revolution, were finally confronted by a more implacable enemy – urban development.

One by one the Chinese authorities painted the Chinese word 'Chai' meaning 'demolish' on them. Demolition of old communities of old lanes, many of which had become denser during the Cultural Revolution had to move to distant new flats. Starting in 1990s the stories of demolition became all too common in Beijing and the other Chinese cities. Soon it was as though Chinese cities had been hurling themselves to the future with little time to think of the future or indeed of the past. In 1985 it would have been hard to imagine any of this. Back then it was possible to cycle right across the city and barely leave the old Hutongs. Occasionally you crossed a wider street but most of the traffic consisted of other cyclists or locals on stroll.

By 1990-91 massive construction was underway with increasingly powerful interests of construction firms and real estate agents. Court-yard houses were disappearing by 1995. Hoardings proclaimed arrival of new shopping cities invested by Hong Kong property developers.

In the big cities people were increasingly living away from their places of work, while public transport did not grow commensurate with the need. Consequently a major road-widening project was started in China around 1997. The new wide roads were a reminder that Chinese love affair with cars had begun. Already the once empty ring road was now becoming jammed. More and more people were being forced into suburbs either by demolition or by rising property prices. The city's public transport network was struggling to keep up. Owning a car became singly important. By 2005 Beijing had five ring roads yet traffic jams were becoming a way of life. Pollution was limiting visibility. City centre pavements were now increasingly empty. Residents were constrained to head for newly opened shopping malls. The new constructions were being replaced by even newer waves of construction.

The phenomena of urbanization and modernization are not confined to China. China was no exception but the game here was played out somewhat differently. In the urban areas most of the houses and lands was owned by the state or state institutions like municipal authorities and factories. People were now offered money to move out of their old low level homes and buy new flats in high rise buildings built on the outer parts of the city. The inner parts of the city were to be transformed into much more expensive and glitzy developments to house business, multinational corporations, banks, restaurants and hotels. Land use henceforth was to be based on land value and not on historical, social or environmental considerations. Traditional building material and designs were to be replaced with modern material, western designs and new technologies. Thick walls and bricks used to ward off heat in summer and the cold Mongolian winds in winter were to be replaced with air-conditioning and modern

heating. Shared toilets were replaced with attached baths. The narrow lanes with cycles and pedestrian traffic were replaced with wide roads for cars. Modernity and technology promoted comfort and individualism. State ownership and sharing was replaced with individual ownership and property.

Beijing was always spread over a huge area but its old neighbourhoods with their narrow lanes gave a strong sense of being closer to each other and distant from the outside world. Old settlements moving to new homes is not just shifting but the break up of friendship and communities. Modernization brought with it social, physical, communal, historical dislocation and breakup of traditions. While modernization was promoted as aesthetics, comfort and speed, it soon revealed itself as vulgarity, stress, sickness and traffic jams. Stoicism, altruism, sharing and sacrifice give way to competition, selfishness and status as the new values. The modernization and urbanization in China has promoted inequality, insecurity and consumerism. Living in a modern high rise apartment with its own bathrooms has attractions in many ways for the people, who had lived a cramped life with lane toilets, yet people resisted their dislocation but their protests were suppressed by the heavy hand of the state. Ordinary people criticized dislocations not from the stand point of heritage, but because it broke up their communities, relationships and separated them from their livelihood with long distances and even brought them indebtedness.

Shanghai – Between old and new

A city with a legendary history which was the crucible of China's modernization in the first half of the 20th century under foreign domination has returned to the role with a vengeance since 1990s. The change in infrastructure has marked a revisit of the foreign capital and a remarginalization of the people who were expelled then to make room for the bourgeoisie from the turn of the 20th century and during the first half of the same until the Revolution turned the tables. Today, once again, the buildings are filled up with luxury boutiques, fine-dining restaurants and contemporary art galleries. Only the old colonial waterfront, the bund itself is now dwarfed by the far taller buildings of the new financial district on the opposite bank of the river with 88 storeys Jinmao Tower.

After Mao's death China's second modernization entered the country the same path as the first modernization in the beginning of the 20th century. During the first decade of the new era in 1980s it was to the South, to Guangdong Province and broadly the provincial capital Guangzhou's (Canton) proximity to Hong Kong that made it the obvious place to set up China's experiment of special economic zones aimed at drawing in foreign investment and creating outsourced new jobs. By the second half of the 1980s Guangzhou had built China's first highways and flyovers.

Shanghai had indeed always been a phenomenon, a city which did not so much grow up gradually as erupt, in the second half of the nineteenth century, after the first Opium War, when the British forced the opening of what was then a medium-size port on the Huangpu River, just south of the mouth of the Yangtze, to foreign trade. To facilitate this trade, the foreigners built their own settlements on the

muddy flats beside the Huangpu, to the north of the old Chinese walled town. Soon the products of China's first modern factories began to flow out of the city, while opium, imported by the British from India, flooded in – and Shanghai swiftly became one of the largest trading ports in Asia.

It was therefore perhaps not surprising that it was here too, in reaction to foreign control and the rise of dependent capitalism, that the Chinese Communist Party was born, at a secret meeting in a newly built terraced house in Shanghai's French concession in 1921.

In the early years after the revolution of 1949, Shanghai's bars, clubs and brothels were closed down; its factories were gradually taken into state control, though most remained open, since the new government realized it still needed the city's industry and economic know-how. Many of Shanghai's wealthiest residents – and not a few of the middle classes too – had fled, to Hong Kong or Taiwan or North America, and their former homes were taken over by the state. Some of these buildings became the offices of government departments while others were divided up to house the families of officials and workers, as well as the hundreds of thousands of military men and refugees from other parts of China who had arrived in the city at the time of the civil war of the late 1940s.

For all its turmoils and changes the revolution preserved its link with history, and foreigners returning to China in early 80s after the Cultural Revolution were startled to find the physical structure of old Shanghai almost completely preserved.

For many of the city's residents, though, the experience was somewhat less divine. Millions were living crammed into the city's old neighbourhoods. Houses originally designed for a single family – and perhaps a servant or two – were now often home to five or six families, each inhabiting one or two rooms, and sharing kitchen and bathrooms.

"Even at the dawn of the 1990s, Shanghai was effectively a city still struggling to cope with a half-century old refugee problem. It retained a reputation, though, for producing China's best quality consumer goods.

Yet by the middle of 1990s it had already embarked on the extraordinary transformation which was to propel it back into the world's consciousness. A city famous for its overstretched transport system suddenly had a shiny new subway line, built in record-quick time; elevated roads leading into the city centre from the old airport, and new shopping centres were beginning to appear on the main streets."

There's the regeneration of the old shipyards and factories along the Huangpu River, to form the garden site for the 2010 World Expo, to say nothing of the magnetic rail line, the new airport terminals, the Formula One race track in the suburbs, the massive petrochemical base – and the eleven new satellite towns, each with a different European country as its theme.

The process of modernization has entailed a major dislocation and eventual marginalization of the local people. So as the relocations gathered pace in the second half of the 1990s and into the new decade, signs of resistance began to emerge.

More than anything people loved their communities and closeness to work and there were repeated stories of strong-arm tactics being used by the relocation firms.

'Here the doors are always kept open, people can just drop in any time, children can come and go,' he said, 'In the new apartments it's very different – once the door's shut no-one comes in.' And to recreate the atmosphere of these old communities in a new area was not easy, he said. 'It's a tradition,' he explained, 'the result of decades of living so close together. It's not something that just develops in three to five years.'

There was still something rather strange about watching a socialist system moving ordinary working people out of the city centre, where they had lived for most of their lives, in order to replace them with luxury housing, offices and leisure complexes for the benefit of big business, foreigners and China's new rich.

Where old neighbourhoods have survived they have changed hands from the people to commercial investors and ventures. The conserved old historical neighbourhoods inevitably will be turned into fashionable restaurants, wine bars and boutiques or homes, where preserved, for wealthy overseas buyers.

The question is what is the purpose and rationale of this huge modernization project? Is it to show growth or make profit by providing investment opportunity? Is it to create a huge propertied class to back up the change in China's policies? And what is the opportunity cost?

Farewell to Welfare

The universal employment, health care, education systems available to the Chinese people up to the end of 1970s has gradually been withdrawn.

The factories provided employment, pension and life time housing. If a factory expanded employment it built additional housing for the newcomers. The factories also provided health care and education which fed into secondary and tertiary level facilities at the higher level. The system was characterized by peoples' decision making, open criticism and discussion and a struggle for equality. Because it tended to be self-reliant there could be diversity and variation from one factory to another and from one commune to another but wherever it was, it was marked by a spirit of class-consciousness, fraternity and egalitarianism. It is only after the factories by and large have been privatized, closed or shifted, or the Communes dismantled that the need for welfare has arisen. By and large factories have now moved to the new system of accounting by profit.

Today unemployment is rampant. Only between 1997 and 2000, 21 million people were made redundant. In Shanghai alone highly massaged figures admitted there were 800,000 people unemployed in the early 2000s of which in 2005, 300,000 were receiving unemployment allowance of around 300 Yuan (about 20 Pound Sterling) per month, equal to the price of ten cups of coffee in a smart café. In less wealthy cities it was much lower, a little over 100 Yuan.

With the withdrawal of the state from production and the dismantling of the Communes, health care for the people has tremendously deteriorated. Hospital patients are now expected to pay registration fee and cash deposit and find their own private helpers from migrant workers in the urban areas to help the patients and bring food if necessary. From a virtually free health care little it seems is now for free. In the past every type of industry had its designated hospital. With the change of economic system and new methods of accounting the factories found it difficult to pay and gradually the patients were shifted to insurance scheme. As with all insurance there is a small print where there are a lot of exclusions. The conditions in the rural areas and among the migrant workers are even worse. If you break a bone it could cost as much as 40,000 Yuan and the patient could end up paying half of it. Long term medication for Alzheimer's disease could cost around 800 Yuan per month - a month's wages for many. So only a small percentage were taking the medicine regularly. There are appeals for help on the internet such as a brain tumor patient who had already spent 100,000 Yuan (7,000 Pound Sterling) on treatment now needed to pay another 15,000 Yuan per month. An employer paid 33,000 Yuan for the kidney transplant of a woman worker but could not cover the huge cost. Another person was playing violin on the street to raise money for a classmate who had Lenkarinior. Relatives of patients who die after a protracted treatment in the hospital may receive exorbitant bills sometimes like one million yuan after the patient's death.

Basically the health care is being increasingly starved of funds and pushed towards privatization, resulting from the withdrawal of state. Between 1980s and early 2000s China's spending of health fell from 6% to 4%, pushing the hospitals to raise money for themselves. Hospitals are trying new ways to generate money. Some opening wards to do cosmetic surgery, some opening luxury wards for wealthy people or by using new imported technology not covered by the price list. There are 17,000 public hospitals in China. The best ones are being heavily oversubscribed and as a result of differentiation people from all over the country flock to the best hospital and many have to keep waiting, with touts selling places in queues or hiring people to wait for them. Waiting rooms or corridors of outpatient departments can be a surreal sight, overflowing with people, some lying on beds. Conflicts and tensions between doctors and patients and their relatives are increasing with more doctors being attacked or sued.

Private health care institutions have been promoted in recent years including a few with foreign backing catering to wealthy Chinese or foreigners but restricting them from providing facilities to patients funded by National Medical Insurance System.

In 2005 Chinese state council itself issued a highly critical report describing the health care reforms as having been largely a failure.

Generation 'Me'

In any big city you will find young people supporting an ever-growing array of different fashions apparently oblivious to the often disapproving glances of the people who watch them go by. Most students now give themselves English names something unknown back in the 1980s.

When we were young we would hide when we saw our father coming; now-a-days kids are more likely to mock their parents when we try to teach them about our views on things, they are not interested.

A survey by an opinion poll company produced analysis of conversations within Chinese families. This showed children did 47 per cent of the talking, their parents 20 per cent each while the grandparents could barely get a word in.

For many young urban people, the internet the latest mobile phones *MP3/4* players and PSPs are an indispensable part of life while many have become hooked on making their own digital video films, or creating their own graphics, and flash animation.

Parent want their only child to learn everything, calligraphy, piano, foreign language everything, before they go to school. They tend to give them everything and the grandparents lavish on a smaller number of grandchildren. Some worry these children are likely to be self obsessed, selfish, demanding, bossy and spoilt. The young generation is likely to have a bedroom to themselves, demand privacy and be more individualistic. They may spend time with their grandparents when they are very young, but once they are older they are likely to be living on their own with their parents, while China's tradition of the extended family unit living together is rapidly breaking down. And with parents likely to be working longer hours than in the days of the planned economy the children are often left to their own devices. And the exchange of ideas between parents and children for all kinds of reasons is not as great as it used to be. When we were young we did not have any games to play at home, so we played in the street all the time. In the new residential areas the families are much more separate, the street is more unsafe and children have internet and computer games at home. They are bound to be more solitary and lonely.

In the medium sized cities internet cafes remain packed with young people until late at night, some making new friends others, hooked on online games. The world's largest online gaming company Shanda is Chinese. Now there are treatment centres for children addicted to the internet. Excessive introversion is contributing to delinquency, even violence. Media reported some parents had started hiring private detectives to follow their children. According to head of a detectives company parents felt their children behaved in mysterious ways, receiving text messages from unknown people, going out late at night and rarely telling their parent what they were doing.

The generation gap between China's new youth and those who had grown up in more sober and austere times was growing. Mr Chen, a man in his forties who had adapted well to change in society and studied abroad for few years was shocked to discover that his son who was in second year in senior high school, had a girlfriend. I just can't believe it. The only time he had raised the subject with his son he had had a furious row, now they had barely spoken for several months.

According to Yang Xiong, a youth expert, today's young generation are often intellectually precocious - but not well equipped for the challenges of the real world. "I was sent to the countryside and then to the army. Today's children are exposed to 3 excesses - excessive parental hopes, excessive protection and excessive sporting. They have not experienced the difficulties of life and their level of socialization is low".

In the words of a youth 'what I am seeking can be summed up in one word: pleasure'.

The change is from the 'we' generation to the 'me' generation.

The Silent Sexual Revolution

Having extramarital relations or living together or even getting married before you had finished your university studies was considered a punishable social offence. Students at the university lived in strictly segregated single sex dormitories. Those were revolutionary times. These values are now fast disappearing. Obviously parents and society even today don't look at liberal attitudes favourably but both these institutions have grown weak and many students now rent private flats after the first year. Parents are embarrassed to ask their offspring whether they were cohabiting, some are even afraid.

In the revolutionary period the opinion of friends, neighbours and society had a great influence over the lives of individuals. This reached a peak, of course, in the Cultural Revolution.

The communist government's first marriage law passed in 1950 gave women equal rights for the first time and there was a flurry of divorces. However, during the highly politicized decades that followed divorce became far less common. But as the 1980s progressed, imported films, popular love songs and specially loosening of social control brought the ideas of romance and promiscuity back into the society. Slowly and surely the divorce rate began to climb too. And changes in the welfare system eventually meant that the once all-powerful work units began to lose some of their influence over an individual's private behaviour. People were also starting to have more living space of their own. Strict controls in hotels began to fade too, as such institutions became more interested in people's money than their morality.

But it was in the 1990s that China really saw the beginning of what Li Yinhe has described as a 'silent sexual revolution'. In the mid-late 1990s, some older women

began complaining that their husbands had made the most of the chances afforded by greater wealth and a more open society to find young mistresses. It was a problem which was most pronounced down south in Guangdong, where wealth was growing fast, and where many young women were moving from other parts of China, in search of job and a better life. A proposal to criminalize adultery was rejected by China's legislature. Society was breaking down and state was retreating from people's lives.

Few questioned the results of a survey which found that the proportion of people who admitted to having sex before marriage rose from 15.5 per cent in 1989 to between sixty and seventy per cent in 2004. Researchers say that young people are now becoming sexually mature four or five years earlier than in the 1970s – sometimes as young as twelve or thirteen.

Abolishing prostitution was one of the Communists proudest achievement after they came to power in 1949. The re-education of these prostitutes and their rehabilitation into society in the early years of the Communist state was heralded as a proof that the bad days of capitalist exploitation had been swept away and more humane society created.

Yet since the late 1980s, when the first large-scale waves of migration of peasants to China's cities began, prostitution has reemerged with a vengeance. A plentiful supply of young women seeking a better way of life, urban unemployment, and the emergence of large number of men with the money and inclination to pay for such services, have all contributed to this phenomenon. Also in the early 1990s some of the factories in Guangdong were like Manchester in the Industrial Revolution blood and tears, people working for 16 hours a day for 600 Yuan a month, while a young girl in her teens had the chance of earning more than twenty thousand Yuan a month through sex work. Some of these women built large houses for their families back home. With the social structure and bindings in the countryside breaking down, no one would look down upon them. "They have money; they can build a house, that's better than anything else".

Floating people

After the Lunar holiday huge crowds of people, like the Valentine Day. Now, from all corners of the country flock back to Shanghai, back to their menial jobs - as waiters and waitresses, chefs and shop assistants, workers in the factories and on the building sites, roadside cobblers and backstreet tailors - which kept life comfortable for the city's residents. Some have no fixed job for them, urban life might mean sifting through the rubbish thrown away by the local residents for things to sell for recycling, or a fresh search for work - like the men who sometimes squatted on the pavement in the remoter Shanghai side-streets.

For Mr. Liu city meant returning to small shared room in a decrepit house on the fringes of the town. Not that these rooms were exactly convenient: sometimes Mr

Liu had to get up by five o'clock in the morning to reach whichever apartment, block or luxury villa he was working on, travelling two and a half hours by bicycle and bus. When there was no alternative he took the underground, though it was more expensive, and the prices had just gone up again. 'These days a ticket might cost you five or six yuan,' he complained. 'When you add the bus fare, plus two or three for a snack, and a packet of cigarettes, you can easily get through twenty yuan or more a day - it doesn't leave too much left. But you've got to make a living, haven't you?' he added. At least the rent was cheaper out in the suburbs, and he was happy to see his old friends, it made the bare rooms feel a little bit more like home.

For many of the migrants returning to the cities, there was no such comfort: many did not even have a place like this to call their own; for those working in factories, accommodation was often just a dormitory shared with their fellow workers. And others had nowhere even that permanent.

He got a job in a tiny restaurant, selling breakfast to workers on their way to start their shifts in the factories, and dumplings and other snacks for their lunch and dinner. But he had to start at 4:30 in the morning and work until seven at night, for just three hundred yuan a month - little more than twenty pounds. Soon he'd had enough.

At the beginning, building work had come as quite a shock to Xiao Yang, even through he was pretty fit. It wasn't just the eleven-hour days he had to work in his first job, it was more the sheer physical demands of the manual labour involved. 'We had to carry concrete blocks,' he said, 'and I'd never done that before. They weigh over a thousand pounds each, so it takes a few people to lift one'.

But it didn't mean it was easy. 'Sometimes in the winter, when you're up on the twentieth floor of a building at 6:30 in the morning, it can be absolutely freezing,' he went on. 'Even if you feel like slacking off a bit you don't dare – it's better to work up a sweat.'

Anyway, he said, there were some good things about life in Shanghai: it was safer than back home, where the law and order situation was not always too good.

But that was for the future. At the moment he was just waiting for the next job, and trying to keep himself in shape. Every morning he got up early and went for a run in the park. 'You have to do something to stay fit,' he said, 'or you can't hope to do the job.' It was particularly important to stay healthy, he added, since there was no medical insurance to cover him if he got sick. 'If it's a work injury they'll still give you your salary,' he said, 'but otherwise they won't pay you - no way!' What's more, he added; 'if you're really ill and don't want to get sacked, you need to get a medical certificate, which is expensive too - otherwise, it's goodbye!'

And experts have become increasingly concerned about the impact of so many children being left behind by their parents. One survey in 2003 claimed that eighty-five per cent of migrants left children at home. Other estimates are lower – but

various official bodies have put the number of children in this situation at between ten and twenty million. And according to a 2003 survey, unhappiness, personality disorders and delinquency were more common among such children.

It's a source of stress and unhappiness, which can make extramarital affairs more likely (though of course many migrant workers barely have the time for such self-indulgence) and lead to marriage break-ups. One survey, however, found that many migrant men wanted to visit prostitutes but could not afford the cost, while China's Ministry of Health has reported that over eighty per cent of male migrants suffer from 'sexual depression'.

Working conditions for women were significantly worse: almost thirty per cent worked more than twelve hours a day, while nearly two-thirds earned less than three hundred yuan (just over twenty pounds) a month.

Migrant workers can now be found in towns and cities all over the country, the total number estimated at some 150 million by 2006.

Shenzhen has more than six million people working in manufacturing, but thirty per cent of them, still receive less than the official minimum wage (officially set, in 2006, at between six hundred and eight hundred yuan, depending on whether they work in the central part of the city or in its more distant suburbs).

In Mr Liu's opinion, this kind of harsh treatment of migrant workers is to blame for a growing labour shortage which has affected many factories in Shenzhen and other parts of Guangdong over the past few years. 'This system doesn't encourage them to stay here and become stable, permanent workers,' he insists. 'Your kids can't go to school here, your whole family can't be here together, you don't have any social welfare. We always tell you you're a worker from outside, a temporary worker, a labourer – and your home is in your native place,' he continues.

Attempts by the government to make life better in the countryside – such as recent steps to cut the tax burden for farmers, for example – may encourage some to stay at home. But many migrants, having grown up with idealized images of city life on their television screens, are now clear about their desire to become urban citizens. As in the European industrial revolution of the nineteenth century, rural people will continue moving to the cities – and once they arrive, the majority will remain there. The figures bear this out: China has been urbanizing people as fast as it has urbanised its land – from around 300 million urban residents in 1990 to an estimated 540 million in 2004. In the 1980s, China's rural population accounted for some eighty per cent of the total; by 1990 the figure had fallen to around seventy-three per cent; and less than a decade and a half later, in 2004, the rural population had fallen below sixty per cent – despite a higher birth rate in the countryside. Almost forty-two per cent of the country's population were now living in urban areas. Some academics have begun to warn that it's a dangerous situation, which will lead to the creation of slums, continuing rural deprivation.

The Land they left behind

The Chinese countryside is nothing if not beautiful. It is an area where the revolution took shape and was enthusiastically embraced by millions of farming families. There were many post revolutionary phases in the countryside. The anti-feudal struggle and distribution of land was followed by small rural cooperatives which in turn was succeeded by rural communes. The commune represented a grass-root democratic structure responsible for common accounting of production, common responsibility for education, healthcare, political debate, and scientific upgradation. China followed the Soviet five year plan model up to 1957 when it decided to opt for the more radical political mass mobilization expressed as 'let a hundred flowers blossom' movement to liberate local initiative and then the controversial Great Leap Forward movement of 1958-61 when peasants were encouraged to set up backyard furnaces to acquire the technical know-how of smelting iron ore and increase production of iron and steel.

The Great Leap Forward was followed by a widening gulf between Party leaders, radicals led by Chairman Mao and the moderates led by president Liu Shaoqi, premier Zou Enlai and the party Secretary General Deng Xiaoping. By 1965 Mao concluded that the moderate section of the Communist Party was not just moderate but was anti-revolutionary revisionist like the post-Stalin Soviet leadership and eventually wanted to restore capitalism in China. Starting 1966 Mao and the radical section of the party mobilized the people especially the younger people and started the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution which continued for 10 years till 1976 when with Mao's death his faction was defeated and many of his compatriots including his wife Jiang Jing were imprisoned or executed. China changed course and so did the rest of the world for which it was acting as the engine of change.

In China's vast rural areas the people's Communes where people even ate together and shared canteens, built their own infrastructure ensured uniform and simple but excellent healthcare and education for all, were gradually disbanded.

By the late 1970s the villagers were given the freedom to experiment with individual farming by dividing up collective farms. Then individuals could choose their own crops to grow and sell surplus products on the new "free market" which began to appear in the China's towns in the early 1980s.

Today the beautiful Chinese countryside is nothing if not beset with problems. For lack of local government funds residents often have to contribute money to build basic infrastructure worry about their own education and healthcare, to say nothing of the migration of some hundreds of millions to the cities in search of jobs and education.

As the self-reliant agriculture of the commune has broken down and peasants are vying with each other to serve the market and the demands of the affluent urban middle class in the nearby cities like growing high priced freshwater crabs for sea-food markets. Some have earned good money from such para-agricultural activities,

others around big cities have set up small rural factories, upgraded their lifestyle and built big houses for themselves.

For the first time a different type of poverty has appeared in China's countryside; it's poverty side by side with affluence. If the Chinese farmers would be considered poor in the past, today he is also unequal. Mr. Shen considers his ten hours a day, seven days a week, work at 400 Yuan a month better than most farmers' income.

Reforms have brought poverty to the rural people in other ways. Communes had brought universal healthcare and farmers network of 'barefoot' doctors took health care to patients in even the remotest villages. Such innovations led to drastic rise in Chinese average life expectancy from 35 in 1952 to 68 some three decades later. Today international donor institutions in Beijing describe China's rural health care system as being in a state of collapse. Wealthier rural areas' final figures showed that only around 7% of China's 800 million peasants had any form of medical coverage by 2002.

Research shows that among the poor families, in around 20% of cases, poverty is the result of someone in the family suffering a major illness.

In decades after the Communist Revolution, China did well by any international standards. Schooling and literacy rate reached more than 90%, despite the complexity of the written language. Compulsory free education was provided well into a child's teenage years. In contrast during 1990s many rural areas struggled to provide the government's new target of 9 years free compulsory education for all.

The policies of the Chinese government are generating disparities between urban and the rural areas. The worsening conditions in the Chinese countryside and the need for cash for inputs and for children's education and even dispossessions has encouraged Chinese peasants to think of earning more, leave the countryside and migrate to the cities. Today some 150 million migrant workers from rural areas are living as second rate citizens.

Culture Shock

Hewitt goes back to 1978-79 just after the Cultural Revolution when art had just begun to free itself from the bondage of working class demands. In the beginning, however, the reopened academies continued the socialist realist style imported to China from Soviet Union. Soon, however, groups of young artists began experimenting with styles from impressionism to minimalist painting and abstract sculpture. The abstract works were really a way of nullifying realism and completely destroying its foundations.

Change was also visible in world of Chinese cinema where a new generation of actors and directors also began to move away from the realism of the past decades.

Foreign interest in Chinese art began to grow after the events of Tienanmen and for the first time paintings by some of the better known contemporary Chinese artists began to sell for significant sums of money.

Some old masters realize that the Chinese art is becoming overly commercialized with Chinese artists queuing up to show their works to the visiting Western curators. And in the world of cinema too, there is a growing sense that fewer truly important works have been produced in recent years.

Faith, hope and disillusionment

In the revolutionary period, China had set up many special museums and conserved places as heritage sites to teach and remind the new generations of the various episodes of China's struggle against imperialist subjugation and feudal oppression.

In a small terraced house, that Hewitt visited, in the old French concession in Shanghai was a wax work tableau of thirteen revolutionaries including Chairman Mao holding the first clandestine meeting of the Chinese Communist Party. There was picture of the last imperial dynasty, the Qing, signing away Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong and other strategic rights to the British in the nineteenth century. Britain who had started the Opium war had used its cannons to open the doors of China to opium trade. Another cartoon of the period illustrated what happened next, showing the western powers as animals dividing up China.

Around the corner from the museum, the western owner of a recently opened restaurant was showing guests around his new establishment. He seemed to have a rather different type of party on his mind. "Here you have a few cases of wine – and of course champagne. Without champagne there can be no party." The restaurateur saw no contradiction between the crystal and silver lifestyle and the socialist shrine round the corner. "What we are bringing to China will change the whole perception of the people who come to this country," he said. "They will realize how open is China today."

The Chinese Communist Party has to think of ever new justifications in their attempts to justify the previously unthinkable when China's stock markets were reopened in the early 1990s, official media reports were quick to point out that Marx and Engels had themselves been stock market investors in nineteenth century Britain.

Some welcomed the decision to admit business people to membership of the Communist Party as a sign that at last the party was accepting the reality of China's changed society. For others it simply reinforced the sense that an organization which once denounced factory bosses and landlords as the "exploiting classes", was moving further and further away from its original ideas.

Mr. Li, a former textile worker in Shanghai watching the BMWs and Audis speeding past him on the road shook his head in a mixture of disbelief and resignation.

'When we worked for the state we didn't earn much' he said, 'but there was little' difference between the rich and the poor. Now there are such big divisions in the society …. It's very unequal". Mr. Zhang, a taxi driver bemoaned the conspicuous consumption of many 'some people spend as much on one meals as we spend on eating for a year.

And the divisions in society, not just between rich and poor in the cities but also between the urban and the rural areas and between the permanent urban residents and the migrant labour force, which has so little access to social welfare, is also striking.

Even a relatively well off businessman from a family of well placed civil servants shook his head as he said, in the past "everyone was the same. We all got the same wages. Thirty-eight Yuan a month – four dollars – there was no difference". It was memories such as these which, he believed, had led some people to become nostalgic for the days of Chairman Mao, like the taxi-drivers who hung pendants with his image in their cars.

On the other hand some of those who have done well are quick to emphasize their undiluted gratitude notably to Deng Xiaoping, like the young Xiao Zhang, who had just finished his degree in management at one of China's top business schools. The classes he had taken in Deng Xiaoping theory had apparently had their effect. "If you want people to have equal wealth all the time, will only get equal poverty."

Younger people in the universities for example tend to be more positive about life. It may be that, in the absence of real participatory politics in China, and in a society where there is little day-to-day debate on fundamental political issues, it is easier for many people to feel more distant from society's problems. These days people are more concerned about problems of everyday life like education, healthcare, jobs, housing, transport, family, art, disputes and justice. There is little attention and debate on the direction of the ship itself in which all this, drama is being enacted.

Nationalism and patriotic sentiment is still deep. But being a patriot is not exactly the same thing as supporting the Communist Party. In fact there is hardly anyone who really believed a lot in the party nowadays. "Who believes in the party nowadays? The party doesn't even believe in itself now – "it's like the story of the emperor's new clothes: everyone knows, it's just that nobody dares to say it!"

With the abandonment of the communist ideology the Chinese people have lost their focus and lost their idealism. The void has been filled by a highly individualistic agenda of earning more, raising their standard of living, securing against present day adversity and future through the education of their children. However, such materialist explosion is breaking down family and community relationships and generating unbearable stress. No wonder the weaker lot is searching for alternative ideologies and philosophies turning to Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism and cults like Falun Gong. Falun Gong combined breathing exercises with traditional Chinese philosophy and religion. It promised good health and the possibility of

curing many ailments without medicines. It grew rapidly during the mid-late 1990s. The government finally took it on in the name of curbing superstition in 1999 and suppressed it but only after some effort.

The Falun Gong phenomenon and the dedication of many of its supporters seemed to be further evidence of the search of many in China for new beliefs. There has been a growing sense in recent years of a crisis of values in Chinese society as political ideology has lost its power and influence. Even a trainee priest Hewitt once met in Beijing seemed to lament the passing of the old days of ideological purity.

The revival and growth of religions, especially Christianity, supported by foreign funds, and Budhism, has been a striking counterpoint to the growing materialism of much of the Chinese society.

The Chinese Communist Party realizing that its moral ground is slipping has tried to launch campaigns to reassure the public that social inequality was being tackled. The CPC is also trying to deal with many of the selfish trends set loose by its policies by employing caliches like 'Honour to those who are hardworking and shame on the indolent'.

But in the materialist society of today it's highly doubtful that Communist Party can revive either the idealism of its early years, or the rigid, upright values of Confucianism. As one academic put it, "you need basic social justice to have a foundation for morality."

Review

Sartaj Aziz 2009, *Between Dreams and Realities: Some milestones in Pakistan's History,* Karachi: Oxford University Press. Reviewed by Seemi Waheed

The geo-strategic location of a country gives it advantage or disadvantage in its relation with the comity of nations and addressing its domestic challenges. The vision, acumen and capacity of political leadership, however, determine the maximization of advantages from geo-strategic location in attaining the national interests. Interplay of domestic political power, geo-strategic location and global power dynamics are aptly reflected in the political history of Pakistan as narrated in "Between dreams and Realities".

"Between Dreams and Realities" is both an autobiography and a dispassionate account of Pakistan's chequered history as the author puts it "watched the political drama as ring side observer." The author was actively engaged in roles, confronting formidable challenges to improve policy coordination and implementation. A sequenced political, economic, and foreign relations history of Pakistan is described illustrating turning points, milestones, and debacles in her existence as a country. The political scenario of Pakistan, marred by intermittent military takeovers, with disregard, and mutilation of the constitution, mainly served personal interests. The rulers, irrespective of whether elected or otherwise, conjoined survival of their rule with that of the country. Thereupon, usurpation of power is legitimized by engineered elections or putting in place pliable judiciary. The indiscipline in political parties, absence of vision, political inexperience, self-centered, and headstrong political leaders, increase the vulnerability of parliament to complete its tenure. Weak organization of political parties is, thus easily maneuverable to the wheeling and dealings of the 'establishment'. This is amply visible in all military takeovers of elected governments, right from coming of Ayub Khan in 1958 to dissolution of Nawaz Sharif's government in 1999.

As a by-stander, and later as a participant the author analyzes various events and milestones of the history of the country, which changed the shape of domestic politics, economy, and regional and diplomatic dynamics. Various accounts of Kargil debacle are available, but the version of the crisis as seen by himself as the then foreign minister takes the maximum space (38 pages), followed by the longest chapter on "Military Take over October, 1999" (59 pages). According to the author, there exists no institutional framework to coordinate effectively the work of foreign office and military inputs to arrive at concerted foreign policy formulation and implementation for improved regional and global relations, especially with the super powers. The foreign office does not know the military planning, while military is engaged in actions without consulting the relevant institutions. One reason for

Kargil crisis was the absence of this institutional coordinating framework. The efforts to maintain regional peace and to demonstrate responsible behaviour by a Muslim nuclear power were derailed by the Kargil operation. Megalomaniac military adventurism assumed the adversary as weak. Non-involvement and absence of consultation with political leadership proved disastrous. Conversation between Gen. Musharraf and Gen. Aziz on 26 and 29 February 1999 intercepted by RAW, does not suggest a sagacious and prudent act. It speaks volumes about how the military has not learnt from its past blunders, and in this particular situation caused derailing of the peace process and embarrassment to the whole nation. General Musharraf's claim that he briefed the Prime Minister about Kargil sector in the Cabinet meeting on 5 February 1999 is challenged by the author. As the author himself was present in the meeting, the veracity of his position remains unchallenged. The author this debacle terms as a 'black spot', in the history of Pakistan, which caused immense set back to diplomacy, regional and international relation, and infamy to the country. Moreover, it weakened the Kashmir cause.

Interestingly, there were many initiatives which were originally envisaged during the second Nawaz Sharif Government and for which General Musharraf claimed credit. One such act was restarting the peace process, stopped due to Kargil adventurism. During the Agra Summit, he assumed the image of a peace-loving diplomatic general wanting the laurels of the peace initiative with India placed on his head.

The intermittent military takeovers in the sixty-three years history of Pakistan, have left both the institutions and political parties dwarfed and incapacitated to respond to the challenges, both domestic and international. The author intrigues that "each time Pakistan is required to participate in a great global game, there is military rule in Pakistan; whether this coincidence is really accidental". The geo-strategic location of the area comprising Pakistan, even before independence, was important for the global powers. Both US and the Soviet Union wanted this area under their respective sphere of influence. The Russian interest was to gain access to warm waters of the Arabian Sea; and US to counter Russian influence and control over energy resources of Central Asia. After independence, the tug of war intensified and China joined the fray looking for the shortest route to the Middle East and Europe but in a low-key approach. Military rule in Pakistan is more amenable to USA interests. The military rulers in order to seek legitimacy look for support from the super power and in *quid pro quo* allow the super power to work for its national interest in the area. Within the country they have sought such legitimacy from indiciary and tried to make it pliant. In the process, military rule weakens the national institutions. With weakened institutions it becomes easy for external powers to penetrate and take advantage of the situation. US interests in Pakistan's domestic issues have been omnipresent, covertly and overtly until today. According to the author the US could not digest the defiance of Nawaz Sharif of carrying out nuclear tests in May 1998. Its concern over the then impending passage of Shariat Bill and micro management of domestic issues was also not coincidental; it was designed to protect its global interests.

The mishandling of institutions (judiciary and executive) by the politicians and military rulers alike, and above all the tussle between the institutions of the President and Prime Ministers, has been a constant battle ground; eroding credibility, predictability, and trust in the institutions.

The book has many policy lessons for the politicians and military rulers, provided it is read dispassionately and the mistakes are thought through to rectify and avoid future mistakes. The book is written with a purpose to "convey to the coming generations" that Pakistan, despite its many failings, "can survive only through a genuine democratic framework" fulfilling the aspirations of people through participation of federating units and adopting fair and just practices in distribution of resources and a meaningful dialogue with the stakeholders. The self-sustaining democratic institutions, based on the parameters of separation of powers of the three pillars of the state, without meddling into each other's domain and allowing it to function in unison, rather cross cutting, can take the nation forward. Finally, the author feels the cultural and ethnic diversity is an asset of the Pakistani nation and by adopting a participatory, democratic framework; this diversity can be utilized to bring vitality to economic progress and military strength.